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“Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: 
that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” 
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The intense rivalry between India and Pakistan has prevented regional peace in 
South Asia since the birth of these two states in 1947. The absence of peace between 
these two nations has put the destiny of more than one billion people at stake. Pakistan is 
a small state when compared to India, it has a weak institutional base, and it has mostly 
been ruled by the military since its inception. In comparison, India is geographically the 
largest country in South Asia and shares borders with all seven states of this region. It has 
a long tradition of democracy. Naturally, because of her sheer size, military might, 
economy and huge population [billion plus], India considers itself to be a great regional 
power if not a global power. In order to counteract China, India works hard to maintain 
its supremacy in the South Asian region. But its security relations with Pakistan impede 
India from becoming a regional superpower. This ebb and flow in their security relations 
has brought India and Pakistan to war three times in 1948, 1965 and in 1971, as well as 
leading them to a passive armed conflict in 1999. A new dimension of rivalry was added 
in 1998 when both states became overt nuclear competitors. This has brought the South 
Asian region to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. A major factor which is deteriorating 
regional peace is the dismal security relations betwe n these two states. 
 Now let us look at the sentiments of Indians and Pakistanis towards this conflict. 
A survey was jointly done by two leading national dilies of India and Pakistan [The 
Times of India and The News] at the beginning of 2010 to gauge the popular sentiments 
of Indians and Pakistanis regarding their security relations. This survey showed that 
“72% of Pakistanis desired ‘peaceful and friendly relations with India’ while ‘60 percent 




Indians were hopeful of such an eventuality” (TheNews 1.1.2010). The Times of India 
reported: “About two-thirds of those polled in India and almost three-fourths of those in 
Pakistan said they desire a peaceful relationship between the two countries. Only a tiny 
minority, 17% in India and 8% in Pakistan, are opposed to the idea of consigning 
hostility to the dustbin of history” (ThetimesofIndia 1.1.2010). The survey was part of the 
efforts launched on New Years Eve [2010] by these two leading mass media 
conglomerates of India and Pakistan, captioned under the title of “Aman ki Asha” [desire 
for peace]. People were polled in six major Indian cities and eight Pakistani cities as well 
as 36 villages. Without deliberating on the methodol gy employed or the data set used in 
it, this survey gives us a general idea of variations in the two levels of analysis adopted in 
this study. One is the level of distrust which is conventionally presented by both states’ 
political and military elites which I have discussed in the first paragraph and the other is 
the popular level which is the desire for peace in the region among the majority of people 
from both sides.  
 This inherent tension between popular perceptions and the perceptions of the 
ruling elites has created a security dilemma between India and Pakistan. This security 
dilemma is unique because it is caused by the social practices of both states’ ruling elites. 
The ideas propagated by the elites are responsible for shaping the conflict between these 
two states. The propagation of this elite-designed security dilemma is necessary for 
pursuing the elites’ vested interests. For example, in Pakistan, the army is the principal 
actor in state politics and it needs the perception of a continuous Indian threat to keep 
hold on its stakes in the state polity. Similarly, in India, the Hindu fundamentalist parties 
have based their political agenda on anti-Muslim and ti-Pakistani sentiments. 




Consequently, in the sixty three years since the founding of Pakistan, the army has ruled 
directly for thirty-three years, while the Hindu fundamentalist parties in India have been 
in power three times [1996, 1997 and from 1998-2004]. These examples show the high 
stakes of the elites of both states that make up this rivalry.  
 All scholars agree that a security dilemma exists between India and Pakistan. A 
security dilemma refers to the predicament that arises n the relations between state A and 
state B, whereby any security initiative of state A is perceived by state B as a threat that 
weakens the security of state B. Since the separation of the two states in 1947, India and 
Pakistan have had conflict with each other many times over the past sixty-three years. 
There have been few long durations of peace without either of the two countries accusing 
the other of wrongdoing. Their rivalry has traditionally been studied as a power struggle 
between two states in an anarchic world system. If India tests a new nuclear device or 
fires a missile it is perceived as an aggressive act by Pakistan and ultimately results in 
some kind of reciprocal action. According to the realist model, the security dilemma 
between India and Pakistan can easily be described as being caused by the selfish 
interests of the states. But is this a security dilemma based solely on the materialistic 
capabilities of the states? Are these two states really like units engaged in cost benefit 
calculations? Moreover, are the defensive moves by one state always considered as an act 
of aggression by the other?  
 There is something more to the relationship of both states than the usual 
explanation based only on the material capabilities of states. The security dilemma 
between India and Pakistan is also influenced by ideat onal factors, such as national and 
religious identities and the social practices of the principal actors of both states. 




Moreover, I assume that there are some aspects or atributes which are very peculiar to 
the region and cannot be grasped fully by these traditional materialistic theories. These 
factors among others include culture, states’ identti s, an intersubjective social 
environment and other domestic factors that contribute to the overall ‘social cognitive 
structure’ of the conflict between India and Pakistan (Hopf 2002). These additional 
factors are better addressed by a social constructivist approach, due to its emphasis on 
ideational discourses, rather than with materialistc theories like neorealism or 
institutional liberalism.  
 Why do these negative perceptions prevail in both c untries regarding each others 
security concerns? Why is an Indian security act perceived as a threat to Pakistan’s 
security and how does it add fuel to the security dilemma? Pakistan’s social construction 
of Indian identity can be traced back to the days when these two countries were 
undivided during the British colonial period. The Muslims and the Hindus never 
amalgamated as a nation and there was never a common self-abnegation of these two 
communities. The ‘we feeling’ required for peaceful coexistence within the subcontinent 
and the integration of the region has never been allowed to develop by these country’s 
respective elites (Fierke 2007). The perception of many Indian elites regarding Pakistan 
after independence in 1947 was that it was “the vivisection of the motherland” [the 
phrase used by Mahatma Gandhi of India] (Wolpert 2005: 103).Various Hindu leaders 
issued policy statements at the birth of Pakistan describing the division as a temporary 
phase in the history of the subcontinent. At that time, the Congress party [the founding 
party of India] passed a resolution that in the future Pakistan would come back under the 
folds of ‘mother India.’ Pakistan was born as a weak st te. It was weak not only in terms 




of capital, but also weak institutionally, as well as psychologically due to the huge influx 
of refugees and communal violence. The perception of Pakistan in this environment and 
under these circumstances towards India was that of fear and annihilation. The continued 
survival of the state of Pakistan and the fear of the Indian army posed at its borders 
became the immediate concerns after independence in 1947. These two different and 
opposing perceptions of the two states have helped in carving out their identities with 
respect to each other. Pakistan perceives India as a hegemonic power and the ultimate 
enemy, while India perceives Pakistan as a breakaway part of India and a constant threat 
to its own fragile communal balance. The daily interaction of both states has ascribed an 
intersubjective structure of non-cooperation on all issues. Every action by the two states 
is always perceived to be the result of this intersubjective anarchic structure. 
 This intersubjective part of their relationship, aart from its materialistic 
connotations, also has an equally important ideation l component based on socio-cultural 
norms, the states’ narratives and the elites’ discourses regarding both states’ identities. 
The inadequate knowledge of the socially constructed nature of the security dilemma 
between India and Pakistan is one aspect of the problem that will be examined in this 
dissertation. The other aspect is normative and deals with the resolution of this security 
dilemma by envisaging a hypothetical security community. Creating a security 
community is one of the means of obliterating a security dilemma. It simply refers to the 
stable expectations of peace, the absence of war or the absence of any ‘organized’ 
planning of war between states (Deutsch 1970; Khoo 2004). This security community 
will be theoretically conceptualized in Chapter 3. Every security community needs some 
common material interests. What could be the common aterial interests between India 




and Pakistan? They can be economic, security or political interests. At the same time the 
ideational component requires the articulation of such common interests in order to bring 
them to the attention of the decision makers for joint policy making and collective action. 
I will be exploring this ideational component as the first step in the formation of the 
security community. Such a community requires an intersubjective understanding of 
mutual cooperation among states. The irony for the formation of a security community 
between India and Pakistan is that although the people of both states have knowledge, as 
well as shared understandings of each other, this shared understanding of each other’s 
identity has been negatively articulated as states’ interests through the elites’ social 
practices. Therefore, there are several advantages o explain the existing security 
dilemma from a cultural vantage point and to look fr its normative solution in a security 
community.  
 First, there is a noticeable gap in the existing lterature dealing with South Asian 
security (Nizamani 2008). The security relationship between India and Pakistan are 
mostly explained through existing theories of power politics (Talbot 2000b; Ganguly 
2005; Paul 2005; Kapur 2006). Similar premises of materialistic theories developed in the 
Western hemisphere do not take into account the important aspect of culture in the lives 
of South Asians. The enormity of the task in the absence of any alternative framework 
demands a comprehensive analysis of these two states’ security relations. Such a study 
should not only take into account the core security disputes between India and Pakistan 
[Kashmir dispute and the nuclear issue], but should also consider those social factors 
contributing to the genesis of both states’ rival identities which led to such intractable 
security disputes in the first place.  




 Second, without summarily discarding explanations ba ed on material expositions 
or the power struggles between states the added value in this study is the exploration of 
social norms which form an important aspect of the security dilemma between India and 
Pakistan. Furthermore, my normative research objective, to explore the possibility of a 
security community between India and Pakistan, will be aided by the exploration of these 
social norms. Finally, a socio-cultural perspective will help us to devise ways of conflict 
resolution among states that are bound together in similar cultures. Insights gained from 
this case study will help us emulate security communities based on the cultural patterns 
of a particular region around the globe.  
 The importance of explaining the security quagmire between India and Pakistan 
with an alternate theoretical framework can result on he one hand in identifying peaceful 
norms that can lessen bilateral security tensions and on the other hand can eliminate the 
space given to transnational terrorists who threaten th  region. A classical example of this 
has been witnessed recently in 2008 in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks when 
India used phrases like ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘limited war’ referring to Pakistan. The 
hostile relations between India and Pakistan have provided terrorists a chance to exploit 
the dismal security relations between these two state  for their own gains. The trust 
deficit between these two states, in addition to the incongruity of material power, has an 
equally important socio-cultural aspect that is often neglected and seldom gets enough 
recognition.  
 This leads to my main research question which is as follows: Can a security 
community be socially constructed between India and Pakistan as a means to solve the 
security dilemma between these two countries? This main puzzle will be unraveled in the 




subsequent chapters of my dissertation. My thrust of arguments for explaining the 
security dilemma and exploration of an abstract security community between India and 
Pakistan are based on the following two assumptions; 
• The rivalry between the two states is elite centric and carefully grafted in the 
identity and security discourses of two states by the elites. 
• The social norms required for the formation of a security community that are 
found in the culture of both states are held hostage by the social practices of elites. 
 
 My argument is that the security dilemma in South Asia is constructed by the 
social practices of the elites in India and Pakistan and that there is enough justification to 
envisage a security community based on the intersubjective socio-cultural norms found in 
both states among the people in general. Presently, there is a hidden tension among the 
elites and the masses concerning the two states’ mutual threat perceptions. The identity 
discourses which both states have undertaken for their security are being constructed by 
elites which require a threat perception of the ‘Other’, in order to survive the ‘existential 
anxiety’ of self identity (Giddens 1991). The elites have not tried to explore the existence 
of socio-cultural norms that are required for security community formation because of 
their own vested interests. 
 This research adopts a two pronged approach. I will first explain the security 
dilemma that exists between the two countries from a social constructivist perspective. I 
will then formulate normative arguments for the creation of a hypothetical security 
community as an alternative to the current security dilemma.  




 In order to better explain the security dilemma tht exists between India and 
Pakistan, I have selected as my case studies the Kashmir issue and the nuclear problem. 
The Kashmir dispute was the main reason behind three out of four wars [1948, 1965 and 
1999] between India and Pakistan. The dispute regarding Kashmir is also one of the 
longest standing issues before the United Nations. While the nuclear issue has led to a 
regional nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, it is also the core case of 
materialistic theories and by exploring its socio-cultural component, this study aims to 
add value to the existing knowledge about the conflict. The proposed security community 
between India and Pakistan is also compared with two existing security communities, the 
Association for Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the European Union [EU]. The 
significance of this comparative analysis depends upon the comparability of the three 
regions. Are these three security communities comparable? At a first glance, it appears 
that the answer is negative, considering the optimal level of security and cooperation 
achieved in the EU, the increased skepticism concerning ASEAN’s function as a security 
community and the non-existent India-Pakistan security community. But the motive of 
this research is not to score points over the efficacy of a security community, rather its 
aim is to explore the nature and ‘path dependence’ of security communities (North 1990). 
The selection of the EU and ASEAN as existing security communities has been made 
after taking into consideration the distinctiveness of geographical regions and their 
divergent cultural fault lines. It is a move to explain that security communities are 
dependant upon regional norms and cultural distinctiveness and a varied geographical 
perspective is required for the comparability of cases.  




 Traditional International Relations theories are commonly used to define security 
relations in the Third World, yet these theories usually ignore cultural factors. My 
objective is to explore these socio-cultural factors and other variables which influence the 
context of security relations in Third World states like India and Pakistan and which are 
important stepping stones for security community formation. The case study of India and 
Pakistan security relations shows the impact of such context related variables. Similarly, 
the case study of ASEAN presented in the later part of this dissertation affirms the 
‘context bounded ness’ of security communities (Acharya 2009b).  
 In other words, exploring the possibility of a security community between two 
arch rivals first requires the explanation of their security dilemma by going beyond the 
pre-destined notions of the materialistic theories. If these theories have failed in the West 
to predict the end of the Cold War by remaining in the narrow confines of bi- polar, ego- 
centric Cold War power politics, how can they be of relevance to a region full of cultural 
dogmas, divisive politics, personality cults and religious norms such as South Asia and 
Southeast Asia? In summary, this dissertation seeks to identify the socio-cultural factors 
behind the security dilemma as well as contemplate the ‘context boundedness’ of security 
communities (Acharya 2009a). This study by adopting a social constructivist approach is 
basically a theory guided dissertation. This does not imply that I am testing the validity of 
a theory, but rather it explains the ‘problem solving’ nature of a theory (Cox 1981). This 
means my arguments are derived from the theoretical spring board of social 
constructivism. This will become apparent in the explanation of the security dilemma and 
the security community, as well as in the empirical analysis of the study subsequently.  




 In order to answer the main research question at two levels of analysis [elite and 
popular], the methodology mainly used is critical discourse analysis [CDA] (Wodak and 
Meyer 2001). To explain in simple terms, discourse is a linguistic term commonly 
defined as “texts and talk as part of social practices” (Potter and Hepburn 2008: 276). 
Critical discourse analysis examines the ‘structural rel tionship’ between power and 
language (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This means that langu ge can only gain prominence 
if it is used by those who are in power. There are two prior steps which are of utmost 
importance while adopting the methodology of CDA. One is the proper grounding of 
language in the historical context which means giving prominence to ‘extra linguistic 
factors’ like ‘cultural, society and ideology’ (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 15). The other is 
the ‘continuous feedback’ or resonance between data and the theoretical framework. 
Context is a ‘social structure’ whose ‘properties’ help us to explain the discourse (Dijk 
2001). In other words, CDA is strongly embedded in theoretical insights. It is an 
‘abductive approach’ which demands a constant’ to and fro motion between theory and 
‘empirical data’ (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 70). ‘Cultural competence’ is a strong 
prerequisite for any form of discourse analysis (Neumann 2008). The person should not 
only be able to identify the cultural metaphors used by those presenting a discourse, but 
also recognize their influence on the general public. The data sets used for this study vary 
from press clippings, to elites’ statements and to mass media programs.  
 To understand the role of elites in the security dilemma, an analysis of speeches 
of the elite will be conducted. In this regard, this d ssertation seeks to analyze the 
political rhetoric of elites who use a specific cultural phraseology while attempting to 
establish their discourse as the predominant discour e. This phraseology is carefully 




measured by taking into account the relevant historical context and is then put into the 
wider context of security. The thesis explains the social norms of animosity, historical 
narrations of rivalry and distinct religious norms employed by the ruling elites in their 
respective states’ identity and security discourses. This ‘politico-linguistic analysis’ 
explains why the state’s security practices are being strongly influenced by the nexus 
between ‘polity’ (states), ‘policy’ (states’ identity) and ‘politics’ (elites’ rhetoric) (Reisigl 
2008). This interpretive technique involves explaining the discourse by first qualitatively 
taking into account ‘the social, historical and thepolitical context’ or the wider discourse 
in which the discursive factors are being placed (Reisigl 2008).  
 To understand the exploration of socio-cultural norms of India-Pakistan security 
community at the popular level, the popular culture m thodology is used in Chapter 7. 
The methodology of popular culture in social constructivism traverses the identity course 
of a state through mass media, ‘pulp fiction’ and literary classics found in societies 
(Milliken 2001; Hopf 2002; Mautner 2008). Milliken who defends this methodology 
explains, “[by] analyzing the everyday cultural conditions of novels, comic books, 
television and film and how they render sensible and legitimate particular state action” 
(Milliken 2001: 149). The methodology studies the role of social factors and their impact 
on regulating and constituting social norms of behaviour. The popular culture approach 
studies the role of mass media to construct a lay mn’s identity. It explores social norms 
by studying ‘pulp fiction’ and popular films (Hopf 2002). Although this methodology is 
relatively new in the field of International Relations, its potential has already been 
demonstrated (Shapiro 1997; Milliken 2001; Weber 2001; Hopf 2002). The various 
genres of popular culture among others include films, television, literary classics, novels 




and fiction. By considering Indian films as cultural arenas of mass production of meaning 
in both India and Pakistan, this study not only analysis the thematic approach of films, 
including their scripts and settings, but also the censorship regimes imposed on these 
films by the ruling elites of India. I will not discuss the scope of Pakistani films for a 
number of reasons. First, I will not consider Pakistani films because of their poor view 
ship as very few people watch them. Second, an average Pakistani prefers watching 
Indian films and third, the Indian films are cheap and easily accessible through out 
Pakistan. Indian films are not only a major source of ntertainment in India and Pakistan, 
but they are also responsible for the production of meaning in the every day lives and 
routines of the people.  
 It is also important to mention that since the beginning of the 1990s anti-Pakistan 
films in India are on the rise and this critical junction also marks the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalist parties in India and reflects the brittle security relationship between the 
two states. A brief overview of the methodology adopted in the study of the popular 
culture of films is explained below: 
• Selection of Indian films based on India-Pakistan security relationship. 
• Critical discourse analysis of the content and underlying message of the films. 
• Examine the strict ‘censorship regime’ imposed by the state’s elites on these 
films. 
• Link these themes to the wider discourse of elites’ social practices and security in 
the region. 
 




 The popular culture methodology also analysis the li erary classics of India and 
Pakistan. It brings to surface the nostalgic feelings of both societies which have so far 
been denied space by the ruling elites. There is anadvantage to use the popular culture 
methodology, since it reveals the hidden tension betwe n the states’ ruling elites and 
aspirations of the majority of the people by exposing the strict ‘censorship’ regimes 
imposed by elites. This clearly demonstrates the diff rence between elite social practices 
and the people’s aspirations. It is an interpretive ph nomenological exercise of explaining 
states’ identities.  
 Chapter 7 also offers a comparative study of security communities and adopts 
discourse analysis along with ‘anthropological insights’ of regional norms as being 
highlighted in respective discourse of a security community (Klotz and Lynch 2007). It 
brings out hidden social norms influencing the course of security communities by 
focusing on the discursive factors that can be found in the political speeches of the ruling 
elites. Social norms are explored from the domestic source of security communities and 
then these variables are tabulated and compared. Th precarious security situation in both 
states impedes me from conducting open ended intervews in India and Pakistan. The 
data that has been used for CDA are the speeches of both states ruling elites found in the 
archives and national newspapers. These data source are complemented with secondary 
sources obtained from books, periodicals and existing literature. The primary data also 
analyzes history text books in India and Pakistan which are being taught at the primary 
and secondary schools as well as the thematic analysis of Indian films of 1990s. In order 
to control my own biases, ‘triangulation’ was adopted hrough the content analysis of the 
leading contemporary national newspapers from India and Pakistan. Fortunately, both 




states have national dailies available online and are e sily accessible. The data used 
comes from three leading Indian dailies which include The Times of India, The Hindu and 
India Today while the main newspapers from Pakistan are the pre minent English daily 
Dawn, The News and the Daily Times. In order to examine the policy statements of 
Indian elites I will specially focus on the national media coverage of the Indian general 
elections of 2009. This will help to understand to what extent Pakistan plays a role in the 
Indian security discourse and vice versa. The study of these national dailies provides 
additional coverage and information concerning the state of affairs in contemporary 
South Asia.  
 The methodology used brings to light the intersubjective character of the shared 
interests and social norms of the people. The leaders’ speeches reported in the press and 
archives are contextualized with secondary sources f om the existing literature. In a nut 
shell, discourse analysis explains the context of meanings and the ‘accompanying process 
of communication’ (Klotz and Lynch 2007:19). However, there are some methodological 
constraints in the study of both types of social prctices [elites vs. masses]. 
Regarding the social practices of the elites, the requirements of a rigorous 
discourse analysis demand that texts gathered from different sources should be clearly 
defined and demarcated. The primary sources used for the discourse analysis of the elite 
should be subdivided into official texts, intra-party debates and so on. But there is a 
problem in constructing the ideal settings required for such a discourse analysis. This 
problem not only has to do with the paucity of well documented materials, but also, more 
importantly, relates to the inaccessibility of these materials to researchers. There is a 
coterie of elites that are actually involved in decision making and an outsider has no 




access to this decision making processes in both India and Pakistan. Nor for that matter 
can I ascribe relative weight to any of the sources studied for the elites’ discourse since 
there is no catagorisation of such sources in the first place. That is why I have to rely a 
great deal on my secondary sources to collect the spe ches of elite from archives and 
books as well as from newspapers. However, this doen t mean that the entire trajectory 
of discourse analysis is lost due to the inaccessibility of sources. This study adopted a 
critical discourse analysis [CDA] rather than an ordinary discourse analysis. The CDA 
particularly studies the language of those who are in power (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). 
If we study the role the elites in India and Pakistan played in chartering the course of both 
states’ security relations by making a causal link of their public speeches through CDA to 
their social practices, then we can better appreciat  the importance of this critique. This is 
because CDA, as explained by Wodak, is “fundamentally concerned with analysing 
opaque as well as transparent structural relationshps of dominance, discrimination, 
power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). The paucity 
of sources is a problem, but not a major impediment for the use of CDA because the 
‘structural relationship’ of the dominance of the elites is readily apparent in both states’ 
intersubjective security relations (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This means studying the 
context of the speeches of both states’ elites becom s more important than studying a 
simple text in order to expose these structures of dominance. 
 The CDA is different from normal discourse analysis in a number of ways. First 
of all it is deliberately focused on the discourse of the powerful and how they 
manipulated the organs of the dissemination of information in order to present their 
constructed reality. One of the pioneers of this approach van Dijk explains that CDA 




“focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and 
reproduction of power abuse or domination…[it shows] ‘solidarity with the oppressed’ 
with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk” (Dijk 
2001: 96). Moreover,  “there is no typical CDA way of collected data” (Wodak and 
Meyer 2001: 23). That may make the CDA a biased approach, but that is just what it is. 
As van Dijk explains, “CDA is biased - and proud of it” (Dijk 2001: 96). Actually, CDA 
is more concerned with exposing the embeddedness or the ‘context’ in which the text is 
placed by focusing on the “concepts of power, history and ideology” (Wodak and Meyer 
2001: 3) 
 By following the above parameters of CDA, this study does not further elaborate 
on the essentiality of establishing well defined parameters for the relevant data. However, 
it does promise to explore the embeddedness of the text by locating it in the relevant 
historical time frame. The aim is clear since the CDA was used in order to explain the 
role of the powerful elites in constructing the intersubjective security dilemma between 
the two states. Right from the onset this study mayseem biased and the verdict which 
implicate the elites may be evident through out the study. But that is what the aim of this 
study is all about, to expose the ‘regimes of truth’ held by the powerful elites while 
constructing the identity and security discourses of the two states (Foucault 1994). The 
methodology adopted first explains the ‘theoretical analysis’ of the research problem and 
then in the light of a predestined theoretical approach the ‘discourse or social structures’ 
are analysed (Dijk 2001: 98). It is called ‘theoretical sampling’ which means that we first 
analyse the theoretical requirements of the research problem and then the relevant data is 
examined (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 24).  




 Regarding popular social practices, the methodology of popular culture and 
anthropological insights demands a very careful anaysis of the complexity of societal 
views in India and Pakistan. But again this study focuses on the social norms with an 
impact on people’s daily practices. For this purpose, Indian films, educational curricula 
and the rhetoric of the elite have been singled out as examples. But these are not the only 
ones that form the major portion of the ‘social cognitive order’ on which the social 
practices of the average Indian and Pakistani are constructed daily (Hopf 2002). This 
means that the study does not aim to bring to lightthe complexity of societal 
differentiation based on various aspects of public opinion. This study instead focuses on 
the explanation of socio-cultural norms that form the social practices of both the elites 
and the masses alike. The text books studied in Chapter 7 are the compulsory text books 
which have been taught to young students from grade school through University since the 
independence of both states. So there is no need to xplain the sampling in terms of time 
and other similar factors. The data demonstrates for us the unidirectional focus of the 
elites’ guided discourse concerning identity and security in both states and shows how 
speaking out against these established perspectives is not only considered a taboo, but is 
also understood as an act against religious dogma.  
 It is important here to explain a bit more about the elites which are the focus of 
this study. The elite of a country are commonly considered the nation’s leaders, i.e. the 
President or the Prime Minister, meaning their political and military elites. But there is a 
certain section which focuses on political party elites. Haas has defined the elite elites as 
“the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the making of 
public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen 




of political parties” (Haas 1958: 17). The word ‘habitual’ in the definition of elites is 
noteworthy in the case of India and Pakistan since the elites of both countries are 
‘habitually’ or ‘routinely’ involved in constructing the ominous imagery of conflict that is 
supposed to exist between the two states. In order to sustain their sense of self identity the 
elites of both states continually find themselves engaging in hostile behavioural patterns 
towards one another.  
Each chapter starts with a brief preview of the main arguments to be discussed 
and ends with its main findings. After presenting ad explaining the problem statement, 
the research questions, and the methodology in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 explains the 
theoretical framework of social constructivism and especially focuses on the question of 
why this approach should be preferred rather than coosing neo-realism or neo-
liberalism. A question may also be asked regarding the selection of neo-realism and neo-
liberalism for their comparison with social constructivism over other theories of 
International Relations. Why do I make these two theories the centre of my analysis? My 
reasons for adopting these two theories are due to the fact that the security relations 
between India and Pakistan are to a large extant shped by systemic conditions. Both 
states’ security relations have become entrenched du  to the excessive involvement of the 
super powers. Pakistan joined the USA’s camp early, fter independence in 1947, when it 
became the member of SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation] in 1954 and a 
member of CENTO [Central Treaty Organisation] in 1955. Although India helped to 
found the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] in 1955, it rec ived substantial American aid 
after its war with China in 1962. India was also the largest recipient of military aid and 
trade from the USSR. In 1969, India signed a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with 




the former USSR. In a nut shell, understanding global politics does seem to go a long 
way in helping to explain the interstate behaviour between the two states. That is why 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism have been selected which are the major exponents of 
systemic level theories. Moreover, in many prior studies of their bilateral relations, India 
and Pakistan security relations have been explained from these systemic perspectives. I 
extended this explanation right up to the societal l vel in order to examine the socio-
cultural norms which lie behind their rivalry. The domain of finding such norms falls 
with in the theoretical framework of social construc ivism. Therefore, it is important to 
first explain why the systemic level theories, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism, are 
ultimately inadequate, before I move on to argue the case for establishing a social 
constructivist framework. It is also important to explain the relevancy of these theories 
with practical examples of the issue at hand [India-Pakistan conflict] since my aim is not 
to formulate a new theoretical approach, but rather to show the efficacy of the social 
constructivist approach. 
The conceptual terms of the security dilemma and the security community are 
defined from a social constructivist perspective in Chapter 3. It reinterprets the security 
dilemma from the realist perspective of a materialistic power struggle to a social security 
dilemma grounded in the two states’ ‘daily routines’ or social practices. In order to 
understand the formation of identities of India and Pakistan, the identity discourse 
initially adopted by both states under the influences of their founding fathers’ ideologies, 
which was later on distorted by both states’ social pr ctices, will be traversed in Chapter 
4. I will look at what are the ramifications of identity discourse on contemporary security 
practices of both states. For instance, the nuclear India is closely tied to ‘Hindutva’ 




identity, but at one time India was also being influenced by its’ founding fathers’ dream 
of secular identity based on ‘ahimsa’ or non violence. After having discussed these 
theoretical questions the two empirical cases that s pe contemporary relations between 
India and Pakistan are elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, the conflict over 
Kashmir will be discussed as an identity tussle betwe n the two states. In Chapter 6, the 
nuclear issue is presented as an upshot of elites’ social practices deeply entrenched in 
cultural metaphors. The symbolism used by Indian and Pakistani elites in their speeches 
and in their party manifestos explains the importance of such metaphors. How do 
domestic social factors contribute to it by making it a corollary of each state’s respective 
identity discourse?  
 The Chapter 7 explores the possibility of a hypothetical security community 
between India and Pakistan and further juxtaposes this proposed security community with 
already established security communities. This chapter explains which social norms are 
required for establishing an abstract security community between India and Pakistan. The 
educational norms, literary classics, mass media as a venue of the ‘cultural production of 
insecurity’ as well as elites’ rhetoric will be some of the social practices highlighted in 
this Chapter (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The presence of ‘negative norms’ at the elite 
level have so far prevented the possibility of a security community between these two 
states (Khoo 2004). In contrast to it the positive norms found at popular level help to 
facilitate the formation of one such security community. The later part of this chapter 
construes a dialogue between different security communities of the world. Can we find 
distinct cultural patterns in established security communities like the European Union and 
ASEAN?  




 Finally, the concluding chapter synthesizes the main arguments and emphasizes 
the value of adopting a socio-cultural prespective in xplaining security relations between 
states, especially when conceptualizing security communities around the globe according 
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2. The India-Pakistan conflict: Social constructivism versus neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism 
 
Why do we need theories? Waltz’s has argued, ‘Theories are collections or sets of 
laws pertaining to a particular behaviour or phenomenon’ (Waltz 1979).1 In his most 
sought after work in International Relations the Theory of International Politics, Waltz 
points out that theory is distinct from reality, but at the same time it also explains some 
part of reality. It enables us to ‘simplify reality’ by providing an ‘intellectual foundation’ 
to frame policies (Ferguson and Mansbach 1997). A sound empirical analysis needs 
sound footing in its theoretical framework. I present my theoretical framework in two 
chapters. This chapter explains the theoretical efficacy of social constructivism over neo-
realism and neo-liberalism for my case study of the India-Pakistan conflict. The next 
chapter explains the key concepts of the security dilemma and the security community 
from a social constructivist perspective.  
 This chapter is divided into three interwoven sections. The first section defines 
the key assumptions of the neo-realism and the neo-lib ralism approaches and it explains 
why both fall short of explaining the India-Pakistan conflict. The general assumptions of 
the neo-realist and liberalist approaches are not dealt with in detail because both are well 
known approaches in International Relations. The second section consists of three sub-
sections. This section explains the main attributes of a social constructivist analysis, and 
                                                
1. My explanation of neorealism is focused around Kenneth Waltz’s work. See the detail of the relevance 
of the theories with reality and their explanatory powers in Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International 
Politics ( London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 2. 
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why these attributes merit their use in my case study. These attributes include identity 
formation, intersubjectivity and the relevance of ideas, culture and norms. These three 
sub-sections elucidate in considerable detail how the social constructivist approach that 
emphasizes a cultural perspective can better explain the security relations between India 
and Pakistan. The third and final section concludes th  whole argument by analyzing 
variants of social constructivism as well as their r levance for my case study. The 
inadequacy of neo-realism and neo-liberalism will further be exposed from my case 
studies [Chapters 5 and 6] which will show that the conflict between India and Pakistan is 
much more complex than realism and liberalism allow us to comprehend. It is for this 
reason that the inadequacy of both theories [neo-realism and neo-liberalism] will also be 
shown in tandem with the social constructivist persctive by using concrete examples of 
the conflict between India and Pakistan.  
 
2.1 Neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
Main stream theories in International Relations, particularly neo-realism and neo- 
liberalism, both focus on the material capabilities of tates. They agree that interstate 
relations develop in an anarchic environment which is exogenously created by an 
international system. In other words, it is an inherent trait of a competitive world system 
from which there is no escape for states. Most of the realists consider states to be 
distrustful of each other and war is always in the offing (Mearsheimer 2001). Realists 
also do not have much confidence in the ability of international institutions to convince 
states to cooperate with each other in order to overc me their existential threats 
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(Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Snyder 2002). To save neo-realism from obscurity in a fast 
changing, interdependent and globalised world, the neo-liberalism approach comes to its 
rescue by devising various means of cooperation among states. However, according to 
both these theories, states’ interests are presumed to be selfish and they are ‘not 
problematized’ (Finnemore 1996a).2 This means that the attainment of the selfish state ’ 
material interests is taken for granted, as a given fact, as part of the world competitive 
system. The prominent difference between them is that neo-realism on the one hand 
emphasizes structural systemic constraints under which states work, treating states 
themselves as unitary actors with fixed self interests. While, on the other hand, neo-
liberalism though acknowledges the anarchic environme t as a constraint on states’ 
behaviour, emphasizes the remodelling of interstate anarchy with institutional norms 
leading to cooperation among states. In a nut shell, t  neo-realist and the neo-
liberalism’s level of conceptual analysis begins with the states as unitary actors [selfish or 
cooperative], their emphasis is on material capabilities [power or economic interests] and 
their causal argumentation is directed towards the s ructural management of states in a 
world system [anarchy or institutions]. These are the basic assumptions common in all 
varieties of realist and liberalist approaches.  
 According to the neo-realist perspective, the security situation between India and 
Pakistan is usually defined as volatile due to the diff rentiation in material capabilities of 
the two states as well as the structure of the South Asian security system which is greatly 
tilted in favour of India. India because of its size and economy tends to want to dominate 
                                                
2. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 
p. 9. Finnemore has discussed the impact of international norms and institutions in transforming the 
interests and identities of the states. She has worked in an institutional constructivist vein.  
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and act as a hegemonic power in its relations with Pakistan. While Pakistan has the 
tendency to counteract every Indian move as the only plausible solution for its own 
survival. There is nothing more to offer from a neo-r alist angle apart from these 
materialistic considerations. The same holds true for the neo-realist explanation of their 
core security disputes. The two core security issue between India and Pakistan are the 
Kashmir dispute and the nuclear issue. The first issue, the Kashmir dispute, is commonly 
viewed as an ‘intractable’ territorial dispute betwen these two states since their 
independence in 1947 (Hassner 2006). It is the ‘unfinished’ agenda of the partition of the 
subcontinent (Schofield 2000). The second is the issue of nuclear proliferation in the 
region. Both these security issues are often defined i  terms of the material interests of 
both states. Realists’ often narrate the ‘disputed legacy’ (Lamb 1991; Lamb 2002) of 
Kashmir from the historical account and charges are att ibuted to the ‘institutional 
failure’ (Ganguly 1996; Ganguly 1997) of Indian democracy to accommodate Kashmiri 
aspirations (Bose 2003; Ganguly 2007). The issues of identity in the Kashmir conflict in 
‘rational’ theoretical accounts are raised only at the ‘sub-national’ level (Mitra 1995). Yet 
it is precisely the affirmation of India and Pakistan’s national identities that have 
empowered the sub-national and indigenous Kashmiri identity that has made Kashmir 
one of the longest standing territorial disputes in the United Nations since 1948. [This 
point will be argued in detail in Chapter 5 which deals with the Kashmir dispute]. 
 The ‘enduring’ India-Pakistan rivalry (Paul 2005) and the ensuing ‘unstable’ 
(Kapur 2006) nuclear peace in the region is usually studied from the traditional realist 
perspective of the ‘stability instability paradox’ (Snyder 1965). This paradox explains 
that nuclear or strategic stability in a region lessens the prospects of an all out nuclear war 
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among states. However, according to this perspective, i  may at the same time encourage 
states to pursue localized conventional conflict with the hidden assurance that the other 
state will not pursue the nuclear option since it would lead to the mutually assured 
destruction [MAD] of both states. In other words there is an intrinsic paradox of nuclear 
stability and conventional instability. In 1999, Pakistan took advantage of this situation 
during its localized armed conflict with India over the Kargil hills [Kashmir]. Although 
some may differ in their assessments arguing that Pakistan’s ‘asymmetrical’ nuclear 
posture has actually violated the conventional wisdom of nuclear stability in the region 
[i.e. more nuclear weapons leads to more stability as argued by Waltz],3 still these 
arguments challenging this wisdom remain strictly within the realist’s presumption of an 
anarchic world system (Narang Winter 2009). The nuclear issue is also being viewed 
according to the realist assessment of selfish state interests and power politics. There is 
another problem of propagation of nationalist feelings in the writings of Indian and 
Pakistani realists. Most Indian or Pakistani authors affirm the pre-defined notions of their 
states’ official identity discourses formed at the expense of ascribing negative attributes 
to each other. Moreover, any attempt to deviate from this nationalist perspective is 
rejected. This sometimes makes indigenous neo-realist work on the India-Pakistan 
conflict biased where Indian and Pakistani ‘antinomies of nationalism’ hamper any 
alternative explanation of the conflict (Varshney 199 ). [The nuclear issue and all its 
complexities will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6].  
                                                
3  Kenneth Waltz forwarded this hypothesis after examining the scope of conflicts in the post Cold War 
scenario. (“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More maybe Better”: 2005, Longman Publishing Group).  
  Theoretical debate 
 
 
   
 34 
 Neo-liberalism accepts three core assumptions of ne -realism. It adopts the state 
centric approach, the belief that the order of modern ay politics is systemic anarchy and 
the belief that the interests of states are tied to its material capabilities. It only differs 
from the neo-realist perspective in that it views in titutional norms or ‘regimes’ acting as 
constraints on states’ behaviour thereby leading them to cooperate (Keohane 1989). Neo-
liberals believe cooperative ties between states can be enhanced by the prescriptive 
guidance of norms achieved through ‘formal’ institutions (Keohane and Nye 1977: 54). 
According to Nye, the various brands of liberalism are: “(1) commercial liberalism, 
which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic liberalism, which asserts the 
pacific effects of republican government; (3) regulative liberalism, which asserts the 
importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries; (4) 
sociological liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts 
and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions f interest” (Nye 1988: 246). They all 
explain the effect of transnational institutional norms or ideational sources on states 
leading them to cooperation (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). With the neo-liberalism 
approach, unlike the neo-realist approach, we can ide tify norms as an additional variable 
affecting state’s interests. I would now examine what is meant by norms in the neo-
liberalism approach.  
 The International Relations literature generally focuses on two trajectories of 
norms, the first deals with the top-down institutional effects of norms on actors’ 
identities. The second is about the bottom-up effects of social norms generated from 
domestic culture and effecting actors’ identities. In neo-liberalism the emphasis is on the 
top-down trajectory of institutional norms. Consider the case of Pakistan joining the 
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regional security organizations of SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization] in 1954 
and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] in 1955. According to the neo-liberalism 
perspective, the sole reason behind Pakistan’s deciion to join these defence pacts was 
because of the [top-down] influence of institutional orms to join the USA sponsored 
forces [SEATO & CENTO] to serve as a bulwark against the communist threat in South-
Asia. However, it can also be argued that Pakistan’ decision to join these organisations 
was the result of [bottom-up] domestic influences. This viewpoint explain that Pakistan’s 
decision to join these organisations in its formative phase of state building was an attempt 
to get weapons in the face of the potential threat of Indian aggression (Nawaz 2008). This 
bottom-up perspective of domestic norms shows us the Indo-centric approach as the other 
viable explanation for joining these defence pacts. In order to explain the India-Pakistan 
conflict we have to examine both types of influences [top-down and bottom-up]. 
 Now the question arises, how we can distinguish whether a state’s actions are 
taken under the influence of transnational institutional norms or because of domestic 
social norms. For this intricate question we have to xplore the social practices of elites 
either coercively done by institutional norms or pesuasively done by domestic social 
norms. The second route can be explored further by xamining a state’s identity 
discourse. Every state’s identity is particular to its own history which means that it 
normally develops through domestic sources. It enables the ruling elites of a state to 
pursue a certain security discourse in line with its identity. The causal relationship 
between a states’ identity and its actors’ social pr ctices helps to explain the influence of 
domestic norms by distinguishing them from institutional or systemic norms.  
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 The neo-liberalism emphasis on regional cooperation by promoting the economic 
interdependence among South Asian states is based on the existing power structure which 
gives India a ‘pre-eminent’ or ‘managerial’ role to regulate South Asian affairs (Ayoob 
1999). At an institutional level, the formation of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation [SAARC] may be explained from the neo-liberalism perspective. It 
was established in 1985 among seven countries [now eight with the inclusion of 
Afghanistan] in South Asia. Yet even here success cannot be declared, because since its 
inception, in the past 25 years no tangible results have been shown of cooperation 
between the two major states [India and Pakistan]. The neo-liberalism logic expects 
institutional norms to affect both states’ selfish interests by binding them together with 
mutual interests in an institutional framework (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 
1989). But the problem with the neo-liberalism approach is its adherence to the influence 
of institutional norms from the top-down. For analyzing the conflict between India and 
Pakistan there are two different perspectives [top-d wn and bottom-up] that need to be 
taken into account. For example, the official 16th summit meeting of SAARC in Bhutan 
in 2010 was a mere ‘talk show’, but the unofficial 15th get together of people from eight 
countries of South Asia, under the banner ‘the people’s SAARC’ in Delhi was a success 
culminating in the demand of ‘a union of South Asian countries’ patterned after the 
European Union (Nayar 30.4.2010). This aspect of studying norms from the bottom-up is 
missing in neo-liberalism and it becomes an acute problem when both these views [elites 
guided top-down and people guided bottom-up] often clash with each other. Neo-
liberalism is fond of explaining a unidirectional flow of institutional norms towards 
member states because both [views] are more or less synchronized in the Western 
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democracies. But in the case of India-Pakistan, popular perceptions seem divergent from 
the institutional ones, so in this case neo-liberalism does not adequately explain the 
influence of norms. An editorial in one of Pakistan’s ational newspapers, Dawn, 
discusses the institutional perspective of SAARC during its 2010 summit meeting as 
follows:  
 
“Unfortunately, animosities between the two South Asian neighbours  
[India and Pakistan] have dogged SAARC ever since its inception 25 years  
ago. Although many do not admit to this major impediment to progress in  
regional cooperation, the fact is that India and Pakist n tend to dominate and  
influence multilateral developments in South Asia. This is unavoidable given  
their size. The SAARC founders were aware of this when they inserted a proviso  
in the association’s charter that contentious political issues of a bilateral nature 
 would not be taken up by the regional body. That principle may have been  
observed strictly but it has not prevented the agenda of SAARC from being  
overshadowed by bad patches in India-Pakistan relations (…). Initially each  
had feared that the other would use the rest of the members as a tool to promote  
its own interests in South Asian affairs. Mercifully that did not happen. But by  
allowing their frustration with each other to be reflected in the working of  
SAARC they have done a great disservice to the regional body” (Dawn 27.4.2010). 
 
 We might have been expecting to see the results of twenty-five years of SAARC’s 
service formulating some sort of mutual interest betwe n India and Pakistan. Yet it seems 
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to have seldom made any difference or changed interests. Instead, as recent history has 
shown, quite the opposite has occurred. After the establishment of SAARC in 1985, India 
and Pakistan both became overt nuclear powers in 1998, fought a localized conflict in 
Kargil in 1999, were in a military standoff at their borders in 2001-2002 and have been 
exchanging threats of ‘surgical strikes’ in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorists’ attacks in 
2008. Expecting the institutional norms of SAARC’s to have a positive influence on India 
and Pakistan’s relations is like putting the cart before a horse without first understanding 
members states’ identities. What is needed is to first explore this rivalry by trying to 
define India and Pakistan’s identities, rather than establishing an institutional framework 
without any normative value.  
Neo-realism developed in the West when the world was divided between a 
capitalist and a communist camp. Waltz’s neo-realist explanation of security relations 
between the USA and the former USSR might have beenright during the Cold War with 
notions of self help and anarchy. Both states were pol s apart psychologically, 
geographically and culturally and were involved in a zero sum game where the loss for 
one was the gain for the other. The prime focus of ne -realism is on peace through 
bipolar stability in a particular time frame of history. However, as a theory it has come 
under criticism. It has been labelled as ‘too static’ a theory without any predictions due to 
its failure to predict the end of the Cold War (Buzan, Jones et al. 1993; Williams 2005). It 
lacks foresight due to its inability to include other factors apart from materialistic ones. 
The geo-strategic conditions between India and Pakist n are entirely different. No doubt 
both are rival states, but they are not poles apart geographically, culturally or 
psychologically, rather both were united for centuries and were only separated in the 
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aftermath of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Their rivalry is based on much 
more complex factors than only the material dispersion of power politics. The socio-
linguistic ties between the societies of these two neighbouring states add an additional 
level of complexity to this rivalry which was virtually non existent between the USA and 
the former USSR. The people of both states grew up together for centuries on the united 
subcontinent. They have shared unique social practices of their own. Yet these common 
social practices are not recognized in rationalist theories like neo-realism and neo-
liberalism. These shared characteristics among others include popular culture, social 
norms and elites’ behaviour. This does not mean that these theories are of no value, but 
that in this case, they do not adequately explain the exact nature of this complex conflict, 
since both theories have their own set of prior assumptions or basic premises.  
 I shall offer two examples to illustrate my point; one is taken from the Pakistani 
press and the other one is taken from India. An editorial in the Daily Times states,  
“At independence, Pakistan inherited an over developed colonial  
structure, a relatively weak political class, and a fragmented society  
from the British. Rather than sparing efforts for nation building,  
the colonial state structure, designed to maintain hold over ‘subjects’  
rather than ‘citizens’, soon asserted its control over the polity and  
sidelined the political class in national decision-making”  
                         (DailyTimes 28.4.2010: emphasis original). 
 
 The editorial mentions ‘subjects’ not ‘citizens’ of Pakistan. From this perspective 
two levels of analysis are being generated, one deals with the social practices of elites, 
while the other deals with the social practices of the masses. Rationalists’ theories explain 
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the behaviour of states in the context of what leaders or political actors say at the helm of 
affairs. In India and Pakistan there are two different levels of opinions of what is in the 
states interest. One level is what the leaders think of the state and its interests. The other 
is determined by societal norms and how the masses conceive of what is in the states’ 
interest. Sometimes both views overlap, but most often they clash with one another. In 
such circumstances understanding the behaviour of a state only from its principal actors 
is like denying space to the other very important majority. I will illustrate this with the 
second example taken from India.  
 In an article in the Dawn, the former Indian External Affairs and Finance Minister 
from 1998 to 2004, Mr. Jaswant Singh said while refrring to the Indian-Pakistan 
relations that “They are possibly the [most] complex r lations between any two countries 
on earth. They are hostage to high emotions and history as no other. In India-Pakistan 
relations, the past is also the present” (Dawn 23.2.2009). On another occasion while in 
Pakistan promoting his book entitled Jinnah India-Partition Independence, Jaswant 
Singh was asked “what was the major stumbling block in India-Pakistan peace”. He 
responded with four words: “the shadow of history” (Dawn 14.4.2010). Paraphrasing the 
above statements in simple terms without ascribing to any conceptual technicality, the 
question comes to mind, is there any room in the prevalent rational approaches of 
international relations for high emotions [social norms], the ‘shadow of history’ [local 
myths and culture], or the dichotomous and often contradictory stances of the elites and 
the masses [social practices]? Are all states like units and we keep on singing 
monotonous rhythms of their predicted behaviour as enshrined in realist and liberalist 
epistemologies?  
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 To summarize, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are static theories that seem unable 
“to foreshadow let alone foresee” any change (Katzenstein 1996: 3). The formulation of 
states’ interest cannot be explained only by rationl behaviour (Katzenstein 1996: 2).4 
Embracing strong generalizations about the behavioural pattern of the superpowers and 
explaining the interstate behaviour of the rest of the world states by disregarding their 
regional cultural factors make them too narrow approaches. That is the price a 
parsimonious theoretical analysis has to pay. The problem only becomes acute when we 
travel to the ‘oriental’ side of the globe (Said 1978). It means turning away from the 
incubatory base of these theories in Western democracies, created as a result of the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), towards eastern nascent states being recently set free from 
the clutches of their foreign colonial masters. The parsimonious characters of these 
theories may explain a lot about interstate relations in the West since all these states 
developed on some how the same pattern and more importantly, are held together by 
common norms of democracy, rule of law, and public opinion as a check on elite 
behaviour and so on and so forth, but these theories cannot fully comprehend state 
characteristics of the East. Here the common state characteristics stem from the ravages 
of colonialism, affluent, but inefficient elites, poverty, culture, religious dogmas, 
totalitarianism, among other things. The understanding of the interstate behaviour of 
these countries, which is a far more complex process, r quires recognition of their 
peculiar characteristics. 
                                                
4. Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press,1996), p.2. Katzenstein’s edited book is the first comprehensive book which has
discussed the concept of national security along cultural lines. All the authors in this volume have discussed 
various case studies by defining the national interests of states on cultural lines which the neorealists often 
take for granted.  
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 The most important part missing in both neo-realist nd neo-liberalism 
approaches is the question of identity. The formation of state identity is an ongoing 
creative process and various factors contribute to his discourse. However, a project of 
deconstructing states’ identities, taking into consideration both domestic as well as 
systemic norms, has never been given a place in neo-lib ralism. Although such a project 
is not yet fully accommodated by the social constructivist approach, it still is much better 
than the neo-liberalism or neo-realist attempts. The historical narratives of the formation 
of India-Pakistan identities requires a central place in order to better understand their 
rivalry instead of throwing them under the carpet as ‘like units’ or ‘black boxes’ (Waltz 
1979).  
 Therefore, the neo-liberalism approach is not much different from neo-realism in 
its basic premises. The only difference in the words of Keohane, is for “those who accept 
the foundations of neorealism, and the overall shape of the building, can still argue about 
the exact design” (Keohane 1986: 22). But if the foundation is faulty then there is no use 
thinking about changing the design since a building stands on its foundations and not on 
its design. There are some peculiar elements of the region like culture, norms, and 
identities which are not given recognition by these theories. These elements have a large 
role to play in my case study of security relations between India and Pakistan. It is 
because in addition to the material power structure of the region there is an equally 
important ideational structure based on socio-cultural norms which needs to be examined. 
This structure is dependent upon elites’ social practices and prevalent popular social 
practices. The social constructivist approach, by taking these elements into account, is 
better suited for analyzing South Asian politics, rather than the rational approaches of 
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International Relations that seem obsessed with their explanation of power politics of the 
region. 
 
2.2. Social constructivist framework 
 Social constructivism defines states’ identities and interests “discursively 
structured by intersubjective rules, norms and institutions” (Reus-Smit 2002: 488). Adler, 
a leading constructivist explains, “Constructivism is the view that the manner in which 
the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on 
dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997a: 
322). According to the constructivist perspective, th  identity of a state is of vital 
concern; it is socially constructed and is a prerequisite to interests. Social constructivism 
has emerged as a meta-theoretical debate with its emphasis on the construction of states’ 
identities and interests through culture and norms and it has challenged the notion of 
fixed states’ interests. It hypothesizes that “structures of human association are primarily 
cultural rather than a material phenomenon” (Wendt, 1992: 32).  
 Social constructivism has its roots in sociology. It explains states’ interests from a 
social behavioural point of view. In contrast to neo-r alists’ and neo-liberalism’s 
preoccupation with the material interests of states, the ‘sociological perspective’ points 
out that agents’ interests are most commonly derived from their ‘cultural’ beliefs 
(Katzenstein 1996). The conventional constructivists usually adopt the sociological 
perspective. While partially accepting that state’s interests are based on the material 
disposition of power, social constructivists push further by asking “what other kinds of 
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power and security do states seek and for which purpose” (Katzenstein 1996). This 
sociological perspective provides the context, or the social environment, in which the 
material interests of states develop. Conventional social constructivism explains 
numerous accounts of states’ behaviour under the influence of social norms which defied 
and even contradicted the materialistic connotations of state interests, as the only viable 
option. It is not only material considerations [states capabilities, power structure, 
systemic constraints], but also equally important cul ural aspects [social norms, identities] 
which are primarily responsible for creating shared or intersubjective understandings 










Figure 2.1: The confluence of material and cultural variables on actors’ identities and 
interest. 
Figure 2.1 shows the material and cultural variables and their cumulative effects 
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there are two sets of influences shaping actors’ ident ties which then in turn formulate 
their interests. One set is regarding the influence of cultural variables like norms or 
intersubjective understandings, while the other set pertains to the material interests of 
states and systemic material constraints of the region. Material capabilities defined by 
Glaser refer to a state’s ‘military capabilities’ or the “measure of the ability of its forces 
to perform missions against an adversary” (Glaser 2010: 41). 
I do not assume that states’ interests are formulated by material and ideational 
factors in a cyclic form i.e., cultural/ideational variables leading to material interests and 
then to actors identities and again to cultural variables, rather my assumption is that state 
interests are sometimes guided solely by ideational/cultural parameters even defying 
material connotations. That is why there are independent arrows from cultural variables 
and material variables towards the actors’ identities. Sometimes a state’s behaviour 
conforms to ideational factors which are ‘not rational at all’ (Jong 2007). Sometimes only 
material factors define states’ interests, while other times there may be a confluence of 
material and ideational factors influencing actors’ identities and actions. But the 
important thing in social constructivism is that the identities of actors are formed prior to 
their interests.  
 Social constructivism in International Relations theory is an approach to study 
interstate behaviour by examining the influence of socio-cultural forces on the identity 
formation of states. It focuses on a shared intersubjective structure developed through 
states’ interactions. These ‘shared beliefs’ create agents’ identities and are a ‘precursor’ 
to their interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 392- 3). Here I would also like to 
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conjecture that domestic culture is the principal contributing factor in the formation of 
agents’ identities through an interface of societal norms and narratives. It is mainly 
domestic culture and social norms which compel state ac ors to adopt a specific line of 
action in their relations with rival states. Identity denotes a society and a ‘society is 
constituted by identity’ (McSweeney 1999: 74). Social norms and identity are both 
‘facets of culture’ (Kowert and Legro 1996). The evolution of identity formation for a 
[nation] state is a long process which is embedded in historical narratives and maintained 
through out the ages. The collective identity of states is not a ready made solution which 
can redeem all problems which may arise in interstate behaviour. It is actually a discourse 
which involves the efforts of various segments of society who collectively gather a 
‘response’ to ‘urgent demands’ (McSweeney 1999). Since there is no room to discuss the 
entire theoretical debate surrounding social constructivism, I want to concentrate on some 
core postulates of the social constructivist theory which are directly related to this case 
study. 
 
2.2.1 Identity formation 
 Identity in social constructivism has usually been d alt by two overlapping 
approaches. One is from the psychological insights based on Tajfel’s social identity 
theory (Kowert 1998) and the other is from a sociological perspective based on Mead’s 
‘symbolic interactionism’ (Wendt 1999). After taking these ideas into account, I will 
also add to them by conceptualizing India-Pakistan ide tities from their ideological 
parameters. The identity of an actor is defined as the “relatively stable, role specific 
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understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1994: 385). The expression of  
‘state identity’ is being exhibited through the social practices of ‘key decision-makers’ 
(Jackson and Sorensen 2007: 172). Constructivists argue that the interests of a state 
originate from its identity. They consider human thought, ideas and norms crucial in 
making states’ identities and the present internatio l order.  
 According to Giddens, identity is required whenever ‘existential anxiety’ 
threatens ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1991). Ontological security gives oneself a 
sense of ‘fundamental’ security and ‘trust’ by making the world us around 
comprehensible and avoiding threats to our ‘existential anxiety”(Giddens 1991: 38-39). 
Therefore, it can even be said that identity is a precursor to interests. In other words, the 
state identity is developed by elites through its cultural and social milieu and then its 
interests are configured according to this identity. The process of identity formation is 
‘enacted domestically and projected internationally’ (Katzenstein 1996). A state may 
have many identities and it can assume an accomplished identity towards any state with 
which it is in conflict through its social practices. Wendt has categorized identities into 
two types: ‘type identities and role identities’(Wendt 1992). ‘Type identities’ may be 
shared by many states like a democratic state, liberal state, and Islamic state and so on. 
While ‘role identities’ represent the relationship between specific states. With regard to 
the relationship between India and Pakistan, both state  have developed enemy ‘role 
identities’ toward each other. India’s identity as an enemy of Pakistan is acquired through 
its social practices towards Pakistan.  
 The development of a state’s identity is a social process contributed by socio-
cultural norms of society. It is within this ‘social structure’ that national identities 
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develop (Kowert 1998). Since this ‘social structure’ is based on domestic social norms, 
the whole idea of an identity is endogenous and is prone to change (Kowert 1998). 
Identity develops from ‘domestic’ sources of ‘national ideologies’ which form state’s 
interests (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). The absence of problematizing a state’s 
identity in neo-realist assertions makes it difficult to understand Indian and Pakistani 
identity vis-à-vis each other. The domestic culture exhibits traces of Indian and 
Pakistani identities at two distinct levels. One is a dominant discourse of state identity 
which transpires through elites’ social practices, while the other is the subjugated 
popular identity defined by popular social practices which is hidden under the official 
identity discourse. Oddly enough, both these identity discourses are lumped together 
representing a homogenous state identity in the ration lists’ theories. These popular 
social practices will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. At this point, what is 
important to understand is that the identity of a state changes and whenever it changes, 
it produces shifts in the intersubjective understanding of states. The conflict between 
India and Pakistan is the result of such shifts which I will explain in following 
paragraphs. 
 Identities are not in flux all the time, nor are th y ‘carved in stone’ (Wendt 1995: 
71). McSweeney, a theorist in social constructivism, reprimanded Weaver and Buzan for 
taking a culturalist stance in the construction of state identity. According to McSweeney, 
identity is always in flux due to the changing norms of states (Roe 1999). Buzan and 
Weaver reject this charge claiming that if one keeps on studying identity which is in flux 
then there will be no finished product. They argue it is important to study identity at its 
stable points using recurrent social practices of a state as a “possible referent object for 
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security” (Buzan and Waever 1997: 243). Identities and interests can change over time 
which may produce ‘subtle shifts’ in the relationship of states (Walt 1998:8). Wendt uses 
the term ‘alter casting’ (Wendt 1992) to refer to the change of identities in a given 
situation. This means that in an anarchic situation between two states A and B, if state A 
wants to change its identity towards state B, then it will send a gesture of good will to 
state B. This will be very novel to state B given the history of its relationship with state 
A. Now if state B accepts its new role and reciprocally sends a goodwill gesture to state 
A, then the identities of both states will change vis-à-vis each other. The change in Indian 
and Pakistani identities by their respective elites ha  been accomplished primarily 
through ideological and psychological routes. 
 Pakistan and Indian identities have shown that they become less accommodative 
of each other whenever elites with strong ideological commitments come to power. 
Whenever ideologically committed political parties hold power in India they try to 
change the identity discourse resulting in violent shifts in the intersubjective behaviour of 
India and Pakistan. I propose that by closely studying the social practices of elites who 
are ideologically committed with in a stipulated time frame, we can discern the change in 
intersubjective behaviour which develops between thse two states. It is important to 
understand this critical link between ideology and identity for the context of India and 
Pakistan security relations. 
Identity and ideology are correlated. Pakistan is an ideological state that was 
established on the basis of the “Two Nation Theory”. Similarly, the presence of a 
mainstream ideologically committed Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] in India made it 
imperative to study both states identities through the ideological practices of their elites. 
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According to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, ideology has cultural connotations that 
make “incomprehensible social situations meaningful for those experiencing them”. 
Geertz believes that “ideologies are born and come into conflict where societies are in the 
throes of change” (Festenstein and Kenny 2005: 11). Identity dilemmas for a state 
become acute primarily during two phases of state building. First, when a state achieves 
independence; and second, when there are sudden and violent shifts in the history of state 
building. In the history of the subcontinent both these stages converged at the time of the 
independence of India and Pakistan. There was an abrupt end to British colonial rule in 
India followed by the worst communal carnage in the region where millions of people 
lost their lives as a consequence. This created identity crises among people of both states 
who had previously lived together for centuries. The Pakistani elites used Islamic 
ideology and Indo-centric approach for its identity. Islamic ideology has greater potential 
to fill the void of anxiety by acting as a ‘thick signifier’ to an identity (Huysmans 1998). 
Ideology in this sense is the ‘wider framework’ or an important ‘structural’ constraint 
which encompasses the identities of the two states, nd without it we cannot understand 
the identities of India and Pakistan (Huysmans 1998). Among these norms, religious 
beliefs played the most dominant role in shaping the ideological beliefs of the two 
societies.  
 India has a secular identity, but since the 1990s ideological slogans of ‘Hindutva’ 
have started to be used in the Indian body politic. Religion in India and Pakistan is a way 
of life. Religious beliefs encompass all aspects and spheres of life. When religious 
slogans were first used to define distinct and separate identities of the Muslims and the 
Hindus in the subcontinent during the colonial phase, it automatically constructed two 
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communities. Religious norms have been largely employed by the elites of both states to 
construct the identities of both India and Pakistan. Some argue that religious norms tend 
to influence the social psychology of individuals more than other sources of norms (Seul 
1999). In the case of Pakistan, religion is a source of stability for its ethnically, 
linguistically and culturally disparate regions. The rationale for establishing the state of 
Pakistan was supported more by those provinces in India where Muslims were in the 
minority, than in the Muslim majority provinces whic  actually formed the territory of 
Pakistan in 1947 (Jalal 1985). The state itself wasalso sandwiched between two regions 
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan with a thousand miles of Indian territory separating 
them. Given this separation, there was a pressing need to form a common identity. Thus, 
there developed a strong nexus between state elitesand the propagation of their ideology 
by the state regulated media machinery. This means that those who provide a ‘discourse’ 
can also present it as ‘true’ (Kinvall 2002). The elites developed a strong feeling of hatred 
based on the process of ‘Othering’ against the rival state in order to overcome threats to 
existential anxiety. Nationalism and religious ideological tools helped to fill this 
existential void by providing a stable sense of identity for the people through their self 
claimed true narratives (Kinnvall 2004). But identity as a discourse does not end here as 
there are various transforming phases in social practices of the two states depending on 
the ideological commitments of the ruling elites in power which I will explain in detail in 
my empirical chapter on the ideology and identity of India and Pakistan [Chapter 4]. The 
ideological-identity route is one way of trying to ease the ‘existential anxiety’ of people 
in India and Pakistan. The other route is the psychological route. 
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 The second discourse on identity resulted in a deliberate attempt by both states’ 
elites to create hostile binaries among them in order to fortify one’s own claims of self-
identity. In psychology, the theory of social identity maintains that people belonging to a 
group always project a positive image of their group and associate negative attributes to 
another group in order to maintain feelings of ‘Us versus Them’ (Tajfel 1982). Social 
identity is defined by the ‘values’ or the norms of a group (Monroe, Hankin et al. 2000: 
421). People in an in-group see their actions on the basis of situational logic, negotiations 
and so on but behaviour of an out-group is always being considered as homogenous, 
‘intentional’ and directed against an in-group (Kowert 1998). It is called ‘attributional 
bias’ in psychology (Kowert 1998). The ‘concert’ of social constructivism and cognitive 
psychology depends on the role of the elites while explaining ‘national identity’ (Kowert 
1998). The elites play on people’s attributional bis by ‘exaggerating’ (Kowert 1998) the 
differences between ‘Us versus Them’ (Lebow 2008). Moreover, the absence of the free 
movement of people across borders between India and P kistan has created an identity 
void, which has helped the elites by giving them the opportunity to develop each other 
identities as ‘hostile binaries’ (Lebow 2008).  
 The commonality found among either the ideological or the psychological route is 
the role played by the elites in India and Pakistan. The elites’ ‘discursive practices’ have 
played a significant role in both states’ identity construction (Waever 1995). The social 
world is intersubjectively created through such ‘rhetorical practices’ (Waever 1995). Just 
a brief example can demonstrate this point. There were almost two simultaneous 
announcements in India at the beginning of the year2010; one was at the state’s elite 
level, while the other was at the societal level. At the elite level, the Indian outgoing army 
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chief General Kapoor proudly reiterated that the India  army was ready to simultaneously 
cope with twin threats from China and Pakistan. However, at the societal level, the 
people of both countries had launched ‘Aman ki Asha’ [A desire for peace] through the 
largest mass media groups in the two states [see Chapter 1]. It was at this level that the 
majority of people from both states voted for peaceful relations. Hence, having an 
identity is not the problem as it explains ‘how a self’ can sustain changes throughout ones 
lifetime (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997: 206).5 It only becomes a problem when deliberate 
attempts are undertaken to develop identities as the in-group versus the out-group. These 
social practices cannot be understood from a strictly ra ionalist [neo-realist and neo-
liberalism] standpoint because these theories are “at base about redefining identity and 
interest” (Wendt 1997). The attempt to understand state ’ identities leads to an 
intersubjective relationship among states. In my next sub-section, I will examine what is 
meant by this intersubjectivity and how it develops in India Pakistan relations. 
 
2.2.2 Intersubjectivity 
 Why there exists a hostile relationship between India and Pakistan? This is an 
intersubjective situation which means it is neither objective [final], nor subjective 
[deductive], but rather it is intersubjective or shared. The mutual understanding of each 
other’s behaviour among the states has led to a soci lly onstructed structure of 
intersubjectivity. It is a malleable structure that s been formed by each other’s 
perceptions and reinforced by the social practices of the states’ elites. In short it is based 
                                                
5  Kratochwil and Lapid have used the metaphor of a ship to signal the arrival of cultural studies in 
International Relations after the demise of Cold War. 
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on the ‘shared cognitive’ social practices of the states (Pettman 2000). According to 
Calhoum, “the ways in which people share understanding of their social world…are 
effective in shaping that world itself as well as their identities as individuals within it” 
(Calhoum, Gerteis et al. 2007: 6). The behaviour of a state is influenced by 
intersubjective knowledge rather than the material structure (Wendt 1992). All 
‘meaningful behaviour’ of a state can be explained in this ‘intersubjective social context” 
(Hopf 1998). It forms a ‘collective’ understanding which helps to ‘organize’ behaviour 
(Wendt 1992: 397). This also refers to the collective knowledge which develops in the 
relations of states. Once this intersubjective structure is formed it also has the power to 
‘empower’ and shape the actions of actors by presenting to them the ‘social reality’ 
(Adler 1997a: 328).  
 In order to change a hostile pattern in a relationship, there must be a greater role 
for the intersubjective structure. In other words the structure must not only be shaped “by 
material power [alone] but by social meaning and interaction” (Fierke 2007: 61). 
According to Wendt, “the process of creating intersubjective meanings starts with 
signalling, interpreting and ends with responding” (Wendt 1992: 405). Consider the 
influence of intersubjectivity based on animosity when an unprecedented situation is 
introduced in the relationship between two states. For example, intersubjectivity is more 
or less akin to the ‘empathy’ of others. ‘Empathy with your enemy’ was the first principle 
out of eleven drawn by McNamara, the former US Secretary of State during the Vietnam 
War, in the Oscar winning documentary ‘Fog of War’ (Morris and Glass 2003). It refers 
to the ability to put oneself in the place of one’s nemy and view them sympathetically in 
a particular situation. It can also be argued that t e Cuban missile crisis [1962] between 
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the USA and the former USSR which nearly led to a nuclear war was the result of prior 
intersubjective hostilities in the relationship betw en these two states. Similarly, the 
change in the former USSR’s policies in 1980s such as ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ took 
its time to influence the mindsets of people in the USA, but once a renewed and 
cooperative intersubjective pattern developed; it led to the fairly peaceful disintegration 
of the former USSR.  
 The social practices of the elites’ have so far constructed a hostile intersubjective 
relationship between India and Pakistan. Elites act as an agency in this process. The 
power of social practices lies in “their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings 
that constitute social structures and actors alike” (Hopf 1998: 178). We will have to know 
about, “culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices” of the actors 
of India and Pakistan in order to define this intersubjective structure (Hopf 1998: 173). It 
is being implanted through the cognitive and epistemic social forces of the state firmly in 
control of the states’ elites. Every action of Indian policy makers passes first through this 
intersubjective structure before it is interpreted by their Pakistani counterpart. 
 In the absence of wide scale people to people conta ts between India and 
Pakistan, the codes of appropriate behaviour [social norms] are being formulated 
through elites’ social practices in the identity discourses of both states. All forms of 
social behaviour ‘presuppose’ some ‘prior’ social structure (Dessler 1989: 451). For 
example, is the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan due to the constraints of 
the structure itself, or has the agency’s itself [elite’s social practices] developed this 
relationship? Which one is prior to the other? Some e phasize the ‘process’ by 
subordinating ‘structure’ to that of ‘process’ (Wendt 1992). The attributes of power 
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politics among states do not automatically emerge fom a prevalent anarchic system as 
neo-liberalism and neo-realism have claimed; rather i  is due to the ‘process’ (Wendt 
1992). Structure does not exist separately from the process, i.e., the practices of the 
actors. The identities of states and their interests are formed through practices and they 
can change the structure of the system through this process. So if the identities of two 
rival states can be changed through mutual practices, th n we may envisage a change in 
the system as a whole. Even the identities and interests of the states have been 
subordinated to the process (Wendt 1992: 407). 
 However, my arguments are more in favour of agency than the structural 
constraints. The two states’ respective elites have developed this rivalry through their 
social practices and for their own vested interests. It has become habitual for Indian and 
Pakistani elites to malign each other. This habitual pattern of hostility between actors has 
led people of both states to believe in these constructed norms and any deviation from 
this way of seeing things is not possible. Although I agree that structure and agency are 
mutually constitutive since they both reinforce each other, I maintain that any qualitative 
change in inter state behaviour can only be brought via a change in agency. If Indian and 
Pakistani elites decide to behave differently on the world stage then the present hostile 
structure will slowly wither away. Similarly, if the structural constraints of the system 
entice these two states to cooperate then the properties of agency [states] can also change. 
The structure can not only ‘shape’ identity, but it can also ‘constrain’ behaviour (Shannon 
2005). States contribute through their social practices and intersubjective understandings 
[process or agency] while making this structure. In this way, it serves as mutual 
reinforcement. So both domestic factors [social practices based on social norms] and 
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systemic constraints [regional/global power structures] have to be studied in order to 
explain interstate behaviour. However, in comparative case study research, systemic 
constraints are studied most often, while the equally important domestic structure 
including the social practices of states are usually ignored. 
 Sometimes an external or structural constraint from outside can also bring about 
change in the belief system of principal actors. The systemic or exogenous shocks are 
epiphenomenal, while domestically institutionalised norms if contested can bring an 
enduring change in the belief systems of the principal actors. ‘Exogenous shocks’ can 
force state actors to change their ‘beliefs’ (Berman 2001: 237). In Pakistan the presence 
of army in politics has a strong connection with the norms of American involvement in 
the South Asian security environment, be it the Afghanistan proxy war against the former 
USSR in 1979 or the recent war on terror in the post 9/11 era. The Afghanistan imbroglio 
helped the Pakistani army rise to power with the help of American military aid and 
shaped the identity of the Pakistani army as the sole arbiter and saviour of the nation. The 
USA over the years has actually supported all martial law regimes which emerged in 
Pakistan. There is a famous saying in Pakistan which states that Pakistan is governed by 
three “As, Allah, America and Army” (Abbas 2005). 
 Similarly, the rise of religious parties in Pakistan’s politics in the aftermath of its 
alignment with the United States’ war on terror in the post 9/11 period, shows the impact 
of an exogenous shock on a state’s identity. During the 2002 elections, religious parties 
were able to invigorate religious sentiments in their election campaigns by introducing 
anti-American slogans. They were able to win enough seats to form a provincial 
government in the NWFP province [its new name is Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa which is on 
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the border with Afghanistan]. They were also able to win 53 seats in the National 
Assembly [which has a total of 373 seats]. This amazing achievement has no parallel in 
the past electoral history of Pakistan where liberal forces have dominated electoral 
politics since its independence. This challenged th existing expectations of the majority 
of Pakistani’s who are moderate voters. Yet the success of these parties was only possible 
because of the exogenous or external shock of the Am rican war on terror and the U-turn 
which Pakistan took on its Afghan policy. Once the concern for the war on terror was 
eased, most of the religious parties faired miserably in the general elections in 2008 
where they won only one percent of the total seats. In developing countries like Pakistan 
and India with fragile social indicators of development, the elites with their social 
practices change existing norms by appealing to people on religious or communal lines. I 
will now elaborate on the ontology of norms discussed in social constructivism. 
 
2.2.3 Ideas, Culture and Norms 
 Before discussing the social constructivist’s assertions on norms, I will juxtapose 
it with the neo-liberalism perspective on norms. There is also a close nexus between neo-
liberalism and social constructivism in the form of institutional constructivism. 
Institutional constructivism explains the influence of institutional norms on states’ 
behaviour or preferences (Finnemore 1996b). Neo-liberalism also emphasizes 
institutional norms and ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). There is no need to bring 
neo-realism into the discussion again on norms, since neo-realism does not place any 
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onus on norms or on the possibility that ideational factors can help reconfigure a states’ 
interests unless it is supported by a ‘powerful’ agency (Hurrell 2002).  
 Neo-liberalism conceives of institutional norms prior to understanding the context 
in which they are embedded with an emphasis on formal and informal rules and ideas. In 
social constructivism, norms have a ‘life of their own’ which means that they go through 
a process before being adopted by a state leading to concrete changes in a state’s 
behaviour. This process involves ‘context bounded’ norms which are implanted in 
domestic discourse through ‘constitutive localization’ (Acharya 2004). Furthermore, their 
‘diffusion’ (Checkel 2007) requires the socialization of states’ elites either through 
‘persuasive argumentation’ (Checkel 1997; Checkel 1999; Checkel 2007) or through 
coercion. Neo-liberalism has its focus on the after affects of norms and not on the 
processes involved in their genesis in the first place. Neo-liberalism usually studies the 
‘stickiness’ of institutional norms and how states behave under the influence of such 
norms (Acharya 2005). It does not offer a causal exp anation of the diffusion of norms in 
the domestic arena of states or their influence on the identities of the practitioners of such 
norms. The emphasis of neo-liberalism is on the regulatory effects of institutional norms, 
rather than on their constitutive aspects. Social constructivism differs from neo-liberalism 
on precisely this point, because it takes into consideration not only the regulatory effects 
of norms, but also their constitutive effects which shape actors’ identities (Katzenstein 
1998). How do norms influence state actors’ identities?  
 Socially accepted norms, behaviour and traditions act as a sort of guide for an 
actor when making decisions (Parsons 1991). At the one end they keep an existing social 
  Theoretical debate 
 
 
   
 60 
system running by restricting choice of individual action, and at the other end they keep 
the action of an actor in line with accepted traditions. The rational choice theories focus 
on the behaviour of state from an individual point of view of cost benefit calculations. 
These cannot define the wider ‘social order’ (Jong 2007). Society is built on “socially 
accepted rules of behaviour, norms and values” (Jong 2007: 225). The social norms of a 
state are important for understanding the context of a state’s identity. It helps us in 
anticipating the ‘primacy of norms’ in a state’s interaction with another state (Palan 2000: 
578).  
 For social constructivists, norms and ideas play a significant role in shaping the 
identities of actors. Norms are defined as, “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors 
with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Some constructivists define 
norms as, “shared expectations [of] appropriate behaviour” (Zehfuss 2002: 31). Others 
believe that they are shared understandings which constitute actor’s identities and 
interests (Checkel 1997). In other words, they are collective understandings that make 
behavioural claims on actors. There are two groups of constructivists that explain the 
effects of norms on prescribing or proscribing the behaviour of states. Some emphasize 
the importance of international norms on state behaviour [Fennimore, Checkel, Wendt] 
while others [Kaufman] emphasize domestic norms as the determining factor of state 
behaviour. Yet “all of them agree that the state identities are constructed within the social 
environment of international and domestic politics” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 399). 
Norms help to establish ‘inter-subjective meanings’ among actors so that they can form a 
pattern of interaction between them (Zehfuss 2002: 18 quoting Kratochwil).  
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 Norms have been defined as ‘shared expectations’ of behaviour of a state with a 
particular identity, which is being forged upon it by state actors (McDonald 2008). Ideas 
embedded in cultural norms can explain the politica a tions of an actor. Culture 
generally explains ‘social and legal norms’ and how they form ‘ actors’ identities and 
interests’ (Reus-Smit 2005). Once ideas are defined as ‘beliefs’ they shape ‘political 
outcomes’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3). Ideas give way to norms. Norms are 
“collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” 
(Katzenstein 1996: 5). They are ‘shared’ and ‘unspoken premises’ (Katzenstein 1993: 
268). Norms are not rigid structures, insulated from change. In order to understand them 
better, we have to deconstruct the definitions of norms. First, norms are shared. This 
means that they are widely accepted as customs, traditions or accepted forms of 
behaviour by a majority of people in a state. Second, norms can exist at the intrastate 
level or at the interstate level, which means when after being constructed at the intrastate 
level, they are being projected at interstate level where they are being contested and 
afterwards intersubjectively developed through interaction of both states. Neo-liberalism 
or social constructivist institutionalist’s normally study the second way which is at the 
interstate level (Keohane 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 
2001), while it is at the intra-state level that a lot is revealed about the India-Pakistan 
conflict. But how can we separate social norms which are influencing the elites’ social 
practices? 
 In that case, we have to argue for the primacy of these social norms which help 
to define a state’s social practices. This means tho e norms that not only prescribed or 
proscribed the behaviour of the state’s elites, but also helps to influence an 
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intersubjective pattern already developed between states. But the question arises, which 
aspects of norms should be studied to explain their‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ 
effects on actors in a security relationship (Katzenst in 1996). In order to explain them 
in security relations, we have to understand them as an “interplay between [states] 
interest and ideas” and how socio-culturally defined interests of states relate to “the 
situational logic” in a particular time frame (Archer 1996: 188). 
 This means first of all delineating the material components of a state’s interest 
from its social aspects and then freezing or locking the actions of state’s actors in a given 
period in order to look for social or cultural reason  for their actions, e.g. India became an 
overt nuclear power in 1998. If we were to freeze this period of time for examination, we 
would be able to distinguish the obvious material explanation of Chinese nuclear 
programme, from the socio-cultural slogan of ‘Hindutva’ used by the Bharatiya Janata 
party which was in power at that time. The same can be done in other cases concerning 
India-Pakistan security relations. In other words, it is possible to identify the key groups 
in power in both states and gauge how they maximize their power through cultural 
determinants with in a given time frame. The rise of the Hindu fundamentalist parties and 
the Indian decision to go nuclear shows that those who ‘wields’ power through cultural 
norms can also formulate state’s interests based on them (Archer 1996).  
 The suspicion of Pakistan towards India and vice versa is based on social norms 
which have become part of the political culture or ‘national character’ (Bloom 1990). 
This “national character” propagated by the ruling elite is guided by “a particular 
ideological and cultural framework that determine decision outcomes” (Bloom 1990: 18). 
For Indians, Pakistan is considered a breakaway region so it does not accept the existence 
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of Pakistan and formulates policies to malign it at every front. Similarly, Pakistan’s 
raison d'être is its Islamic character and anti-Inda  policy. The threat of India is used as a 
unifying tool in the nation building process of Pakistan. Every act of friendship towards 
India is considered to be against the long term survival of Pakistan. It has become part of 
their social cognition. The reason behind this are the elites social practices which are 
being ‘tied’ to this “normatively determined identity” (Bloom 1990: 49). These national 
characteristics based on socio-cultural norms disseminated by the ruling elites of both 
states have resulted in the dismal security relationship between India and Pakistan.  
 
2.3 Which constructivism? 
 As explained in Figure 2.1, the social constructivis  analysis emphasizes the value 
of cultural variables concerning Indian and Pakistan’  identities and interests. These 
factors are never taken into account by the neo-realist and the neo-liberalism approaches 
of International Relations. But they serve as the corner stone of all social constructivist 
analyses. At this point, one final question can be asked which is, what brand of social 
constructivism am I going to use in my research? I do not treat the state as a given, but I 
consider instead that state formation is an ongoing process constructed by the elites 
through an intersubjective pattern of identity and interest formation. The next chapter 
[Chapter 4] will trace in detail, the ideological grounds of the formation of the states of 
India and Pakistan by their respective elites in the colonial period. Although my focus of 
attention remains on state elites in this social constructivist analysis, I have deliberately 
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avoided the categorical acceptance of conventional constructivism. Why I have done this, 
I will explain in the rest of this section.  
 There are as many brands of social constructivism [based on their typological 
criterion] as there are of any rationalist theory like realism. The ‘postmodernists’ or 
critical variant of social constructivism argue forthe importance of language following 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1922] by defining the structure of 
language as ‘rules’ and international relations as ‘intertextual’ relations (Derian and 
Shapiro 1989; Onuf 1989). A critical constructivist, Onuf argues that ‘rules’ or language 
are the primordial mode for forming an intersubjective structure of understanding 
between agents (Onuf 1989). They are mainly concerned with the affect of language 
(Fierke 2003). Some simply focus on language by way of discursive practices among 
states (Waever 1995). While the critical social constructivism based on cultural premises, 
often refutes all claims of statehood and instead describes security relations as a cultural 
product of human practices (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The effects of culture have also 
been studied independently by dismissing parsimonious claims of state centric theorists 
through affixing the primacy of culture on states’ identities (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). 
Among all these variants, the moderate one is the conventional or ‘soft’ constructivist 
variety which accepts states as their main focus of study and yet which problematizes a 
state’s identity by exploring the ‘constitutive’ and the ‘regulative’ affects of norms 
(Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Wendt, a conventional constructivist, believes systemic 
factors serve as ‘supervenience’ to domestic ones while constructing states’ identities 
(Wendt 1997). 
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 The basic difference in the understanding of identity between conventional 
constructivists (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) and critical or linguistic constructivists 
(Onuf 1989; Kowert 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999) is the role assigned to societal 
factors in the construction of identity. For critical constructivist, identity is based on the 
‘active role’ of people through social norms resulting into “the fabrication of their own 
political identities” (Kowert 1998: 103) and it is conveniently ignored by social 
constructivism ‘structuralists’ who still believe that the world system is ‘superveneous’ 
(Wendt 1994). Critical constructivists place more importance on language by saying 
“speaking is doing” (Kowert 1998). Language may be pivotal in critical/ linguistic or 
post-modernistic social constructivism, but it is fraught with the danger of ‘double-
speak’ (Nizamani 2000) which means saying one thing and doing another. In order to 
bridge that gap an interpretation of the social norms of society provides an additional 
resilient layer for argumentation. My conception of Indian and Pakistan’s identity is 
especially centred on the elites’ ‘speaking’ and social norms ‘doing’ the rest. It means 
that the ruling elites intentionally initiate endeavours for their own vested interests by 
emphasizing contentious norms hidden in history in order to establish rival social 
practices. It is also being aided by the fact that ere is minimal interaction among 
people of both states so what ever picture is painted of the other it is considered fairly 
close to reality. Social norms based on centuries old myths are more resilient and 
stronger for stereotyping Indian or Pakistani identity than merely focusing on the 
double speak of actors.  
 It does not matter for my case study whether it is critical [language], conventional 
[norms], or post-modern [cultural] social constructivism which should be adopted, rather 
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I argue for considering the relevance of soft variables like identity, culture, and norms 
that subsumes various brands of social constructivism. Without indulging in a discussion 
of the slight ontological differences among different brands of social constructivism, it 
can be claimed that all broadly agree that the behavioural pattern among states is being 
socially and intersubjectively created. 
 All these labels vary and different typologies arepplied to one extent or the other 
in various works. In order to avoid a needless debate in trying to situate this study in one 
specific camp, my frame of reference instead remains fixed on elites.  I do not claim this 
study to be an exclusive conventional constructivist ariety. In my thesis I will first 
elaborate on the domestic factors that contribute to he formation of state identities. I will 
then look at the cultural imperatives that need to be given due consideration. I will also 
draw parallels from critical constructivism by focusing on the discursive practices used 
by the Indian and Pakistani political and military elites. Lastly, allying myself with the 
anti-foundationalist camp, I refute the traditional methodology to formulate a security 
community between the two states. I intend with this by adopting the popular cultural 
approach. To summarize, the aim of this study is toshow the inadequacy of materialistic 
International Relations theories that are based solely n state social practices by 
emphasizing the relevancy of identity and culture and the processes involved in its social 
construction. Problematizing the identity of states or human practices or community 
practices is common among all brands of social constructivism and I also tread along this 
same path. While the rational IR theories, namely no-realism and neo-liberalism, never 
venture down this path. As a result, these issues and discussions are absent from all their 
scholarship. 
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3. The social constructivist security dilemma and the security 
community: the popular and elites’ social practices  
 
 The two basic themes of my dissertation are the security dilemma between India 
and Pakistan and exploring norms for its solution through the establishment of a security 
community. In this chapter, I present a social constructivist understanding of the security 
dilemma and the security community. The objective of this chapter is to create a 
theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the two case studies, the Kashmir 
problem and the nuclear issue, by delineating the security dilemma from its traditional 
realist confines. The term security dilemma is often used by the realist approach in IR and 
it is an integral part of its scholarship. A dilemma is commonly defined as a ‘quandary’. 
It refers to the situation one finds oneself, where the only choices are ‘choices of evils’ 
(Kindersley 1997). A security dilemma occurs, when two states are not sure of each 
other’s intentions, thereby, any defensive act of a state is perceived as an offensive act by 
the other state which thereby reciprocates with its own security measures, thus leading to 
insecurity for both states. The choices of a state are limited due to the lack of any other 
viable options to get out of this predicament. It can lead to anxiety among states in their 
bilateral relations with other states and in some cases can also result in war. My argument 
is that by understanding the dichotomy between elites’ social practices and popular social 
practices, we can not only better understand the dynamics of a security dilemma, but we 
can also conceive of a security community between th  two states. The elites’ social 
practices define the identity discourse of a state which is ultimately linked to its security 
practices. These routinizations are designed by elites to overcome the existential anxiety 
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of a state’s identity and to provide the state a sense of its ontological security. A 
contradiction sometimes appears between the two social practices, elucidating the 
constructed-ness of this dilemma only at the elite lev l. This will be elaborated on further 
in this chapter. The popular social practices are bsed on socio-cultural norms of society. 
Based on these popular social practices, the security dilemma can be overcome by 
envisaging a security community, a concept that has already been rejuvenated and 
revitalized by other social constructivists (Adler 1997b; Adler 1998; Waever 1998; Adler, 
Barnett et al. 2000).  
 The chapter is divided into five interlinked sections. The first section is a 
historical overview of the realist security dilemma which explores the work of prominent 
realists. At the end of this section a definition of the security dilemma is arrived at which 
bridges a realist and a social constructivist security dilemma. The second section defines 
a social constructivist security dilemma. It is divi ed into three sub-sections. The first 
sub-section starts with the ideas of Wendt and thenmoves forward by fusing them with 
the cultural norms of society. The second sub-section explains four steps to understand 
social norms of state’s identity based on this cultura  prespective. The third sub-section 
describes the role of elites and popular social practices. The third main section traverses 
the theoretical discourse of a security community and lso explains the dismal role of 
SAARC in the context of India and Pakistan security relations. My emphasis in this 
section explains how popular social practices can explicate shared social norms for 
peaceful coexistence. The fourth section of this chapter explains the importance of the 
normative structure underlying security communities for their comparative study. The 
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fifth section concludes the whole argument by emphasizing the relevance of socio-
cultural norms on the security dilemma and the security community. 
 
3.1 The realist perspective of the security dilemma  
 John Herz was the first to introduce the term security dilemma in International 
Relations in the seminal work he published in 1950’s after the commencement of the 
Cold War. In this work, he highlighted the predicament human society was facing in the 
absence of any organizing principle or authority. Herz has defined a security dilemma as 
a problem encountered by humans in a ‘social constellation’ (Herz 1950). He does not 
call it a ‘biological condition’ [inherent trait of human nature which was the standard 
version of the leading realists of that time] or ‘anthropological’, but a hard fact of human 
beings in a ‘social constellation’ (Herz 1950). At around the same time when Herz was 
writing about security dilemma, Herbert Butterfield, a British historian, coined the term 
‘irreducible dilemma’. Butterfield’s thesis was based on the Hobbesian understanding of 
the inherent selfish nature of human beings and the predicament they face when they are 
epitomized as states battling for survival. Butterfield describes this predicament facing 
human kind with the following reflection, “you cannot enter into the other man’s counter-
fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous ... since he cannot see the 
inside of your mind, he cannot have the same assurance of your intentions that you have” 
(Butterfield 1951: 21) 
 Initially there was no immediate response in the IR community to the works of 
Butterfield and Herz in the 1950s, and the concept of the security dilemma was not 
developed further at this time. This may seem strange as it was the beginning of the Cold 
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War which had already created the security dilemma between the USA and the USSR. It 
took many years until the school of neo-realism or structural realism, developed by 
Kenneth Waltz, began to work with the concept (Waltz 1979). There are other two 
prominent variants of neo-realism, defensive realism and offensive realism.  
 Robert Jervis, a defensive realist, reinvigorated the security dilemma with great 
fanfare in his article ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’. Jervis defined a security 
dilemma as the result of two states interaction in which the gain of one is the loss of 
another leading to uncertainty between the two state  (Jervis 1978). The entire dilemma 
or confusion among states is built around ‘perceptions and misperceptions’ (Jervis 1976). 
It revolves around a false belief system which the two states hold towards each other. As 
the states are not sure of each other’s motives and intentions, they often misperceive the 
actions of the other. Thus a defensive measure by one state can easily be misunderstood 
as an offensive act by the other state. Here it is important to understand the realist’s 
explanation of insecurity which consists of two elements. One is due to the world anarchy 
and the other is the uncertain relationship developed between two states due to their self 
seeking selfish interests. In an uncertain environme t where there is a lack of authority 
misperceptions can lead to creation of a security dilemma.  
 After the publication of Jervis’s article during the peak of Cold War era, interest 
in the examination of security dilemmas was rejuvenat d with a plethora of new issues 
that developed. Glaser, Kydd and a few others who consider themselves defensive 
realists, introduced and redefined the idea of the security dilemma by placing emphasis 
on the defensive powers of states to create harmony among them. Glaser differentiated 
between security seeking states or ‘status quo’ states and ‘greedy states’. In other words, 
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between states which have benign intentions and states with malign intentions towards 
other states (Glaser 1997). Glaser’s contribution to the security dilemma resulted in the 
addition of two more variables of “greedy states and u it-level knowledge of the state’s 
intentions” (Glaser 1997: 190-191). Greed is the characteristic of a state which can be 
corroborated with an identity of the state, but it is not an identity which is intersubjective, 
rather it is an objective identity of a state through which the motives of a state develop. 
‘Unit level analysis’ of other state’s motives is an interesting variable for the study of 
security dilemma and at face value it looks some what similar to socio-cultural norms of 
a state. However, Glaser does not develop the explanatory power of this variable in this 
sense, but rather he explains the general proposition  of the democratic attributes of states 
that do not indulge in war. By differentiating betwen ‘security-seeking or status-quo’ 
states and ‘greedy states’ (Glaser 1997), where the former acquires weapons for a 
defensive role, while the latter for offensive intetions (Jervis 1978), defensive realists’ 
try to devise means of getting out of this dilemma (Jervis 1978).  
 Defensive realists introduced another term, “costly ignalling”, which is intended 
to reduce the tensions of a security dilemma between two states (Kydd 2000b). It means a 
state deliberately and substantially lessens its material capabilities to harm the ‘Other’ 
state, in order to gauge the response of the ‘Other’ state. It is a materialist strategical 
approach by one state to end the psychological insecurity in the minds of actors of the 
other state. Kydd defines costly signals as “signals designed to persuade the other side 
that one is trustworthy by virtue of the fact that they are so costly that one would hesitate 
to send them if one were untrustworthy” (Kydd 2000a: 326). The underlying idea of 
costly signalling is “to dispel these [false] beliefs through strategies of reassurance” 
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(Kydd 2000a: 325). He uses a model developed by Charles Osgood called the 
quantitative Gradual Reciprocation In Tension Reduction (GRIT) analysis to examine the 
Cold War with rational choice theory (Kydd 2000a). The underlying philosophy is to 
develop trust between two arch rivals locked in a security dilemma by a gradual piece 
meal approach of confidence building measures. He concludes that “the essence of 
reassurance is sending costly signals” (Kydd 2000b: 415). Furthermore, he maintains that 
“common sets of norms, expectations, and institutions may facilitate the development and 
maintenance of trust” (Kydd 2000b: 416).  
 According to the offensive realists, there is no ed to uncertainty and the anarchic 
environment in which every state has to interplay. For the offensive realists, uncertainty 
is infinite and is the ‘determinative constraint on state behaviour’ while for the defensive 
realists, although the core assumption of uncertainty remains, it is not infinite and it is 
assumed that the factors leading to such a dilemma can be overcome by reconciliation 
(Montgomery 2006). The offensive realists’ strategy for overcoming a security dilemma 
lies in maximizing a state’s power to its utmost level. The only way for absolute security 
lies in becoming the most dominant hegemonic state in the world (Mearsheimer 2001). 
By assuming that fear among states in anarchy is a ‘constant fact of life’ (Mearsheimer 
2001), offensive realists do not put trust in any ‘i stitution’ (Mearsheimer 1994-1995) to 
help facilitate cooperation among states. Instead of a f cus on cooperation, there exists a 
quest for ‘hegemony’ by the powerful state (Snyder 2002).  
 Thus, the parsimonious characteristics of a security dilemma become apparent 
when we look at both the defensive and offensive realist accounts. Realists assert that 
security dilemmas have a rational foundation and that a material response is needed in 
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order to find any solution for them. Even the structural realism of Waltz takes states as 
similar units making no concrete differentiation among them. Moreover, no further study 
has been conducted by structural realists to try to characterize these units (Waltz 1979). 
All realists hold in contempt the social constructivists, especially Wendt, for questioning 
the long established and well defined materialistic terminology regarding a security 
dilemma, and moving the discussion towards an intersubjective ideational structure of 
two states social interactions (Glaser 1997). 
 According to the realists’ appraisal, a security dlemma starts with confusion or 
misunderstanding the motives of the other state and ends with the net loss of security for 
both states. Or in some cases, if one state is powerful enough, with the annihilation of the 
other state. The main argument of all the realist approaches explaining the contours of a 
security dilemma revolve around three basic assumptions: 
1. An anarchic environment leads to uncertainty. 
2. A lack of trust that exists among states. 
3. A misperception of each other’s motives or intentios. 
 No matter which version of realism one is alluding to, be it offensive realism or 
defensive realism, one will be able to find these thr e basic premises in all of them. Fear 
is at the heart of all realists’ understanding of security dilemmas. This means, as per the 
realist logic, because one state does not know whatthe other state’s intentions are, and 
since all states are concerned with their own security, they are always fearful of other 
states actions. Booth and Wheeler acknowledge that “fe r is primordial,...[but] the way 
fear is felt and expressed is invariably social: it has a history, a culture and a politics” 
(Booth and Wheeler 2008: 172). It is strange that we quite often refer only to the political 
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part of the fear constructing the security dilemma, while the socio-cultural aspect of fear 
is often ignored. Here the question emerges whether world anarchy really does pose such 
a constraint on the security of states invariably leading to security dilemmas, or not? 
 The problem with the realist accounts is that they all agree that anarchy between 
states is a constant and that a “constant cannot explain variations” (Mearsheimer 2001: 
43). From this constant the realists have tried to generalize and establish the probabilities 
of state behaviour. The bipolarity and strategic stability in the world during the Cold War 
[1947-1989] helped realists define its key aspects a cording to scientific propositions. All 
realists agree that we cannot know the motives of the s ates since they are unobservable. 
It is again a material solution to an ideational problem. The diagnosis of the problem 
shows that the security dilemma has something to do with the social norms which 
influence the state’s actors to be greedy or benign and its prognosis lies in studying the 
cultural or social environment of the state. Every realist who writes about security 
dilemmas knows that they are largely based on falsebeli fs. However, the response 
realists prescribe for this is only a material response by treating this set of false beliefs as 
if it were some sort of black box. First, this black box has to be opened to understand the 
construction of a security dilemma. And second, what about states where rivalry, material 
interests and power are not as clearly defined and coherent as was the case between the 
USA and the former USSR? 
 The conflict between India and Pakistan is one such example where in addition to 
material factors, the security dilemma has been greatly influenced by social factors. Even 
Herz, who coined the concept, acknowledged this fact in the last article he published on 
security dilemmas before he died in 2005. He deplord the present day scenario of power 
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politics and security confrontation among states. In an email published in a journal to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the use of the term ‘security dilemma’, he stressed 
that the causes of a security dilemma are “in a socio-political rather than an innate 
psychological condition” (Herz 2003).  
 It is important at this phase of the chapter to finally arrive at some sort of a 
definition for security dilemma which bridges the gap between the realist’s security 
dilemma and the social constructivist’s security dilemma, before embarking on its further 
deconstruction. I use the definition provided by Booth and Wheeler in their book ‘The 
Security Dilemma: Fear Cooperation and Trust in World Politics’. They have explained 
it in realist terms as “in logic ‘lemma’ is a proposition that is assumed to be valid. A 
dilemma therefore occurs when two related lemmas forced a choice … a dilemma is 
particularly [a] vexing predicament” (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 3-4). By further 
dissecting it at two levels, the ‘dilemma of interpretation’ and ‘the dilemma of response’ 
they explain that at the first level, the state or actor is in a state of confusion about the 
motives of other actors, while the other level relates to the ‘most rational way of 
responding’ after understanding motives at the first level (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4). 
 In bilateral relations a dilemma makes both states vulnerable to misperceptions. 
This means that any wrong calculation of the other state’s motives may lead state [A] to a 
tense confrontation with state [B] resulting in a ‘security paradox’ between these two 
states. Booth defines a security paradox “as a sitution in which two or more actors, 
seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an 
increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all around” (Booth and Wheeler 
2008: 9). In other words, there is a slight differenc  between a security dilemma and a 
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security paradox in the sense that a security dilemma lies at the level of deliberations or 
decision making while a security paradox lies at the action level. Both these acts, when 
taken together in interstate relations, can cause ins curity all around. The reason for 
choosing this definition over others is because it dissects the security dilemma at two 
distinct levels, the level of ‘interpretation’ and the level of ‘response’, hence, it leaves 
room for the social constructivists’ account of security dilemmas at the level of 
‘interpretation’. Yet it may be asked, how can we interpret a security dilemma from a 
rival state’s identities, norms and social practices? 
 The next section explains how these social factors c ntribute to the understanding 
of the security dilemma. 
 
3.2 The social constructivist security dilemma: a cultural prespective  
 As a concept, the security dilemma was born during the days of the Cold War 
with the ‘balance of terror’ in place in the world which might have explained a lot about 
super power rivalry. But the world has changed a lot since then, for example, what about 
states whose security dilemma revolves around theirid ntities? Here the security 
dilemma is being created by an intersubjective structure through the interplay of their 
social identities. Before embarking on my project, I want to clarify some misperceptions 
regarding the social constructivist approach in inter ational relations.  
 First, social constructivism does not imply that a security dilemma or a state’s 
foreign policies can be changed over night or that ey are in flux all the time. Social 
constructivism with its focus on processes of interaction between states tries to explain 
the structures [intersubjective or transitory] that develop between states. It is akin to the 
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“social construction of reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1967), which means that the 
reality is out there, but the social processes involved in making that reality undergo 
change, there by influencing the construction of reality itself. For example, the security 
dilemma between the former USSR and the USA was a reality, but societal norms and 
cultural determinants of both societies as social processes acted upon the mindset of 
agents involved, to construct and then resurrect the security dilemma.  
 Second, constructivism is not equal to relativism. Constructivism in International 
Relations especially the ‘conventional’ (Checkel 1998) or ‘conservative’ (Pettman 2000) 
constructivist approach accepts the epistemology of realism giving due importance to the 
constraining power of the material structure. The main difference with the traditional 
approaches lie in the attributes of the structure developed between the two states in a 
security dilemma. A realist structure is exogenous and hard to change, while a social 
constructivist one is intersubjective [shared] which means that it remains as long as the 
agents involved in making it intend it to.  
 Third, a constructivist analysis is more dependent on the agency or process side 
rather than on the structural side while explaining relations between two states. By 
presenting how states’ social practices lead to structu e [mutually constitutive], it gives us 
a ray of hope to envisage different social practices n order to alter the overall structure of 
a security dilemma between states.  
 Fourth, with the concept of intersubjectivity betwen states which can be changed 
by altering state practices, social constructivism i  better equipped for the explanation of 
security dilemmas among Third World states from the post-colonial era. This is because 
these states face common predicaments of state building, subjugated societies, identity 
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dilemmas and more importantly their societies share socio-cultural norms and associates 
themselves with social practices guided by these norms. For example, in Third World 
states, mired with ethnic and religious cleavages, the state elites face the predicament 
wherein their benign intentions of nation building may lead to unforeseen ‘outcomes’ by 
antagonizing various other communities (Roe 1999). Thus a security dilemma “become 
theoretically messy: benign intentions, malign outcmes” (Roe 1999: 199). This is the 
paradox of a state’s identity in the Third World. 
 According to the social constructivist’s approach, the two states develop their 
relationship through a mutual understanding of each other’s identities which means that 
identities of states are prior to their interests or objectives. These identities are not 
developed in a vacuum. States do not behave as inordinate like-minded units, but rather 
they are formed by the social activities of their actors. This ‘social structure’ has to be 
given a priori, in addition to its material counterpart (Wen and Wai 2003: 4). The identity 
of the state depends upon the knowledge an actor obains during its interaction with 
another actor (Wen and Wai 2003). A security dilemma according to the social 
constructivist explanation revolves around identity conceptions of a state which the other 
state maintains about it. Starting with Wendt, the constructed nature of anarchy was 
explained by him with an example of ‘alter and ego’ which start their relationship by 
‘signalling’ (Wendt 1992). Each do not consider theother as inherently aggressive and 
bent upon crushing the other, rather the communication between them is developed 
subtly, with every action and gesture being monitored by the other (Wendt 1992). The 
interpretation of these signals and watching each other’s actions leads to the development 
of an intersubjective cooperative or hostile relationship between the states rather than a 
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relationship based on systemic constraints or inherent selfish interests (Wendt 1992). 
Based on these basic premises of social constructivism, I argue that an examination of the 
domestic cultural milieu of a state can provide us with an operational understanding of a 
state’s actions. There is a specific cultural environment of a state consisting of social 
norms, national narratives, as well as its historical background which gives meaning to a 
state’s identity.  
 Social constructivists as well as anthropologists question why realism does not 
explore the belief system surrounding a states’ social elites and more importantly how 
cultural differences between two societies can shape a state’s actors perspectives (Avruch 
1998). It is important to explain the significance of culture on actors’ perspectives 
because if these cultural influences on a states’ id nt ty are not properly understood then 
it may lead to misperceptions which lie at the heart of the realist’s security dilemma.  
 Culture is a highly contested term in the social sciences. Without delving into its 
complex ontology, I simply define it as “socially inherited solutions to life’s problems” 
(Avruch 1998: 106). Culture is not static, but rather is dynamic and changes in societal 
customs and traditions evolve over time. The interpretive understanding of culture forms 
an integral part in identifying an actors’ perspective in a security dilemma. In order to 
explain conflict resolutions among states, anthropol gists derive ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ 
approaches to study the cultural behaviour of actors’ involved in a conflict (Avruch 
1998). The emic approach, explains cultural norms surrounding an actor’s behaviour, and 
reveals the cultural rationale behind the actions of an actor. In other words, it offers us the 
‘native point of view’(Avruch 1998: 60). It helps us to understand the cultural 
sensitivities of the parties involved in the conflict. In contrast to this the tic approach 
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studies only the systemic context of a conflict which is the cultural perspective of the 
whole system. The reason a state misperceives the other state is due to a ‘disjunction’ 
caused by ‘cultural interaction’ rather than the constraining power of structural anarchy 
(Inayatullah and Blaney 1997). Underlying the ‘emic’ or ‘native point of view’ are certain 
narratives of statehood which are held sacred by states and these have social or cultural 
sensibilities tagged to them. For example, ‘Hindutva’ is a cultural slogan of statehood 
devised by a mainstream Indian political party. It envisages the pre-dominance of Hindus 
in India. When such parties come to power and the elites’ social practices are derived 
from such cultural parameters, the hostile relations between the Hindu majority in India 
and Muslim majority in Pakistan will likely develop. Similarly, for both the Israelis and 
the Palestinians there are cultural sensibilities attached to Al-Quds and without 
understanding the cultural embedded-ness of these narratives it is impossible to achieve 
conflict resolution. 
 Culture helps an actor to see politics in a specific way. It helps in “constructing a 
sense who we are in relation to them” (Giles and Midleton 2008: 27). It gives a sense of 
identity to the competing actors in a conflict. Lebow explains, that “culture generates 
identity in a double sense” because “it emphasizes some motives and downgrades others 
and regulates the ways in which ones should be developed and expressed” (Lebow 2008: 
563). Material forces have their interplay at a much later phase. Although the United 
States and present day Russia still possess weapons of mass destruction, once the feeling 
of ‘us versus them’ was gone, then so was the security dilemma. 
 However, this does not mean that the cultural understanding of a conflict can 
provide us with ready-made solutions. There is no li ear or reductionist effect to culture 
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since there is a ‘fuzzy logic’ attached to it, which means that culture provides us with 
‘rubbery’ statements or sets of ‘more or less true or false’ arguments in times of 
uncertainties (Avruch 1998: 36). In other words, if we take the security of a state as a 
discourse, then the culture of security guides us through various narratives of statehood 
and the significance these narratives have for understanding a state’s identity. The 
relationship between a ‘state’ and a ‘society’, as well as the ‘values and norms’ of a 
state’s ‘political culture’ explains the identity discourse of the state (Risse-Kappen 1994). 
If we understand a state’s narratives, it will help us to comprehend its security dilemmas. 
But the question remains, how can we understand the norms underpinning the narratives 
of a state’s identity? 
 
3.2.2. Steps to understand social norms of state’s identity 
 Security dilemmas revolve around the unobservable part or intentions or motives 
of the states which cannot be calculated. This unobservable part can be identified through 
the existence of social norms which shape a state’s id ntity as a precursor to the state’s 
motives or interests. How can we empirically quantify norms which influence state 
behaviour? In this regard, Farrell emphasizes that “shared beliefs often leave physical 
residues…of strategic culture [which can] include th public statements and confidential 
papers of policy and political policy elites” (Farrell 2002: 60). For the evidence of norms 
in a state, Farrell emphasizes the “norm salience…in domestic political discourse, 
national institutions (procedure and law), and national policies” (Farrell 2002: 61). This 
leads us to a four step approach for understanding a security dilemma: 
1. Understanding the cultural sensibilities of the states in a conflict. 
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2. Quantifying the social norms of a state’s identity [narratives, history, etc.]. 
3. Comprehending elites’ social practices [national policies, identity discourse, etc.]. 
4. Understanding the dichotomy between elite and popular social practices. 
 After having explained the first two steps, I will now concentrate on the third and 
fourth points. The ‘speech acts’ (Waever 1995) of elites are being employed for 
‘securitization’ or ‘de-securitization’ as referent of security in a state’s security discourse 
(Ross 2001; Williams 2007). This means that the ruling elite in their speeches can 
highlight or downplay the importance of a security subject. This can be shown by 
conducting a critical discourse analysis of the speech s of the elites in order to 
comprehend their social practices. Thus, the constructivist approach seeks to explain how 
“something we cannot directly observe (culture) shapes something we can (behaviour) 
(Farrell 2002: 62). There is no consistency in the uncertainty of a security dilemma so it 
cannot be ‘assumed’ as ‘it is a variable’ which canbe explained by the social practices of 
the elites’ (Farrell 2002). Once the norms of a state are fully understood by another state, 
after examining their daily social practices, then this confusion is replaced by certainty. 
The examination of the social practices and norms of state can also help in reading the 
minds of the policy makers who are behind a state’s s curity policy. I will now look at 
the last step of dichotomy between the ‘speech acts’ of elites and popular social practices 
which contribute to a security dilemma. 
 
3.2.3 Elites’ ‘routinization’ versus popular social practices  
 Critical constructivists or ‘social theory constructivists’ (Pettman 2000) have 
pointed out the parameters of the ‘language’ of a state’s elites or actors as ‘rules’ (Onuf 
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1989) in ‘interstate interactions’ (Kowert 1998; Fierke 2003). This requires an 
interpretive understanding of the security discourse rather than the positivist methodology 
of realism (Avruch 1998). For example, India’s specific national jargon regarding 
Kashmir is that ‘Kashmir is India’s “attootang” [a part of the body which cannot be 
separated]. Similarly, the specific phrase Pakistan uses to refer to Kashmir is “Kashmir is 
Pakistan’s sharag [the jugular vein of Pakistan]. These examples show the primacy of 
language among these state’s security discourses. Th  history books of both states are 
filled with such particular phrases adopted by both states’ elites. The ruling elites in India 
and Pakistan have employed these metaphors in their respective security discourses. The 
elites are not only influenced by the environment in which they work, but they also help 
to construct this environment. There is no denying the fact that power politics are part 
and parcel of any policy orientation of a state’s actors, but they are strongly affected by 
their state’s interactions with other states on a daily basis. 
 A state’s identity is sometimes linked to its quest for ontological security [self 
security] which results in the deliberate construction of a security dilemma (Mitzen 
2006). The state’s actors themselves want ‘routinization’ in their social practices with 
other states (Mitzen 2006). In order for the self to feel secure, ‘routines’ or social 
practices are needed to help comprehend the uncertainties of the world around us (Mitzen 
2006: 354). ‘Routines’ are ‘everyday rituals’ which hold the society together in this era of 
uncertainty and anxiety (Goffman 1959). In order to educe the uncertainty surrounding 
the other state’s motives, states develop among themselves a deliberate pattern of social 
interaction that does not depend on whether it is conducive to their security. Some state 
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elites prefer to cling to the ‘conditions of uncertainty’ for the sake of their state’s identity 
(Mitzen 2006). 
 The states themselves want certainty in their relationship with other states. At 
times, this may mean maintaining a conflictual relationship with other states in order to 
overcome scepticism of each other’s identities. It is the social practices of the elites 
which determine this certainty in the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. More 
importantly, both states’ identities emphasize differences with the other, instead of being 
based on shared commonalities. As a consequence, an Indi  identity cannot be 
constructed without a negative Pakistani identity and vice versa. But all these identity 
discourses are the creations of the elite and they destroy the possibility of any other 
alternate discourse on identity development. 
 Both the states’ elites create “routines which regularize social life, making it, and 
the self, knowable” (Mitzen 2006: 346). The ruling elites desire for ontological security 
helps us understand the common patterns of behaviour among decision makers over a 
long period of time, despite signals of assurance and cooperation from the other state 
(Mitzen 2006). India and Pakistan’s security dilemma is the classical example of such 
type of state behaviour, in which despite repeated gestures of confidence building 
measures both the states have failed to cease their host lities and end their security 
dilemma. It is because their ontological security is based on these routines which have 
constructed their identities and they cannot disengage from these social practices for fear 
of losing their identities. These routines or state’s social practices have been intentionally 
embedded in the socio-cultural norms of society. If there are cultural myths woven 
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around a state’s enemy, then the identity discourses of a state will reify its ontological 
security.  
 In such cases, a state’s ruling elite may use the fear and uncertainty of a security 
dilemma in order to construct patterns of animosity. Such situations are more nuanced 
especially with post-colonial states who share a bitter past or who came into being as the 
result of partition. For them clinging to their cultural mores of labeling the other as the 
enemy is an important part of defining the self through the state’s daily practices or 
routines at the expense of castigating the other state. The daily social practices of states 
can help either to reduce or cause uncertainty surrounding the security dilemma. The 
elites quest for ontological security and sociological approaches to understand their 
behaviour, helps to explain state identities and can reduce uncertainty surrounding 
security dilemmas between states.  
 In a socially constructed environment, the two states through their daily practices 
create an intersubjective understanding of each other. This intersubjective structure is 
sustained by the social norms of society. In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, the 
social norms of society are not sustaining this hostile intersubjective structure. The 
understanding of these divergent social practices between the ruling elite and the rest of 
society is of added value to this social constructivist security dilemma. The discourse 
analysis of the speeches of elites will show that tis security dilemma is deliberately 
created by the elites in each state’s security discourse. At the same time an analysis of the 
popular culture of both states will show the presence of common social norms required 
for a security community which remain underdeveloped due to both states’ ruling elites 
vested interests. So far the social constructivist understanding of a security dilemma has 
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focused on a state’s social practices and does not make a distinction between popular 
social practices and elites’ social practices. This might not be problematic in security 
dilemmas involving Western states where the majority f the public are generally 
supportive of the ruling elites’ social practices, but in the case of India and Pakistan there 
is an evident disparity between the social practices of the masses and the elites.  
 I will now briefly explain some of these popular social practices in order to bring 
to light the dichotomy between the elites and the masses. Since my security community is 
based on these popular social practices, I will cover these in detail in the last section.  
 Popular social practices refer to societal norms and traditions which help to 
formulate the behaviour of the majority of people in a state. If we examine societies of 
India and Pakistan, we find that popular social practices share some common norms that 
will facilitate the formation of a security community, while the practices of the ruling 
elite encourages the formation of a security dilemma between India and Pakistan. 
According to the constructivist approach, actions ad interests are shaped by ‘social 
norms’ instead of by ‘material’ considerations (Barkin 2003: 326). Socio-cultural norms 
produce ‘power relationships’ which is a ‘structure of feeling’ to see the existing world in 
a ‘particular way’ (Giles and Middleton 2008: 25).  
 The popular culture of both states shares some unique popular social practices 
which include among others, the Pakistani masses eagerly watching Indian films, the 
presence of nostalgic feelings toward ‘the Other’ dpicted in the acclaimed literary 
classics of both states, the similarity of linguistic norms and the educational curriculum 
formulated under state patronage which inculcates th  seeds of hatred toward each other. 
This will be elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 7 which deals with the hypothetical 
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India-Pakistan security community. There appears to be two distinct “social cognitive 
structures”, one is operating at the elite level perpetuating the security dilemma through 
routines and the other at the mass level generating peaceful social practices (Hopf 2002). 
Unfortunately, stringent restrictions imposed by both states on people to people contact 
give an edge to the elites’ ‘social cognitive strucure’ to operate freely, denying space to 
the other more popular one. 
 This hidden tension between popular social practices and elite social practices 
opens the black box of society. This helps to explain what is happening inside states. It 
sheds light on the darkness surrounding the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. 
The more we understand the social factors by bringing back the “society in” for our 
discussion of states involved in a conflict, the better we are able to understand the 
security dilemma as shown above (Hopf 2002). But why is there a wide gap in the 
opinions of the ruling elites and the popular masses in India and Pakistan? Some of the 
most glaring features of both states’ societies resulting in a wide gulf between the elites 
and the masses are among other things, the existence of mass poverty, a landed 
aristocracy, the caste system in India and the inheritance of British imperial bureaucracy. 
The dominant values and norms being propagated by the state’s elites do not match those 
held by the wider population with respect to the bilateral relationship between India and 
Pakistan. How these popular social practices lead us to identify social norms of an 
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3.3.1 Security community: a theoretical perspective 
 In this section, I show how understanding the social environment of a security 
dilemma helps us in our exploration of social norms that are required for the construction 
of a security community between states. What is the ess nce of a security community and 
how can it be conceived in the realm of security relations between India and Pakistan? 
The advocates of a security community argue that the absence of war among participant 
countries is its most significant feature. According to Khoo, security communities “are 
characterized by the absence of war, and the absence of significant organized 
preparations for war, such as military contingency planning” (Khoo 2004: 38). The 
formation of a security community is meant for cooperation. Some security communities 
are institutionalized in the shape of multilateral or bilateral organizations (e.g. European 
Union, EU and NATO). However, other times a sociological underpinning is first 
required to change the identities of the states as a precursor for the development of the 
common interests of a community. A security community is a step towards peace.  
 Nearly forty years ago, Karl Deutsch made the connection between peace and a 
security community in International Relations (Deutsch, 1970). He discovered this 
observation while differentiating between political ommunities and security 
communities. In the former there is the possibility of war, but with the latter there are 
“stable expectations of peace among participating units or groups, whether or not there 
has been a merger of their political institutions” (Deutsch, 1970: 33). Furthermore, there 
are two forms of security communities. The first is an amalgamated security community 
in which states renounce their formal sovereignty to a higher authority and join together 
against a common threat. Such an example is the Unit d States of America. The other one 
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is a pluralistic security community in which states r tain their formal sovereignty, but 
formally agree on the renunciation of war and the peaceful resolution of their disputes 
(Deutsch 1970). Such an example would be the EU or any other multilateral and formal 
organization which provide participating states a forum to resolve all their disputes 
through discussions.  
 In addition to the security community there are a f w other concepts that are 
associated with the mutual association of states, such as regional society, regional 
systems, or nascent security communities. All of these are common terms used in 
security studies. What these terms have in common is the existence of shared 
understandings including common values or norms in order to weave their fabric of 
cooperation. The concept was further refined in a social constructivist framework, but 
mainly in pluralistic security communities leaving aside amalgamated security 
communities (Adler 1997b; Adler, Barnett et al. 2000). These pluralistic security 
communities require a sense of “we-ness” (Fierke 2007) among the members of the 
community in order to maintain “dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler, 
Barnett et al. 2000: 7).  
 The question now arises why should we want to formulate a constructivist 
security community and why not a neo-realist or neo-liberalist one? First, all major 
conceptions of security communities have been developed by constructivist scholars. 
Apart from Karl Deutch who first defined a security community back in 1950’s, all major 
work since has been done by social constructivists. Whether it is a case study of security 
communities around the globe (Adler, Barnett et al. 2000), or conceiving of the role of 
‘cognitive regions’ as a precursor to a security community (Adler 1997b), most of the 
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scholars have written in a social constructivist vein. Discussing the ‘ASEAN way’ while 
elaborating on ASEAN’s norms as ‘mushawarat’, the constructivist approach is better 
suited with its emphasis on norms and the influence of the social environment in 
constructing a state’s identity (Acharya 2001)  
 The formation of a security community requires states’ change their identities, 
and if the state interests and identities are bracketed as exogenous, then how can we 
conceive of any change in a state’s behaviour? Identity is the pivot around which 
revolves the idea of cooperation or a security community. It is the identity of the state 
which needs to be accommodative of the other state’ id ntity to bring about any change 
in the intersubjective understanding developed betwe n them. Now looking through the 
prism of neo-realism and realism, the basic premises of these approaches holds that there 
is absolute anarchy in the world and states have to wa ch out for their own self interests. 
As the ‘offensive realist approach’ suggests, each state has a pre-established identity and 
self-interests which demands that its interests should be maximized (Mearsheimer 2001). 
Given such circumstances, it is first of all only a ‘false promise’ that any organization 
will be able to hold countries together on the path of cooperation that are pursuing their 
own self interests (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). Second, the systemic condition of anarchy 
in the world seems to have sealed the fate of all state  by treating them all the same as if 
they are merely ‘similar units’ (Waltz 1979). This “neo-neo” synthesis comprising neo-
liberalism along with neo-realism have the same basic priori conditions while converging 
at a rationalist epistemology (Waever 2008). Neo-liberalism also does not emphasize any 
change in the identities and interests of states apart from their minor modifications under 
the affect of ‘regimes’ or international organizations (Jervis 1982). The neo-liberalists 
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can conceive of cooperation between states, but to envisage any change in the identities 
of state is beyond their scope. The problem with bot  neo-realism and neo-liberalism is 
that they are both rationalist theories of IR and cannot formulate the underlying matrix of 
a sociological security community.  
 The formulation of a security community requires the identification of the social 
forces involved in constructing the “we – feeling” between two or more countries or an 
intersubjective understanding of a collective identity (Fierke 2007). To understand the 
constellation of social forces involved in the formulation of a security community one 
needs to explore the cultural traditions, customs and narratives of societies and not treat 
states as like units whose capabilities are constrai ed under the influence of an anarchic 
system. The social constructivist ‘turn’ starts with the basic premises of change in the 
identities of the states (Checkel 1998). It is not vel ‘ideas in foreign policy’ (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993) which matter, but rather what changes these ideas can bring in the 
‘culture of national security’ (Katzenstein 1996) by transforming states identities. The 
hallmark of social constructivism is the intersubjectively conceived collective identity of 
states. The identities and interests are socially constructed by the states, rather than pre-
determined by the system.  
 It is also interesting to engage in some of the debates concerning a regional 
association between India and Pakistan. Although there is nothing explicit on the 
formation of a security community between these two states, it has been argued that a 
‘regional security complex’ could be established based on the existing power structure 
in South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986; Buzan and Waever 2003). The ‘regional security 
complex’ can be achieved with the desecuritisation of the speech acts of the elites in 
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which their interstate security concerns are downplayed in lieu of emphasising their 
mutual benefits (Buzan and Waever 2003). The main problem with all these approaches 
is that they are primarily based on the existing power structure and do not give any 
room for forces to develop from the bottom up [regional social norms] which can 
influence and change the elites’ identities and interests.   
 While looking for regional security arrangements, Ayoob, who is the protégé of 
Hadley Bull, coined the terms regional society or regional system that correspond with 
the term international society. In order to understand these terms one has to “visualize a 
continuum stretching from a regional system at one e d to a regional community at the 
other … regional security would fall closer to a regional system, whereas a regional 
society would be located nearer to the regional community end” (Ayoob 1999: 248). 
 The figure 3.1 shows a single line being dissected a  intervals and the closeness of 
one section with the other explains the adherence of the two compartments. A regional 
system shows the existing power structure of a region and it lies close to the next 
dissecting line of regional security which emphasize  that the most dominant state has the 
final say in the politics of the region. Similarly, a regional society lies close to a regional 




Regional System     Regional security         Regional society         Regional Community 
Figure 3.1: A continuum showing regional security arrangements 
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 A ‘regional society’ is intended to provide peaceful conditions because of states  
‘conscious recognition’ of matters of ‘common interests’ (Ayoob 1999: 248). Now the 
question arises, how to devise “conscious recognition”? For conceptualizing a stable 
regional order in South Asia, Ayoob assigned a “pre-eminent role” to India as the core or 
the nucleus of such a regional society. This role has to be accepted by all states in the 
region (Ayoob 1999). Yet this Indian role is unacceptable for Pakistan. Role assignment 
and recognition is a consensual process which must be collectively assigned and 
unanimously recognized. The existence of any hostile pr or intersubjective 
understandings between major states of a region can inhibit or prevent the formation of 
regional orders. Again, Ayoob’s conception of a regional society is based on material 
structural arrangement where the regional ‘norms and values’ have the backing of ‘pre-
eminent’ regional power, rather than based on any co sensual role of the participating 
states.  
 The problem with the understanding of these concepts [regional society, regional 
community and regional complexes] in the context of India and Pakistan is that they are 
all tied to the existing power arrangements of the region. My conception of an India-
Pakistan security community is a more ideational one. It is based on the exploration of 
shared norms to build such an order, community or society, if not for the entire region 
then at least between these two countries. The need is to define the term community. 
Community in this sense does not mean integration, but rather it is a mechanism devised 
by norms and shared understandings to solve all dispute  through formal organizations, 
such as SAARC or through informal means. I would like to review the role of SAARC as 
a security community. So far the attempts made to promote regional cooperation have 
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been largely unsuccessful. The organization has been unable to create a South Asian 
identity which is required for the establishment of a future security community. This is 
primarily because of two reasons. The first reason i  because there are inherent flaws in 
its charter. The second reason is the rivalry betwen India and Pakistan that has made the 
entire organization ineffectual. When we look at the first reason, it is evident that 
SAARC has had little effect. The SAARC charter not only prevents its member states 
from discussing bilateral contentious issues at the forum of SAARC, but it also being 
promoted primarily as an economic organization leaving aside the contentious security 
issues. Its founding fathers have drawn parallels with the founding of the European 
Union, but this is not a good comparison since the EU has the backing of the USA which 
strongly supports NATO that serves as a security umbrella protecting the EU’s economic 
progress. In the case of SAARC, the attempt to side tep security issues has made this 
organization an abject failure. By focusing solely on economic interdependence, with 
utter disregard to the security problems among its member states has led to SAARC’s 
failure. The second interrelated cause is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, the two 
neighbouring nuclear countries of the region.  
 SAARC’s efforts to establish joint economic action have so far not been 
successful because the economies of the participating s ates are more competitive than 
complementary. Almost every SAARC member country is producing similar products 
with agrarian based economies. Moreover, intra-SAARC trade is minimal when 
compared to bilateral trade with the EU and other advanced countries, despite the 
announcement of SAFTA [South Asian Free Trade Area] which came into effect in 
January 2006. The solution again lies in providing a  adequate security shield through 
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the re-chartering of SAARC by incorporating a security clause in it, whereby all states 
would be able to settle their security disputes at this forum. Acharya argues that “the 
key aim of a security community is to develop the common interests of actors in peace 
and stability, rather than to deter or balance a comm n threat” (Acharya 2001: 19). I am 
not conceiving of a security community which requires integration between India and 
Pakistan as a prerequisite. Pakistan simply cannot aff rd to lose its identity by 
amalgamating into the folds of India and go against its ontological base of the ‘Two 
Nation Theory’. I am envisaging the possibility of a pluralistic security community, as a 
first step in an attempt to end this perennial security dilemma between these two 
countries in the South Asian region. “The goal is to explore processes of construction 
and change, the processes by which identities and interests are produced” (Fierke 
2007). This approach to the security community betwe n India and Pakistan as a social 
construction will help us to analyze the ‘processes’ of change. There is a role for agents 
or state’s actors in all forms of security communities (Adler, Barnett et al. 2000).  
 My conceptualization of an India-Pakistan security community hinges on the 
domestic norms of society. This is due to the fact tha up until this point there has been no 
effective institutional backing to envisage the establishment of a security community 
between India and Pakistan. However, this does not mean that I aim at domestic variables 
from a neo-classic realist theory. Although neo-classic theory focuses on the state’s 
domestic factors, it is based on rationalist assumptions. This means that the aim of the 
neo-classic theory is to augment a state’s given idt ty and interests from the domestic 
core. First, there is no room for ‘intersubjectivity’ between two states’ behaviour 
according to the neo-classic theory, rather it explains the behaviour of a state by focusing 
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on the domestic conditions with the same prior attribu es of fixed state identity and 
selfish interests. Second, the major attributes of culture and social norms have no room in 
neo-classic realism. We need to understand the identities and interests of Pakistan and 
India constructed from the socio-cultural norms of the society. In neo-classic realism the 
‘logic of consequence’ is applied, which means thate state’s action has to be explained 
by a rational calculus model and so there is less likelihood of the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ explaining a state’s behaviour according to norms, roles and identities 
(Krasner 2009). Although both these logics are not ‘mutually incompatible’ (Krasner 
2009), in the explanation of security relations between India and Pakistan, the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ is seldom invoked to explain the two states behaviour. In other words, 
there are few explanations offered for both states behaviour based on the influence of 
social norms and identities. 
 I am not claiming here that a state’s actions can always be seen as the result of its 
normative values since all states definitely resort to ational calculations under a 
constraining systemic structure. What I want to point ut here is that if we look at the 
case of India and Pakistan their behaviour may better be understood if we take into 
account the causal explanation of the constraining power of norms. Furthermore, I am not 
so much interested in the study of a ‘regional security complex’, but rather the search for 
a collective identity formulated on the basis of the acceptance of norms of behaviour by 
states (Buzan and Waever 2003).  
 Similarly, the concept of security community is alo different from ‘security 
regimes’ which have a time constraint regulation and have a limited scope of state 
cooperation without any qualitative change in the fundamental identities of the states 
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involved (Jervis 1982). For example, a security regime between two countries based on 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Although, both a security community and a security 
regime are devised to mitigate the classical security dilemma between states and develop 
a level of trust between them, the security regime do s not offer concrete, effective and 
long term mutually assured prospects of peace among the states. This is because the 
states in a security regime remain egoistic, self-interested and power maximizing actors 
who are only constrained by the anarchic structure of the system. While they may alter 
some of their interests in order to cooperate in a security regime, it is impossible for them 
to change their basic characteristics. However, in a security community, the emphasis is 
on changing the overall environment of anarchy by encouraging the states to alter their 
identities and interests. The characteristics of the state change from self-interested into 
‘other-regarding’ (Collins 2007).  
 I will pinpoint the negative norms propagated by the ruling elites of the two states 
which hamper the progress of the formation of such a security community. The 
educational curriculum devised under state patronage and subsequent pedagogical 
approaches has constructed animosity between the people of both states. The elites’ 
rhetoric during electoral campaigning also plays a major role in contributing to the dismal 
security relations. Similarly the censor ship regime i posed on Indian films by the elites 
will explain some of these negative norms constructed at the elite level on one hand. 
While, on the other hand, I will also identify positive social norms at the popular level 
between the two countries which include linguistic imilarity, presence of nostalgic 
feelings of each other in literary classics and some mass media initiatives. The common 
people of both countries speak the same language called Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in 
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India. The writing style is different, but it can be easily understood by the people of both 
countries. The relatively independent and influential mass media in both countries acts as 
an intervening variable for the propagation of these norms. The Indian film industry is the 
largest in the world and virtually all Indian films are viewed in Pakistan with the utmost 
interest because of their common language. I assume that change not only comes from 
outside, but it also comes from within. In other words, the intersubjective understandings 
constructed by popular opinion can also influence the elites of both states. 
 The foundation of a security community between India and Pakistan depends on 
the popular social practices between both states. By connecting the popular social 
practices of these two states, there is a better lik lihood for the possibility of the 
foundation of a security community. Popular culture generates a regional identity when 
contemplating a security community between India and Pakistan. Populism, simply 
asserted is ‘appealing to people’ and, if given space it can help bridge the gap between 
the elites of India and Pakistan (Canovan 1999). This may lead to the solution of the 
security dilemma between India and Pakistan that is  construction of the interests of the 
elites. 
 
3.4 Comparative study of security communities 
 As a litmus test, I will also compare the abstract India-Pakistan security 
community with established security communities like the European Union and ASEAN 
in Chapter 7. In that chapter, I will assume that tere lies an underlying normative 
structure based on the historical cultural settings of a region which effectively guides us
towards the dynamics, inclusion and exclusion processes of a security community. These 
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norms are unwritten or un-codified cultural conventio s that form a major part of the 
collective identity of states in the security community. The normative structure is based 
on cultural myths, identity politics and the shared interests of states in a security 
community. Therefore, the constitutive and regulative norms of a security community are 
directly dependant on regional socio-cultural norms which in turn form states’ social 
practices. The normative structure of a region not only helps us to understand why 
security communities can be formed through states’ interaction, but it also helps to define 
the ‘shared interests’ of states involved in a security community. Moreover, this explains 
the reasons behind the exclusion of other states from its ambit. In a subtle way, the 
argument begins from the social constructivist explanation of the identity of security 
communities and then explores their normative substr cture and finally explains the 
salience of their norms. I will briefly define the k y variables of identity, culture and the 
shared interests of states working in a security community. 
 The culture of a security community refers to the core traditions, epochs and 
interlinked historical narratives that identify a region. For example, in Europe, the two 
World Wars, the Enlightenment, the crusades, the rise of Christianity, and the struggle for 
democracy against despotism are all important historical narratives. These narratives help 
us to identify the normative structure of Europe. Similarly, for Southeast Asian societies, 
the colonial struggle, informality, family values and mutual consultations form their 
cultural bedrock. In the India-Pakistan region, religious fervour, popular culture and the 
post-colonial national identity struggles are the key features of South Asian societies. A 
cultural constructivist, Michael Williams in his work ‘Culture and Security’ argues that 
the security practices are centred on agents ‘dispos tions’ towards themselves and to the 
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outside world (Williams 2007: 25). The more we understand the ‘disposition’ or cultural 
orientations of security communities, the more we will be able to appreciate the causal 
relation of its working norms.  
 Within the confines of a security community, identity refers to the collective 
identity of a community. It is not every state’s individual identity, but rather it refers to 
the ‘we-feeling’ aspects of a security community. Who are ‘we’ in a community versus 
‘them’, the other? All security communities are contingent upon their group identities. 
Differences in how its works, membership status and role specification are causally 
linked to the collective identity of the regional security community. Intersubjectivity 
refers to the mutually agreed parameters of a state’  int rest which is determined by all 
the states through persuasion and discussion without any appearance of coercion. The 
shared interests of the security community refer to the intersubjectively defined norms of 
the behaviour of states while working in the community. These shared interests are 
reached through ‘other regarding behaviour’ of states in a community and are not solely 
dependant upon materialistic connections which onlyforms a part of it. In other words, 




 We can understand the security dilemma of third world states if we make a 
distinction between elites and popular social practices by using socio-cultural variables. 
This helps to shed light on state’s motives which remain concealed in the realist 
understanding of security dilemmas. If a security dlemma is a security predicament faced 
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by states that are in a ‘social constellation’ (Herz 1950), then what is social 
constructivism all about? Is it not the way to explain how relations among states are 
constructed by their social practices and intersubjective understandings? There are two 
diametrically opposed ontological positions to the study of security dilemmas. One is the 
positivist structuralist approach in which every dilemma is centred on the anarchic 
structure of world politics. The other is the post-modern or post-structuralist approach in 
which agents and structures are mutually constitutive and no one can work independent 
of the other. Folker points out for its synthesis, “reconciling the two approaches so that 
both stasis [realism] and change [constructivism] in global social order are explained 
simultaneously seems desirable” (Sterling-Folker 2002: 74). The constructivist approach 
being a post-modern one revolves around the centrality of human agency and the role that 
ideas play in mitigating or exacerbating conflict through the reinterpretation of two 
states’ mutual understandings. 
 The security dilemma in social constructivism is the culmination of two states’ 
social practices. In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, the dilemma is the result of the 
confluence of the elites’ social practices in line with their respective states’ identities. The 
understanding of popular social practices gives us a clue of the extent of the constructed-
ness of this dilemma only at the elite level. If wegive the socio-political norms of a state 
an explanatory role, then we can better understand the concept and reduce the confusion 
surrounding it. The basic difference in the understanding of security dilemmas between 
realism and constructivism is the treatment given to the identity of states. In realism, all 
states are ‘rational actors’, whereas in constructivism the state is a social actor (Snidal 
1985). The treatment of a security dilemma as a social construct between states takes into 
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account many rich variables in its explanation, while the realist model is largely shrouded 
in mystery. 
 How should security dilemmas between countries that s re cultural affinity and 
geographic proximity and are still entangled in the conflict, be understood? This is due to 
the fact that their identities have been constructed by their respective elites through their 
social interactions which are in stark contrast to popular social practices. The 
routinization of states’ elites makes this dilemma an essential discourse followed by both 
states in order to overcome existential threats to heir states’ identities. The theoretical 
edifice of a security dilemma is based on the conceptions of two state’s identities, 
understanding of socio-cultural norms and more importantly the generalization of  the 
‘routines’ of two states’ behaviour. The discourse analysis of the speeches of both India 
and Pakistan’s elites will show how cultural norms, local myths and national narratives 
are used as the backdrop in the state’s daily ‘routines’ for their respective ontological 
security and this has led to the creation of a security dilemma between them. 
 




4. The identities of India and Pakistan in the formative phase of state-
building: ideology as a key identity signifier 
 
 This chapter traces the identity discourses of India and Pakistan historically, with 
an examination of the social practices of their respective elites. It argues that both India 
and Pakistan are in search of their identities. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 has 
served as the ‘chosen trauma’ for both states from which they have failed to emerge 
(Volkan 1988). This has given further incentive to both Indian and Pakistani elites to 
configure their respective state’s identity based on each other’s chosen traumas under the 
influence of their professed ideologies. Whenever th se elites arrive at the helm of 
affairs, they have changed state’s social practices by adhering to their supposed ideology. 
Ideology in this respect has played the role of an ide tity signifier. This chapter traverses 
the path of identity formation in both states at the time of independence because it is at 
this point that their respective founding fathers presented their own vision of Indian or 
Pakistani identity. After explaining this initial phase, the argument then describes the 
state’s identity discourse through the subsequent social practices of Indian and Pakistani 
elites. The social practices of the current ruling elites show a serious discrepancy when 
contrasted with the state’s identities as espoused by their founding fathers and enshrined 
in their respective constitutions. The main argument culminates with an interesting 
anomaly which explains that India’s apparent secular identity has been shattered by the 
social practices of it’s ruling elites which is not in conformity with this original secularist 
vision. In other words, even though Indian identity carries a secular label in its 
constitution, the contemporary Indian identity is being shaped by elites social practices 




based on “Hindutva” identity [those ideologically committed to Hindu identity]. 
Similarly, the social practices of the Pakistani elites show how Islamic nomenclature as 
well as the threat towards India is being used instrumentally for the sake of national 
unity. If both states revert back to their identities which were originally envisioned by 
their respective founding fathers, then it would help to decrease tensions in their 
intersubjectively constructed security dilemma. 
 This chapter consists of five sections. The first section of this chapter deals with 
the importance of chosen traumas in the identity discourses of India and Pakistan. It 
explains the relevancy of the partition of the subcontinent as the biggest chosen trauma 
inscribed on the psyche of both states which has influe ced their formation of identity. 
The later part of this section also explores other c osen traumas in the turbulent history of 
both states. The second section describes Pakistan’s identity discourse by focusing on the 
speeches of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It also explains the constitutional 
arrangement of Pakistan’s identity and explores the tension between the elites’ social 
practices and the popular perceptions regarding Pakistan’s identity. The third section 
examines the Indian identity discourse by explaining the vision of its founding fathers, 
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It explains the constitutional provisions to 
safeguard Indian secular identity and the contrasting popular and elites’ social practices. 
The fourth section sums up the identity discourses of India and Pakistan which show the 
influence of ideology on the social practices of both states’ elites. The fifth section 
synthesizes the main argument that the search for identity in both states is going on 
unabated due to the repeated re-visiting of their chosen traumas by their respective elites. 
The sources used for my critical discourse analysis are the speeches of the founding 




fathers of India and Pakistan, as well as the analysis of the constitutions of the two states. 
The secondary sources also include history books and articles written in the daily 
newspapers. 
 
4.1 The role of chosen traumas  
 How can we define Indian and Pakistani identities? Smith defines national identity 
as “the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the pattern of values, symbols, 
memories, myths, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of a nation” (Smith 
2000: 796). This chapter explores a state’s identity in he speeches of its founding fathers, 
constitutions, social practices of its elites and ideologies. The reason to adopt this multi-
pronged approach is because the identity of India and Pakistan cannot be explained at 
face-value, solely from the rhetoric of the elite or fr m a state’s constitution, but rather its 
traces can be found among all of the above. The speches of Mohammad Ali Jinnah of 
Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru of India in the initial phases of state building are of 
utmost importance. The reason for singling out these two founding fathers is because on 
the one hand, Nehru was responsible for shaping India’s i entity discourse after the early 
demise of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. Moreover, Nehru was also India’s longest serving 
Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964. On the other hand, Jinnah served as Pakistan’s ‘sole 
spokesman’ in its struggle for freedom (Jalal 1985). He was the only leader for Muslims 
of the subcontinent who not only created a ‘nation-state’, but also changed the ‘course of 
history’ (Wolpert 2007). Furthermore, ‘the great-man-of-history approach’ has singled 
out the role of ‘Nehru-Gandhi and Jinnah in the fredom struggle’ (Talbot 2000a). It is 
imperative to understand the founders’ views on their respective states’ identities. But the 
actual argument of exploring state’s identity does not end here, as, afterwards there arises 




an inherent tension between the elites’ social practices and the popular perceptions of 
states’ identities. I will explore the identities of India and Pakistan by using discourse 
analysis of the speeches of their founders, constitutional clauses and the historical 
discourse which highlight the tension between popular and elite centric identities. 
However, before examining these sources, it is first necessary to discuss one peculiarity 
of Indian and Pakistani identity. What is particular about Indian and Pakistani identity is 
the repeated re-visiting of their shared chosen traumas by the ruling elites of both 
countries in their speeches in order to shape contemporary Indian and Pakistani identity. 
 In this case, chosen traumas refer to past experiences of Indians and Pakistanis based 
on a sense of deprivation which has played an important ole in the formation of their 
identities. These feelings of trauma have been usedby the elites of India and Pakistan at 
critical historical junctures in the interplay of their identities. For example, the upheaval 
and traumatic partition of the subcontinent is a common chosen trauma of both states and 
many national narratives are associated with this single event. How do these narratives 
help in conflating the dismal security between these two states? According to Patterson, 
“narratives refers to the ways in which we can construct disparate facts in our own worlds 
and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality” (Patterson and 
Monroe 1998: 315). Ross explains that “narratives ar  accounts groups develop to 
address both the substantive and emotional levels of a c nflict” (Ross 2001: 165). Culture 
helps to explain the narratives of the parties involved in a conflict in such a way that their 
identity is constructed when they recall past experiences again and again (Ross 2001). If 
such experiences are traumatic then these experiencs may become the ‘chosen traumas’ 
of a state (Volkan 1988). These chosen traumas “symbolize feelings of helplessness and 




victimization” (Ross 2001: 166). Volkan explains that after the collapse of colonial rule 
in the Indian subcontinent “many large groups became involved in an exaggerated 
process of defining or redefining their identity” (Volkan 1999: 999). Although Volkan’s 
approach is psychoanalytical, it provides important insights into the construction of a 
state’s identity since he links it further with a st te’s behaviour. Volkan finds that ‘group 
identity’ requires a ‘persistent sense of sameness’ (Volkan 1999: 32). This includes the 
continuous reification of a state’s identity by alluding to its historically ‘chosen traumas’ 
in order to create ‘sameness’ or the presumed homogeneity required for a state’s identity.  
 One of the major reasons behind the rise of religious parties in India with their 
ideological slogans of a revitalized Hindu identity is “cultural defence”. For Haynes the 
act of cultural defence refers to “when culture, identity, and a sense of worth are 
challenged by a source promoting either an alien religion or rampant secularism and that 
source is negatively valued” (Haynes 1997: 713). In other words, when these groups 
come to power and their norms and values influence the identity discourse of a state, we 
see a subtle shift in intersubjective relations betwe n states. Kinvall has used the term 
“chosen traumas” in studying the factors responsible for the rejuvenation of Hindu 
identity (Kinvall 2002). She argues that past traums or past glories of a community are 
being used by the interest groups of that community i  order to create an image of “us” 
versus the “other”. Chosen traumas work as an intermediary between a collective identity 
and the perception of the other. Chosen traumas are deeply embedded in the culture of a 
particular community. The partition of the subcontinent on religious grounds and the 
carnage associated with it is a mutual chosen trauma for both Indians and Pakistanis. 
Kinvall argues that “the rise of Hindu nationalism hows the force with which cultural 




bases have been used to build a categorical notion f Hindustan that derives power from 
its ability to integrate nationalism with a constructed version of the Hindu religion” 
(Kinvall 2002: 101). The obvious chosen trauma used for this purpose is the creation of 
Pakistan (Kinvall 2002). Kinvall’s core argument is hat in India the forces of modernity 
have challenged the previous notions of secular identity by inculcating the fear of 
ontological insecurity; this loss of security has created a void which was identified and 
filled by the religious parties through ‘Hindutva’ (Kinvall 2002). In order to provide 
ontological security, the identity of the nation was reconstructed by emphasizing the 
chosen traumas, creating an essentialist ‘Other’ and ‘demonizing’ Pakistan as an enemy 
to its ‘existential security’ (Das 2005). 
 Interestingly, many literary classics of both states explain a sense of 
disillusionment of this elite constructed chosen trauma by explaining the plight of the 
common man on both sides of the border after the partition. The exploratory analysis of 
these literary classics will be done in Chapter 7 which portrays the essentials of a 
hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. It should be mentioned here that the 
chosen trauma of partition is perceived differently by the elites and the masses of both 
states. For the elites, it is a necessary stepping stone to construct their identities as hostile 
binaries, while for the masses it uprooted them from their cherished home or community. 
After independence, the elites of both states intentionally constructed their state identities 
on contrasting narratives based on their shared chosen traumas. For example, for the 
Muslims of the subcontinent the rule of the Mughal kings may be viewed as the past 
glory of their forefathers, but for the Hindus of India it is considered as the invasion of 
their motherland which is seen as a trauma for the Hindu nation. The security relations 




between India and Pakistan throughout their history have been shaped by such chosen 
traumas that are being deliberately emphasized by the elites of the two states.  
 These elite social practices that are based on contrasting historical narratives did 
not end at the time of independence, but they continue unabated to this day. For example, 
in 1992 there was the demolition of the historic Babri Mosque in Ayodhya [India]. The 
frenzied fundamentalist Hindu mob was led by the elit s of the Hindu fundamentalist 
party to raze this historic mosque (Veer 1994). [This episode is covered in detail in 
Chapter 6 which explains the role of the Hindu fundamentalist elites in the Indian nuclear 
discourse]. Not unsurprisingly for Muslims, the demolition of the Babri Mosque became 
their contemporary chosen trauma. Such chosen traumas serve the interests of the 
political elites of both the countries. Without the lp of chosen traumas based on cultural 
history, the narratives of state identity which castigate the other state cannot be created by 
the elites forcefully.  
 These types of chosen traumas demonstrate the underlyi g struggle or the 
dialectic between elites’ social practices and popular social practices. There appeared 
certain confusion on the part of elites as well as the masses. The Hindu dominated Indian 
elites’ social practices defy the essence of a secularist identity, while the Muslim 
dominated Pakistani identity is based on ideological social practices of elites who may 
have a secular outlook but they cling to their Muslim heritage and Indo-centric chosen 
traumas for the sake of Pakistan’s identity. The hidden tension between the elites and the 
popular perceptions of the state’s identity can be shown more clearly by charting the 
discourse of India-Pakistan identities at the time of independence. I will first explain the 
case of Pakistan’s identity.  




4.2 Pakistan’s ideological discourse of identity: Secularism versus Islamic 
  The ideological grounds on which Pakistan got its independence were based on 
the ‘Two Nation Theory’, which demanded a separate homeland to be created for the 
Muslims of the subcontinent. What is this ‘Two Nation Theory’ and what role does it 
play in forming the identity of an independent Pakistan? The crux of the ‘Two Nation 
Theory’ states, that the Hindus and the Muslims are two separate and distinct nations who 
despite living together for centuries on the subcontine t have failed to amalgamate into 
one nation (Khan 1973). This is because of the distinct social, cultural and religious 
norms of the Muslims and the Hindus. It was thought tha  Muslim and Hindu identities 
were too distinct to be ‘properly reconciled’ (Ganguly 2007). After the fall of the British 
Empire in the subcontinent, Muslims feared as a minority, if the rule of Western 
democracy was adopted then they still would be dominated by the Hindu majority. After 
finding no respectable space in the rigid Hindu caste system prevalent in undivided India, 
the Muslims asked for a separate land in order to peserve their own culture and 
traditions. It is ironic that the caste system thatw s officially abolished by India 
immediately after independence in 1947 is once again being revived by the Congress 
party. The ruling Congress party [2009 onwards] has announced that the 2011 census in 
India will “include a caste column” (Nayar 14.5.2010). The views of Jinnah explained 
this Two Nation Theory in concrete words. 
Jinnah explained the desire for a Muslim state on the anniversary of the Pakistan 
resolution in March 1947 which was five months befor  its establishment in August 
1947, He concluded: 
 




 “ Pakistan is the only practical solution of India’s constitutional problem;  
 Pakistan alone will lead to stable and secure governm nts in Hindustan 
 and Pakistan and Pakistan alone will guarantee real p ogress, welfare and  
 happiness of all the people inhabiting this vast subcontinent (…).  
 One India is an impossibility. For it can and will only mean the establishment  
 of Hindu Raj-and for Musalmans [ Muslims, 100 million at that time], merely  
 transfer from British domination to the Hindu Caste Imperialism”  
 (Zaidi 1993:364 facts within brakets mentioned by Jinnah later in the speech). 
 
 It is important to understand the social context of his speech. By March 1947, the 
British government had already shown its inclination f r the division of the subcontinent 
on religious lines. At this time, there was also the likelihood that various modes of 
representation were going to be applied to the subcontinent in order to ascertain the 
wishes of the people. ‘Islam in danger’ was a handy slogan in the hands of powerful 
elites to explain the rationale of founding Pakistan. Under this slogan of the ‘Two Nation 
Theory’, the Muslims of India were successful in winning a separate piece of land called 
Pakistan on the 14th of August 1947.  
 During the independence movement, Gandhi, the founding father of India, had 
epitomized himself in the fashion of a religious Hindu saint. Both his dress and his 
demeanour were evident of this peculiar behaviour. However, Jinnah was a westernized 
educated lawyer. His manners and social outlook were influenced by Western norms. 
When referring to the pre-independence period, Ziring pointed out that “Gandhi’s 
symbols and actions appealed to essentially Hindu religious sensibilities” (Ziring 2003: 
5). However, during the post-independence period, bth states’ identities after being 
incorporated into their respective constitutions experienced a reversal in their fortunes. It 
was Gandhi’s India which received a secularist constitution, while the constitution of 
Jinnah’s Pakistan included Islamic principles. This contrast of personal identities of the 
founding fathers of India and Pakistan was evident even at the very beginning of freedom 




struggle in India, since Jinnah was a nationalist wth utter disregard for the differentiation 
of people based on religion. He vehemently on record opposed the idea of infusing 
religion in politics and was given the title of the ‘ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity’ by 
Indian [Hindu] nationalists. Yet Gandhi, the founder of India, infused religion into 
politics as early as 1920 by becoming part of the Kalafat movement in the subcontinent. 
But how did the nationalist Jinnah became a communalist Muslim? Although this is a 
question that extends beyond the scope of this chapter, it can be argued that Jinnah in the 
late 1930s was convinced that religion was not just a set of rituals, but it represented a 
complete code of life for Muslims which was utterly in contrast to that of the Hindus of 
the subcontinent (Ahmed 1997).  
 The failure of the Hindu leaders in the Indian National Congress [later on called 
Congress party] to accommodate the Muslim League in provincial ministries in 1937 
made Jinnah an ardent supporter of the partition of the subcontinent. This fact was even 
accepted by the Hindu fundamentalist party elites like Jaswant Singh (Singh 2009). V.N. 
Naik has put the responsibility of his transformation on the shoulders of the short sighted 
leadership of the Indian National Congress (Kazimi 2005). The prime motive behind 
Jinnah’s ‘Two Nation Theory’ was the preservation of the distinct culture of Muslims. 
The Hindu culture and religion were in stark contrast to the Muslim way of life. The 
Hindu fundamentalists were “using the ballot box as its instrument, and hypocritically 
concealing itself behind the Congress party’s secular cloak” (Stephens 1963: 27). 
 Jinnah was successful in rallying the Muslims of the subcontinent under the flag 
of Islam and he only used religion instrumentally in order to get political mileage and not 
as an ideological foundation for the future course of Pakistan (Jalal 1985). Once Pakistan 




was established, Jinnah wanted a fusionist Islamic-secularist democratic model as the 
future constitution of the state. This was understandable considering the need to establish 
peaceful coexistence with its one time cohabitant, yet current enemy neighbouring India. 
However, there remains a great deal of debate and co troversy on the question of whether 
Jinnah wanted secular or Islamist attributes in the constitution of Pakistan (Ahmed 1997). 
Many believe that he dreamt of a modern democratic secular state as his main objective 
in the founding of Pakistan (Munir 1980). Yet at the same time, he was quite explicit that 
no law would be implemented in Pakistan that would go against the basic injunctions of 
Islam. There are many speeches of Jinnah which called for Pakistan’s identity not to be 
contrary to Islamic principles. Therefore, there is no doubt that Jinnah ‘negotiated 
Pakistan’ in order to preserve the distinct Islamic culture of Muslims of the subcontinent 
(Hussain 1979: 29).  
 The question may arise, why then Shariah rules not being practiced as part of the 
state policy of Pakistan? Although a complete answer is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
the simple answer is because of the lack of unity among the various sects of Islam 
regarding the interpretation of Islamic principles. After considering the pragmatic nature 
of Jinnah and the geo-political realities of independ nce, it was highly unlikely that the 
Westernized Jinnah would aspire to such a course fo the identity of Pakistan (Hussain 
1979). The founder of Pakistan was well aware of the security situation and the plight of 
millions of Muslims who were still in India after the partition. Without getting too deep 
in the historical abyss, we may safely conclude that Jinnah was impressed by the spirit of 
Islam based on the universal principles of brotherhood and peace, but he was not  a 
fundamentalist nor was he an ardent secularist as understood by the term in the West 




(Ahmed 1997). He was at that time contemplating of a fusion between the liberal 
democratic ideals found in the West and the principles of Islam. I have labelled his 
discourse on Pakistan’s identity as fu ionist Islamic-secularist. If analyzed in their social 
and historical context, the speeches of Jinnah help to explain this fusion.  
 In order to shape the contours of the first constitution of Pakistan, Jinnah 
presented his secular vision quite explicitly in a speech on the 11th of August 1947 to the 
first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan which was asigned the task of making a 
constitution. Jinnah said: 
 “ You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – That has nothing to do with  
the business of the State…there is no discriminatio, n  distinction between one 
community and another, no discrimination between one cast or creed and another.  
We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal  
citizens of one state…you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be 
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not i the religious sense because  
that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the 
state” (Burke 2000: 28-29). 
 
 As the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah envisioned ‘no discrimination’ among 
‘citizens’ of Pakistan on ‘religious’ basis. The timing of this speech was also important as 
it was delivered to the Constituent Assembly in 1947 and should have been taken as a 
guideline for the future constitution of Pakistan. This discourse shows the modern 
democratic emphasis for Pakistan’s future identity that focuses on the general principles 
of humanity and tolerance borrowed from the spirit of Islam (Zaidi 1999). 
 In another interview with Doon Campbell a Reuters’s correspondent in New 
Delhi in 1946, Jinnah claimed that “The new state would be a modern democratic state 
with sovereignty resting in the people and the membrs of the new nation having equal 
rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed ”(Munir 1980: 29). Jinnah 
focused on the spirit of Islam and its universal message of peace and brotherhood.  




 In an interview with the Muslim delegation on the 25th of July in 1947, 
approximately three weeks before the birth of Pakist n, Jinnah vehemently asserted that 
“Just as I want every Hindu [living] in Pakistan to be loyal to Pakistan, so do I want 
every Muslim in India to be loyal to India” (Zaidi 1999: xv). 
In another speech while addressing a durbar [elite gathering] in Sibi, Pakistan on 
the 14th of February 1948, just a few months before his death in September 1948, Jinnah 
said:  
 “ It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct  
set for us by our great law-giver, the Prophet of Islam. Let us lay the foundations  
of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles” 
                                                                                        (Ahmed 1997: 197).  
 
 These passages reveal the Islamic fusionist’s trends in Jinnah’s understanding of 
the rationale of Pakistan. Without contradicting one point or the other, it can arguably be 
said that during the pre-independence period Jinnah was ambivalent concerning Islam 
and the demand for a separate homeland in order to garner the much needed political 
support among the Muslim masses. However, any definitive conclusion about this issue is 
beyond the scope of this present chapter. 
 From these two different perspectives [secular or religious] arises the tension 
between the elites’ and the popular perceptions of Pakistan’s identity. At the time of 
independence, in the popular image, Pakistan was con idered a safe place to practice 
Islamic principles in their absolute totality. This popular perception was in stark contrast 
to Jinnah’s vision as the founder of Pakistan. The extracts of a letter written to Jinnah 
found in the national archives of Pakistan illustrates this viewpoint. A retired junior 




commissioned official [subedar] from the British army wrote to Jinnah on the 3rd of 
August 1947, 
 “Heartiest congratulations on the achievement of Pakistan … I retired as  
Subedar after rendering 21 years service … I am very k en to serve in the  
Islamic Army, even if the period of service is one month. I would be very  
proud of this honor … The offer of service is motiva ed by my devotion  
to Islam”  
                                                                                (Zaidi 1999: 173).  
 
 This letter was written days before the birth of Pakistan and it shows the direct 
correlation between Pakistan and Islam in popular perceptions [social context]. 
 Jinnah did not survive long after the inception of Pakistan in 1947 and died in 
1948. The pertinent question for my analysis is why did Pakistan begin to identify itself 
in such a way that it ultimately led to hostile relations with India?  
 The early demise of Jinnah barely one year after Pakistan’s independence led to 
identity crises. The political elites were assigned the task of making the constitution. This 
triggered a struggle in Pakistan between the liberal fo ces that focused on establishing 
secular democratic institutions like those in the Wst and the orthodox religious forces 
contemplating an Islamic vision of the state. What specific kind of Islamic role model of 
governance they envisioned for Pakistan remains an ambiguity since Islam itself is 
divided in various sects with different theological interpretations. This struggle showed 
the first twist in the ideological discourse of Pakistan immediately after its establishment. 
In contrast to secular principles, those interest groups which propagated Islamic 
ideological norms had interesting insights for the identity of Pakistan. As mentioned 
before, Islamic nationalism is identified with the id ntity of Pakistan for two reasons. 
First of all, Islam is the only common bond among the people of Pakistan who are 
divided along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and racil l nes. From the Pathans of Khyber-




Pakhtoonkhwa [the province in Pakistan bordering Afhanistan] to the Sindis of Sind 
province there is no common bond among the people exc pt Islam. Secondly, the 
preservation of Islamic identity was central to the cr ation of Pakistan and Islam 
represents a thin line forming the Line of Control [LOC] separating India from Pakistan. 
An eminent professor Shariful Mujahid, claimed that “Islam alone is the primary and 
most pronounced factor in making us into a nation: it is the basic sentiment in drawing 
and linking us” (Jawed 1999: 16). It is the cultural heritage and national identity of 
Pakistan based on the ‘the principle of Muslim nationalism’ (Iqbal 1959: 118).  
 While the demand for a separate state based on religious grounds required the 
slogan of the ‘Two Nation Theory’ as a political necessity, state building required the 
cooperation of the whole nation regardless of their rel gion, caste or creed. Pakistan 
received its independence as an abode for the Muslims of India, but the reality of post-
independence demanded the extension of equal rights to all citizens of the state. These 
citizens include Hindus, Christians, Parses and Muslims. But the demand for a separate 
Muslim homeland along religious lines required that t e clauses of the constitution 
should at least look Islamic. That is why the distinctiveness of Muslims from Hindus is 
highlighted in every future constitutional framework which shapes the contours of the 
state’s identity. This has been emphasized by all successive ruling elites of Pakistan. It 
involves the inculcation of the fear of India as an enemy state in the minds of the people 
of Pakistan and appeals to religion as a necessary binding force for promoting nationalist 
sentiments while keeping the provincial, separatist elements at bay. These two different 
course of actions [constitutional and Indo-centric] after independence shaped the future 
security relations of India and Pakistan.  




 Consequently, to the dismay of secularist forces an Objectives Resolution was 
passed in Pakistan in 1949 which effectively defined Islamic parameters to serve as a 
guideline for the future constitution. The resolution clearly divided the rights of the 
citizens of Pakistan along religious lines. The Objectives Resolution defined citizens of 
Pakistan from a religious point of view with a guarantee of rights to minorities. 
Furthermore, it declared that sovereignty belongs to Allah and people must use His 
delegated power as a sacred trust. This objectives resolution became Article 2(a) of the 
1973 Pakistan constitution [which is still valid]. Although the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan after passing of the resolution categorically stated that Pakistan would not become 
a theocratic state, it seems the dye was cast. The resolution subsequently became the 
object of an intense debate in Pakistan (Mehdi 1994). Pakistan’s identity became pseudo-
religious. It was neither purely Islamic governed by Shariah law, nor was it purely 
secular. Rather it represented a hodge-podge of Islamic and secularist trends. This tension 
can be exposed if we explore the Islamic clauses in the constitution of Pakistan and link it 
to actual state practices. If we consider, for example,  
 Article 227 (1) of the constitution of Pakistan which states: “all existing laws shall 
be brought in conformity to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions” [1973 
constitution of Pakistan until amended in 2010]. In Islam usury is strictly forbidden, but 
in reality the state has so far unable to do away with it, despite its abhorrence by Muslims 
and the rulings of the Supreme Court against it. So what is stated explicitly in the 
constitution regarding the future identity of the state, the state is guilty of breaching with 
its own social practices. This is how identity crises are compounded through the social 




practices of the elites. The later course of the history shows that Islam was only 
instrumentally being used by the elites as a rallying point to curb provincialism and 
establish the vested interests of the elites. Its distortion and false interpretation at the 
hands of fundamentalist religious parties has led to state’s practices which in turn have 
permanently established the intersubjective understandings of an “enduring rivalry” 
between India and Pakistan (Paul 2005). The confusion regarding Pakistan’s identity 
whether it is an Islamic one or a “a liberal-theocratic state run by the Muslims still awaits 
an answer” (Brasted 2005: 114). 
 For more than half its entire history, Pakistan has been governed by military elites 
and even under democratic governments the military elites have played a pivotal role in 
the affairs of the state. The military has assumed th  role of the sole guardian of 
Pakistan’s identity by carefully constructing the myth of India as ‘the Other’. Today, 
Pakistan has become more of a security state than a modern democratic state. The army 
in Pakistan has become a state within a state with its strong hold on every democratic 
government. It has also assumed a financial corporate role through its involvement in 
various developmental projects of the states (Siddiqa 2007). Ex-President Musharaff’s 
remarks when leaving his coveted post as Chief of the Army Staff alluded to this aspect 
of the army when he claimed, “This army is an integrating force, the saviour of Pakistan 
…without it, the entity of Pakistan cannot exist” (Khan 2007). Pakistan army’s enormous 
role in the state has changed the identity of the sate to a patriarchal authoritarian state.  
 The political culture of Pakistan has been based on Indo-centric norms of 
animosity, hence allowing military involvement in politics. This has resulted in 
deteriorating security relations with India. Whenever the army came to power, the social 




practices of the state changed and war became imminent. All the major wars with India 
have been fought by Pakistan during army rule. The 1965 war with India was fought 
when General Ayub Khan was in power and the war in 1971 took place when General 
Yahya Khan was in power. Similarly, during the Kargil war in 1999, Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif denied his involvement by squarely putting the onus of blame on General 
Musharraf [the then chief of army staff] for his misadventure. The intersubjective 
understandings between India and Pakistan which developed as a result of the dominant 
role of Pakistan’s army are those of mutual mistrust and hatred.  
 The connection of Pakistan’s identity based on an anti-Indian stance has provided 
the military elites every opportunity to define state practices and interests. But even 
among the military elites we observe changes in state practices based on ideological 
commitments. During General Ayub Khan’s rule, who was the first military dictator to 
rule Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, the state’s social pr ctices were largely secularist. This 
is despite the fact that in theory the 1962 constitution requires that the head of the state be 
a Muslim and the name of state should be referred to as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
[The same was adopted in prevalent 1973 constitution]. But in practice the laws passed 
were inclined towards secular leanings, e.g., the family laws of 1961. During the reign of 
General Ziaul Haq from 1977 to 1988, the Islamic character and identity of the state in 
theory [the constitution] as well as in actual state practices were quite convergent. For 
example, there was the establishment of a Federal Shariah court and the promulgation of 
a zina [adultery] ordinance. In turn in the era of General Musharaff, who ruled from 1999 
to 2007, we find secularist leanings. [Musharaff used the rhetoric of enlightened 
moderation]. The identity crisis is more acute due to differences in the theoretical 




connotation of ideology as mentioned in the constitution, than its practicability in the 
shape of elites’ social practices which by and large show secularist leanings.  
 Elites have used Islamic ideology to shape Pakistan’s identity in order to prolong 
their stay in power. The harm this focus has caused is obvious, given the state preference 
which has led to bad security relations with India. Even before the separation of East 
Pakistan in 1971 [currently Bangladesh], the people f East Pakistan thought that Islam 
was being used by West Pakistan in order to maintain solidarity, but that not much had 
been done to readdress the economic grievances of the people of East Pakistan (Jawed 
1999). The analysis of the speeches of the leaders of Pakistan shows that Islamic slogans 
were used extensively to shape the state’s security preferences against an impeding 
Indian threat. The elites in Pakistan constantly emphasized its Islamic heritage with 
regard to Pakistan’s identity in order to serve the purpose of ‘national’ integration, but at 
the same time many “exploited religious idealism in order to mask our efficiency, 
misdeeds and our lack of faith in a national purpose” (Jawed 1999: 33). 
 After having explained the identity discourse of Pakistan, I will now delve into a 
discussion of Indian identity to show what significan e it has for India-Pakistan security 
relations. 
 
4.3 Indian identity discourse: Secularist versus Hindutva ideology 
 Nehru was one of India’s founding fathers and its longest Prime Minister serving 
from 1947 to 1964. Gandhi was the main founding father, but he died in 1948. India was 
fortunate enough to have more of its founding fathers survive longer than those of 
Pakistan. After Gandhi, some of the other leaders in India were Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar 




Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. However, the “sole spokesman of Pakistan” was 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Jalal 1985). Jinnah died barely one year after Pakistan’s 
independence in 1948. In order to examine the formation of Indian identity, I will focus 
on Nehru’s vision due to his long association with India after independence in his 
capacity as its prime minister. Nehru was disgusted with the communal division of India 
on religious lines and he was cognizant of the presence of multifaceted Indian religious 
nationalities. He believed that religion had no place in politics. In his own book entitled 
“The Discovery of India”, Nehru stated “the bitter conflict between science and religion 
which shuck up Europe in the nineteenth century would have no reality in India” (Nehru 
1947: 446). In the same book, he states that:   
 “ India must therefore lessen her religiosity and turn o science.  
She must get rid of the exclusiveness in thought and social habit  
which has become like a prison to her, stunting her spirit and  
preventing growth” (Nehru 1947: 447). 
 
 Nehru wrote this book before Indian independence i order to show the rich 
cultural heritage and civilization of India. His abhorrence for religion in politics was an 
open secret in the subcontinent politics. 
 At another occasion on the 3rd of April 1948, when addressing the Indian 
Constituent Assembly which was assigned the task of making the Indian constitution, 
Nehru stated: 
 “The combination of politics and of religion in the narrowest sense  
of the word, resulting in communal politics, is - there can be no doubt 
a most dangerous combination and must be put an end to (…).  
This combination is harmful to the country as a whole; it is harmful to  
the majority, but probably it is most harmful to any minority that seeks  
to have some advantage from it” (Nehru 1967: 74). 
 
 The social context of this speech was also important in the sense that it laid down 
the basic parameters for the future Indian constitution. Nehru remained committed to his 




secularist vision for India. Yet he was aware of the scourge of communalism in multi- 
ethnic and multi-religious India. Months before hisdeath in May 1964, Nehru revealed 
that he believed greatest threat to India was the threa  of communalism and not the twin 
threats from either Pakistan or China. He stated, “this communal trouble is entirely 
opposed to our policy and to our future, and I do appeal to you to fight it and to put an 
end to it” (Nehru 1968: 12). The Chinese army had defeated India in 1962 and Pakistan 
had been India’s nemesis since its independence. In a radio broadcast to the Indian nation 
on the 26th of March 1964, Nehru stated,  
 “ India is a country of many communities and unless we can live in harmony  
with each other, respecting each other’s beliefs and habits, we cannot build up  
a great and united nation (…). We must remember that every Indian, to whatever 
religion he might belong, is a brother and must be reated as such”  
                                                                                (Nehru 1968: 12,13).  
 
One of the problems with religion in India is because of its interpretation by its 
founding fathers. For example, Mahatma Gandhi categorically stated, “for me there are 
no politics devoid of religion … politics bereft ofreligion are a death-adder because they 
kill the soul” (Bazaz 2003: 368). However, in a public address in Calcutta on the 13th of 
December 1953, Nehru stated, “If religion is allowed to come into politics ... then 
communalism will have its sway” (Bazaz 2003: 368). However, before getting into an 
examination of the actual social practices of India elites, it is first worth while to discuss 
the constitutional identity of India.  
 These views are fully enshrined in the Indian constitution which guarantees 
individual freedom of religion as a fundamental right in Article 25(1). The Article states: 
 “Subject to public order, morality and health and to all the other provisions  
of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the  
right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion” (Mitra 1991: 765).  
 




 The above clause in the Indian constitution does not mean that there is no 
recognition of religion by the state, but instead the emphasis is placed on the state which 
does not discriminate against anyone on religious grounds. Furthermore, it gives freedom 
to everyone to profess and propagate any religion of his choice. Nehru’s significant 
influence in India in the post-independence phase helped formulate the policy of 
secularism into ‘concrete’ policies of the state (Mitra 1991). The question may arise, that 
if India has professed its secularist vision in its constitution [1950], then why after so 
many decades of secular politics has there been a rsurgence of Hindu fundamentalist 
parties since the 1990s onwards? It was anticipated by Indian elites, especially Nehru that 
the forces of modernization would soon engulf religious bigotry and a coherent secularist 
India would eventually emerge. The ‘special’ characteristics of the Indian polity do not 
assume that there can be a neat distinction between religion and politics as required under 
secularism (Prasad 1976: 133). This demonstrates the ame inherent struggle that exists 
in India between popular and elites’ perceptions of identity as was also explored earlier in 
the discussion of Pakistan’s identity discourse.  
 For the average Hindu, India is their permanent abode to practice Hinduism and 
there are number of references by Hindu fundamentalist parties alluding to the birth of 
Pakistan as a state solely for Muslims. So why should India not be solely for the Hindus? 
The social norms of Hinduism are too resilient to be a sorbed by the modernist tide. 
Polarization caused by ideological commitments to a rejuvenated Indian identity began to 
strongly emerge since the mid-1990s. [This polarization will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6]. But even before this period, the inherent t nsion between Hindu identity and 
a secular outlook was evident from the social practices of the elites after independence. 




These social practices of elites show an ideological commitment towards the propagation 
of Hinduism exclusively and implicitly. This commitent acted as a thick signifier to 
Indian identity.  
 The reasons for the failure of secularization in India lies in the fact that 
modernization and development have so far failed to trickle down and to reach the most 
marginalized segments of Indian society. Instead, the forces of modernization have 
converged with democratic processes, thereby providing fundamental religious parties an 
option to appeal to such neglected segments of society. The religious parties often create 
an acute sense of identity crisis in Indian society. They use the ideological myths of 
‘Hindutva’ or Hindu cultural domination quite often, i  order to develop a true Hindu 
identity in the Indian polity. They exacerbated their lack of ontological security by 
propagating ‘Hindutva’, a reinterpretation of Hindu social and religious norms. Among 
such cultural norms the most important one is the lab lling of Muslims as “the Other” or 
the fifth element in the Indian state. 
 The popular perceptions of a revivalist Hindu cultural identity do not match with the 
officially sanctioned secular label of Indian identity. The Indian elites face the same 
predicament of trying to appease the large majority f Hindu voters, as well as the other 
minorities in India, especially Muslims. However, in the case of India, we can find the 
elite bias toward secularism is largely no more than lip service, while the actual social 
practices are directed toward reviving the dominant cultural Hindu identity in India. It is 
important to understand that the Indian elites treatm nt of Muslims in India, inadvertently 
has repercussions for its relations with Pakistan. I  can lead to the downward spiral of 




security relations between the two states. Before arguing this point further, I will first 
explain some of these social practices. 
 As early as 1948, one year after independence, the former President of the Congress 
party which helped to found India, Das Tandon, retort d: 
 “There should not be any more talk of separate culture and language in  
 the Indian union. There should be no room for such persons in the Indian  
 Union who advocate separate culture and separate language for a particular  
 community … If Muslims are anxious to stay in the Indian Union which  
 is a secular state they will have to adopt Hindi as their language and Devangri  
 as their script … Muslims in India will have to win the confidence of their  
 fellow country men and government not by words but by deeds. They must stop  
 looking to Pakistan for inspiration and make India’s culture their own”   
                                                                                      (Bazaz 2003: 346). 
 
 The social context of this speech shows how Indian elites used the scar of the chosen 
trauma of the partition of the subcontinent. After one year of independence the Indian 
elites demanded that the ‘Muslims’ in India should prove their loyalty by adopting the 
dominant Hindu culture. In 1949, Professor Yashwant Rai, who was a member of 
Congress party, made a similar demand. While speaking to the Indian parliament, Rai 
claimed:   
 “The present education system which is mainly based on Western ideologies  
 should be overhauled and ancient culture re-introduce , if we want to have one  
 culture, one language and one country, we will have to keep one ideology - our  
 ancient ideology” (Bazaz 2003: 346). 
 
 Another case pertained to the role of ‘Lingua Franca’ or the official language in 
India. Here is yet another example of the anomalous behaviour of Indian elites. In India, 
the Urdu language, which is commonly called Hindustani, was not recognized by the 
state even though up and to the present this language is still understood and spoken by the 
majority of Indians. As Dr. Syed Muhammad a Muslim leader in Congress party 




explained, Urdu is neither a “Muslim language nor is it being spoken in Arab Muslim 
countries, all its basic structure, grammar, and the greater part of its vocabulary is Indian” 
(Bazaz 2003: 352). In reality, ‘Sanskiriti Hindi’ with ‘Devanagri’ script became the 
official language of India (Bazaz 2003). This langua e explains the old cultural heritage 
of the Hindus. It is ironic that in spite of the common dialect in Urdu, which both Hindus 
and Muslims perfectly understand and which has no connection with Islam, the Indian 
elites were bent upon searching for an exclusive Hindu vernacular. This was done much 
to the chagrin of the Muslim leaders in founding Congress party of India.  
 The same exclusively Hindu mindset was evident by the elites’ social practices 
when the time came for the selection of the national a them and the national flag. The 
national anthem of India is ‘Jana Gana Mana’ along with ‘Vande Mataram’ that have 
very difficult prose and anti-Muslim feelings (Bazaz 2003). These national anthems were 
given preference over the widely famous song ‘Saray jaha say acha Hindustan hamara’ of 
Allama Iqbal [poet of the subcontinent]. It was discarded because it was compiled by a 
‘Muslim’ and it was in ‘Urdu’ (Bazaz 2003: 355). The same struggle for identity [secular 
identity versus elites practices based on Hindu norms] was evident in the finalization of 
the flag of India after independence. The Indian flg is tri-colour with a wheel called 
‘Dharma Chakra’ at its centre. This wheel was the “symbol of ancient Hindu culture and 
religion” (Bazaz 2003). This step was appreciated by the leaders of the Hindu 
fundamentalist party the Hindu Mahasabha at its 28th convention in Calcutta. V.D. 
Savarkaar, the Hindu Mahasabha’s leader, stated:  
 “ It is a matter of great pleasure to all that the flag of freedom  
 is flying over Bharat Varsha today. Call it a secular flag if you  
 like but it [is] at the same time our Hindu flag. There is that  
 Ashoka Chakra inscribed on it” (Bazaz 2003: 355). 
 




 The social context of all these speeches explains the value of narratives, symbols 
and elites’ social practices in the identity discourse of India. The significance of the 
Hindu symbol on the flag of secular India, as well as the adoption of the Devnagri script 
for India’s national language demonstrates the incongruity between the social practices of 
the ruling elite and the founding fathers vision of Indian identity. Yet another point that is 
not unrelated in this regard is the role of ideology behind elites’ social practices. The 
divergent attitude of the elites was reinforced once they also became committed to 
“Hindutva” ideology, as was shown in the 1990s with the politics of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party [BJP]. [I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 6 which argues that the nuclear 
rivalry between India and Pakistan can be seen as a offshoot of ‘Hindutva’].  
 Another elite social practice that was adopted was to succumb to the demand of 
Hindus to ban the slaughter of cows in India. Cows are considered sacred animals in 
Hindu mythology. The Indian Constituent Assembly which was formed after the partition 
of the subcontinent had to include this demand as “one of the Directive Principles of 
State Policy” for the future constitution of India (Bazaz 2003: 356). This was done much 
to the dismay of the minorities in India (Bazaz 2003). Hence the list of social practices of 
the elites based on Hindu norms under the guise of a secular identity goes on and on. It is 
evident that although living in a secular constitutional state, the elites in practice were 
involved in “the creation of a Hindu state with the avowed object of the revival of ancient 
Brahminic culture” (Bazaz 2003: 362). 
 Paradoxically, the social practices of the Indian elites justify the separation of 
Pakistan on religious and distinct cultural lines bcause of the lack of accommodation for 
“any other cultural pattern” than “Brahmanism” (Bazaz 2003: 363). It is this cultural 




connotation of identity which is at the forefront of the India-Pakistan rivalry. The same 
was acclaimed by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Pakistani Prime Minister, in his address to 
students on the 22nd of January 1949. Khan claimed that “it was for the sake of this 
cultural freedom that Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent made Pakistan the 
supreme goal of their political efforts” (Bazaz 2003: 363-364). 
 What we see in India after more than sixty years of independence is the 
reinvigoration of this cultural heritage by the orthodox Hindu parties. The secular identity 
simply does not match with the popular perception of a Hindu dominated India. The 
elites of religious parties have tried to rejuvenat the identity of the nation which they 
believe has been lost in the recent tide of modernization. The electoral success of the 
fundamentalist Hindu party envisages that the social meaning attached to secularism by 
the masses is different than that of the state’s official document [constitution]. Hinduism 
as a religious ideology is a code of life and it iscompletely embedded in the cultural and 
social norms of the people. Whenever the fundamentalist parties come to power in India, 
they are obliged to take popular actions under the Hindu ideology which are in stark 
contrast to the constitution in order to support their beliefs of Indian identity based on 
Hindu culture. There has been a corresponding change between the rise of such an 
identity and the state’s social practices. These changes have a direct effect on the 
intersubjective understanding of the security relationship with Pakistan. This has led to 
the process of ‘Othering’ where the Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular are at 
the centre stage. These parties project historical events of Hindu mythology by 
humiliating its Muslim counterpart, whether it was the demolition of the Babri Mosque 
that was mythically portrayed as the birth place of Ram [the Hindu god] or the re-




construction of the Somnath temple razed by Mahmud of Ghaznavi [a Muslim Turk who 
invaded India in the twelfth century].  
 Political activities are being linked to these cultural aspects through the 
reincarnation of historical events by pledges made in party manifestos. Ontological 
security is being constructed by explaining the narratives of Hindu subjugation during the 
Muslim Mughal rule in India. This cultural or ideologically religious agenda has its 
obvious connection with the security practices of the Indian state. In this identity 
discourse all the invaders of the subcontinent are considered to be the heroes of Muslims 
[invariably of Pakistan] who denounced the Hindus. Both Indian and Pakistani elites’ 
have failed to appreciate the fact that genealogically both Hindus and Muslims have the 
same ancestors. It was the low cast Hindus who first converted to Islam due to its 
universal message of brotherhood and equality in order to liberate themselves from the 
yoke of the oppressive Hindu caste system. No one had any link with the Turks or Arabs 
who ruled the subcontinent or invaded it.  
 
4.4. Ideology as a thick signifier for elites’ social practices  
 In short, the argument which I want to emphasize is that identity and ideology go 
hand in hand in the context of India-Pakistan relations. How such ideologies become 
national narratives and change elites’ social practices which affect the course of security 
relations between the two countries? Ideology acts s a thick signifier because it brings to 
light again and again the chosen traumas inscribed in the psyche of the nation. Psyche of 
the nation refers to the core ideological values refer d to time and again by the elites for 
identity construction of a state. This helps the task of the elites by creating fear of the 




‘Other’ and providing cohesion among culturally disparate regions of these states. This 
thick signifier exposes the hidden cultural, social and religious differences among the 
people who were once together and were later divided on these lines. Gradually with the 
passage of time and with the absence of people to pople contact between the two states, 
these differences have become rigid enough to create ‘hostile binaries’ (Lebow 2008). 
The elites’ social practices have to allude to such chosen traumas for the sake of their 
state’s integrity in order to get the much needed reification or identity signifier. Both 
states’ identities are more or less tagged with religious ideologies where their shared 
chosen traumas are being constructed by the elites. Thi  ‘religious discourse’ can help 
explain ‘changing social identities’ in the Indian state (Veer 1994). These social identities 
change into national identities when they become “socially shared mental constructs” 
(Dijk 1998). Shared social norms and culture play a definitive role in propagating 
ideologies (Dijk 1998).  
The political parties which use cultural slogans baed on the resurrection of a 
former identity have more chances to succeed if undercurrents of us versus them are 
already present along with the polarization of the society on ideological lines. Therefore, 
both identity discourses in India and Pakistan need each other albeit negatively (Veer 
1994). The Indian founding fathers have feared that communal violence “could render 
meaningless the careful work which has gone into the establishment of a secular state” 
(Smith 1963: 415). After some twenty years of secular politics, many authors prophesized 
that there would emerge perfect harmony between the constitutional identity of the Indian 
state and the social practices of its ruling elite leading to the Indian-isation of the people 
of India (Smith 1963). But so far this has not happened. After more than sixty years of 




Indian independence, we are witnessing the resurgence of Hindu ideology since 1990, 
leading to more fragmentation and the de-secularisation of the Indian state. The 
difference between secularism in Europe and in India and Pakistan has largely to do with 
the success of modern Western state to successful separate itself from any religious or 
cultural commitments and focus purely on modernization. However, in the case of India 
and Pakistan, religious and ideological commitments have worked in connivance with the 
state’s thrust for modernization. Security relations are developed by such practices and do 
not operate in a vacuum. That is why we see the secularist Indian identity transformed 
into a religious ideology in the late 1990s. Yet there is also an anomaly. It was largely 
expected that Pakistan was going to be trapped in fundamentalism because of its 
ideological commitments, however it was India which first succumbed to these forces 
way back in the 1990s (Abbas 2005).6  
 In this way religious ideology is used by certain political elites to construct the 
insecurity between the two states. This shows the clear dichotomy between Indian secular 
identity as envisaged in the Indian constitution and the social practices of Indian elites. 
This resulted in reciprocal social practices by Pakist ni elites through their anti-Indian 
ideology. Thus ideology serves as a strong link betwe n identity and the intersubjective 
understandings of states. Culture and religion are at the forefront of this rivalry (Das 
2005). The case study of Pakistan also shows other s range anomalies. Here the case is 
exactly topsy turvy, with religion being given the p rfect place in the shape of state 
ideology in all constitutional documents. In theory the constitution of Pakistan explicitly 
                                                
1. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and American’s War on Terror (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 161. Abbas has blamed th  periodic military take over’s in Pakistan as well as 
the interests of America in the region to offset the Communist threat as the primary reason for the rise of 
extremism and fundamentalism in Pakistan. 
 




states that no law should be made that would clash with Islamic principles, but in practice 
we see that the laws are being enacted that correspnd to modern secular principles. What 
does this have to do with security relations between th  two countries? The leadership of 
the two countries have found it very convenient to use religious slogans in order to 
overcome the centrifugal forces of their societies at the expense of creating out-group and 
in-group feelings between the two states. An ideological commitment to national identity 
defines the basis of inclusion in a society just as in a group setting ideology “defines the 
basis for the group’s identity” (Dijk 1998). For example, if I am a staunch believer of 
Pakistan’s Islamic identity then I am a true Pakistani patriotic, otherwise I favour a 
secularist India and I am anti-Pakistani; similarly a fervent Hindu is equivalent to true 
Indian-ness. Furthermore, the elites of both states oft n appeal to their respective people 
by suggesting that these identities are at stake and without their proper securitization the 
very survival of the Hindu or the Muslim nation is in jeopardy. The process of 
securitization is intersubjective, meaning thereby that it is neither a question of an 
objective threat nor a subjective perception of a threat. Instead, the securitization of a 
subject depends upon the state actors’ discursive acts. 
 It seems that both states identity has become whatideology through state practices 
make of it7. There is no denying that states can contribute to peaceful coexistence or 
conflict through their social practices and intersubjective understandings. The point I 
want to make here is that in the case of India and Pakistan, the intersubjective 
understandings of each other are largely based on ieological differences that have been 
exacerbated by the elites of both states. The secular onstitutional identity of India is 
                                                
7 I paraphrased this sentence with some alteration from Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what States Make of 
it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization 46(2): 391-425. 




unable to overcome the tides of ‘Hindutva’ and is unable to amalgamate the various 
communal identities in India into one national identity. From secularism to Hindutva, 
India exhibits the transformation in its identity and accordingly shapes the social 
practices of the state. Similarly, the ‘Two Nation Theory’ with its religious overtones 
completes the process of ‘Othering’ of India and helped the Pakistani elites especially the 
military to get a strong hold in state building. Religious norms in a state’s constitution not 
only guarantees their role in state building, but also provides ‘social meaning’ to it (Mitra 
1991). This difference in theory [the constitution] and the state’s actual social practices 
under the influence of religious ideology has contributed to the security dilemma between 
India and Pakistan.  
 Pakistan and India’s complex security relations are based on the elites’ perceptions 
of identity and it has become difficult for them to reinterpret their chosen traumas in 
different vein. The identity discourses of both states’ are being trapped by such traumas 
since secular Indian identity has no room for elite social practices based on Hindu 
mythology. Similarly, the formative phase of Pakistan shows that religion played a 
predominant ideological role in shaping the national identity of Pakistan, but the lack of 
its interpretive role in the post-independence phase only caused strained security relations 
with India. The argument on Indian identity is also based along similar lines. The 
secularist commitment of the Indian National Congress in the pre-independence phase 
has been unable to transform the state as a modern secularist polity in the post-
independence period. By marginalizing religion in a society with lots of religious 
cleavages entrenched in cultural Hindu norms, the stat  has failed to establish peaceful 
security practices with Pakistan. This shows two divergent perceptions of identities in 




India and Pakistan. There is an elite version of identity [constitutional identity, social 
practices] and there are popular perceptions of identity.  
 What would be the impact on security relations with India if Pakistan had adopted a 
purely orthodox religious identity? There were millions of Muslims in India who stayed 
behind either by their own free will or because of geographical constraints. If at its 
independence India like Pakistan had adopted an exclusive Hindu identity, then these 
Indian Muslims would have been completely annihilated. This would have further 
complicated state relations so that they would come to an impasse. What would happen, 
if we consider another scenario? For example, what ould happen if Pakistan had 
adopted a Western secular identity in its initial phase of state building? By adopting a 
purely westernized democratic secular identity the w ole rationale of its establishment of 
a separate state would be lost since Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam. It also 
explains the wide gulf between the elites and the masses who cannot understand their 
raison d’etre without religious foundations because of the lack of education and 
misperceptions. The crux of this study is that the process of state building in a Third 
World state is closely linked to its security situation (Ayoob 1995). For Third World 
states which were once together, the cultural dimension is important for understanding 
the dynamics of state making. ‘Ethnic heterogeneity’ and cultural pluralism’ are 
considered to be ‘threats’ by Pakistani elites and their ‘rhetorical emphasis’ was based on 
‘religious commonality’ (Malik 1997: 168). This is precisely the dilemma of Pakistan’s 
identity, the shadow of religious ideology looms over its identity in which negative 
attributes of Hindu-India play centre stage and whose interpretation is at the mercy of the 
ruling political and military elites. 




 To arrive at some sort of solution to this identity and ideological nexus, we may 
revert back to the ‘secular nationalist discourse’ of the founding fathers of both India and 
Pakistan in order to change India and Pakistan into modern polities (Talbot 2000a: 286). 
Indigenous scholars, like T.V. Sthyamurthy see this identity discourse as an ‘intra-elite 
conflict’ to grab ‘resources’ while the fate of the popular masses of both states are being 
linked to “dispossession, disinheritance, poverty and marginalisation” (Talbot 2000a: 
286). There is a pressing need to ‘spread a new “pro-people” sense of identity which 
transcends existing elite styles’ (Talbot 2000a: 286) 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 Security relations between India and Pakistan are closely linked to their respective 
identity discourses that show ideological overtones. For the people of India and Pakistan 
their respective elites are still using the chosen trauma of the partition of the subcontinent 
and have not taken an alternate route after more than half a century since partition in 
1947. It seems that the “political-cultural-economic geographies of otherness” created by 
the partition cannot be gotten rid of (Chaturvedi 2001: 158). Here social constructivism is 
seen as an intertwined ‘nexus’ between culture and material interests (Shaffer 2006). 
Today Islamic fundamentalism, in its most virulent form in the shape of suicides attacks, 
has made a mockery of Pakistan’s credentials of having an Islamic identity. In the case of 
India, slogans of Hindutva or revival of one Hindu culture for the whole nation are 
justifying the separation of Pakistan from India. The commitment of both states elites is 
still tied to ‘ethnicity and religion’ (Ahmed 1997: 249). Ethnicity and distorted religious 




ideologies based on contrasting cultural myths and a ostalgic past have added fuel to the 
fire in the rivalry between India and Pakistan. 
 The biggest impediment for India to be a great power or to serve as a regional 
power, is its strained relations with Pakistan thathas resisted Indian ‘dominance’ in the 
region through “military and ideological means” (Cohen 2001: 32). This chapter shows 
the ideological commitment of this rivalry. The elit s’ constructed rivalry based on 
ideational factors is largely different from the material considerations of interstate rivalry 
as expounded by realism and liberalism. These ideational factors include socio-cultural 
norms in the shape of religious and cultural myths that were constructed by elites right 
from the initial phases of identity formation in these two states. In order to understand 
this rivalry, I have suggested that both states have been formed by their respective elites 
through the process of identity and interests formation. This chapter shows how the 
founding fathers of India and Pakistan articulated the identity of their respective states 
from the repository of conflictual norms thus making terstate harmony an anathema for 
the succeeding generations of ruling elites. An understanding of this socio-cultural part of 
identity is an a priori requirement in order to explain the perennial security dilemma 
between India and Pakistan. The state centric theories particularly neo-realism and neo-
liberalism only devise a material calculus to understand the fluctuating interests of the 
states. They do not take into account the socio-cultural aspects influencing the ruling 
elites. Without such understandings we can not come up with social norms on which the 
foundations of peace between India and Pakistan can be based.  
 
 




5: The Kashmir dispute: the quest of India and Pakistan identities and  
    Kashmiriyat, the estranged Kashmir’s identity  
 
The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan started t the time of their 
independence in 1947. It has since been a major destabilizing security issue between 
these two countries. This territorial dispute has mostly been discussed as the main source 
of the classical security dilemma [from the materialistic vantage point] between  India 
and Pakistan. I will not explain in detail these realist explanations of the Kashmir 
conflict. These explanations have been briefly discus ed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. I 
will primarily focus on the socio-cultural account of this conflict. The main argument will 
emphasize that Kashmir’s indigenous identity has been encircled by the social practices 
of Indian and Pakistani elites resulting in the exacerbation of this dispute. The state 
narratives being constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan with their respective 
allegiances to Kashmir have their roots in the identity discourses of both states. It has 
now become difficult for both states to re-negotiate ny other alternative narrative due to 
the fear of losing popular support and this has led to a stalemate concerning Kashmir. 
This chapter also discusses historically the distinct a d indigenous Kashmir identity 
based on its own socio-cultural norms called ‘Kashmiriyat’. This identity is quite 
different from the traditional Hindu-Muslim identities of the subcontinent. The discourse 
of Kashmiri identity was developed through peaceful, mutually accommodative and 
religiously tolerant popular social practices of Kashmiris including Muslims, Hindus and 
Buddhists for centuries. However, after the independence of India and Pakistan, this 
indigenous Kashmir identity has not been recognized by either the Indian or the Pakistani 




ruling elites in their respective state’s identity discourses. The role of ideas and norms has 
been neglected in many previous studies on this dispute. Yet if this territorial dispute is 
explored from the vantage point of the interplay of the competing identities of the major 
actors involved, then it will helps us to better understand one of the longest standing 
unresolved disputes before the United Nations. 
This chapter is divided into seven sub-sections. The first section explains the 
narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan about Kashmir and the sources 
used for this case study. The second section briefly explains the material significance as 
well as realist solutions to this dispute through the annals of history. The third section 
defines the ideational or socio-cultural component of this security dilemma. The fourth 
section presents the gist of my argument by examining the indigenous Kashmiri identity 
and the distinct social norms underpinning it. This section further explains that this 
identity is distinct from the contrasting identities of India and Pakistan. The fifth section 
explains the present imbroglio over Kashmir by highlighting the social practices of India 
and Pakistan elites. The sixth section explains the s ruggle between the popular social 
practices of the Kashmiris and the elites’ social pr ctices of India and Pakistan. This 
section further highlights how elites’ social practices have exacerbated the Kashmir 
conflict by denying space to popular social practices of the Kashmiris based on their own 
indigenous identity. The seventh section concludes th  whole argument of this triangular 








5.1 India-Pakistan narratives on Kashmir 
           Kashmir is an inalienable part of Pakistan. Pakistan without Kashmir is incomplete 
since Kashmir is considered as Pakistan’s jugular vein. Kashmir is the unfinished agenda 
of partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan is founded on the principle of the preservation 
of Islamic identity and as an abode for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Without the 
inclusion of the Muslim dominant Kashmir, the identity and rationale of Pakistan is 
meaningless and incomplete. All the rivers of Pakist n come from the melting snow of 
the Himalayas after passing through Kashmir valley. This is a standard narrative which 
can be easily found in all history text books published by the state of Pakistan for study in 
primary and secondary schools, for example, Pakistan S udies for class tenth, published 
by Punjab Text Book Board, Lahore, year 2010. It isa typical Pakistani narrative which 
is being used by the Pakistani elites to justify their claim on Kashmir. The genesis of 
these Pakistani narratives can be traced back to the speeches of its founding fathers. For 
example, the first Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated in 1950, 
“Judged by every consideration, cultural, demographic, economic and strategic,  
Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan. For Pakistan, K shmir is a vital necessity;  
for India it is an imperialist adventure” (Khan 1950).  
 
These comments were made by Khan in the Pakistani parliament on the 5th of 
October 1950 during a debate on the Kashmir Report submitted by Sir Owen Dixon 
(1950). The United Nations had appointed Sir Dixon as its representative after India took 
the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council in 1948-1949. The then 
Pakistan government had rejected the proposal of a selective plebiscite in Kashmir that 
was proposed in Sir Dixon’s report (social context of this speech). 




Now let us take a look at the Indian narrative. Kashmir is an integral part of India; 
it’s inclusion in India is essential for the sustenance of its secular identity. Kashmir is the 
only Muslim majority state in the Indian Union. The presence of Kashmir in India means 
the negation of a separate identity for Pakistan. If Kashmir can be part of India with a 
Muslim majority population, then what is the significance of the creation of Pakistan as a 
separate abode for Muslims of the subcontinent? This standard narrative can be easily 
found in all history and social science text books published by the Indian state owned 
publishers the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in New 
Delhi. The term “integral part of India” [attootang] was first used by the first Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and has since been adopted as part of the Indian state 
narrative on Kashmir (Nehru 1956).  
In a speech to parliament on the 24th of July 1952, after India had rejected the 
United Nations’ arbitration over the Kashmir issue, Jawaharlal Nehru stated: 
 “ I want to repeat that Kashmir is an integral part of India and is governed,  
in so far as the subjects of accession are concerned, by the Constitution of  
India. We cannot upset or violate our Constitution because of some resolution  
put forward in the Security Council” (Nehru 1956: 2).  
 
By juxtaposing Indian and Pakistani narratives on Kashmir it is evident that the 
identity of Kashmir is being inextricably linked toIndian and Pakistani identities. These 
two competing and conflicting narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan 
on the Kashmir dispute constitute an important aspect of their security dilemma. Why 
have these narratives been imbued as essentialist versions of the identity of both states?  
In fact, these competing narratives underlie most of the voluminous literature on 
Kashmir, making it all the more difficult to reach any conclusion of the problem. I have 




primarily focused on the work of indigenous Kashmiris, especially, Prem Nath Bazaz’s 
opus magnum entitled ‘The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, Cultural and 
Political, from the Earliest Times to the present Day’ that was first published in 1954, but 
has been reprinted several times since then. Bazaz’s work presents the cultural account of 
Kashmir from an impartial and lucid angle and is term d as a ‘classic’ (Lamb 1991: 99). 
He is an indigenous Kashmiri and a Hindu pundit. He was actively involved in the 
struggle for the freedom of Kashmir since the 1930’s, when the people of Kashmir rose 
up and demanded their rights against the atrocities committed by the Maharaja. Bazaz 
was a member of a commission established by the Maharaja in 1932 in order to re-
address the grievances of the people of Kashmir. The commission upheld the legitimate 
demands of the people of Kashmir in its report in 1932 (Blinkenberg 1998). Other 
sources used in this case study are the speeches of the Indian and Pakistani elites gathered 
from the archives and the commentaries of British and American authors. These were 
important in order to examine this conflict from a neutral angle. 
Before explaining the socio-cultural factors underlying these narratives, I will 
briefly dwell upon the history of the Kashmir issue. Although the roots of the Kashmir 
dispute stem from the vast upheaval, the territorial partition of the subcontinent, I will 
look at it from another angle which is based on the int rplay of the Indian and Pakistani 
identities. Nevertheless, in order to have a broader historical perspective of the Kashmir 








5.2 The historical perspective and some realist solutions 
The state of Jammu and Kashmir [i.e., the nomenclature of Kashmir adopted 
during the British imperial rule] is presently sand-witched between India and Pakistan. 
This area has a complex history of territorial advancement. While analyzing the Kashmir 
conflict, I refer to that problematic area of Indian held Kashmir which has been a security 
concern for both India and Pakistan. The genesis of this dispute has been studied from 
various angles. One dimension propagated by Indian authors is to study the Kashmir 
dispute by questioning the rationale of the establishment of Pakistan, as well as the 
reasons for the partition of the subcontinent. From their perspective, they argue in the 
first place that the partition of the subcontinent along communal lines should not have 
taken place since it has led to the problem of the Muslim majority Kashmir in India. But 
partition is a reality and has resulted in the establishment of an independent India and 
Pakistan. This fact cannot now be applied retrospectively to the Kashmir dispute which 
currently awaits a solution to its dilemma. This pers ctive can also be dismissed based 
on accounts of the irreconcilable attitudes between th  views of the leaders of the Indian 
National Congress [Indian’s founding party later on Congress party] and the Muslim 
League [Pakistan’s founding party] where the only solution at the time was the partition 
of the subcontinent (Lamb 2002: 21). The Kashmir issue should not be linked with the 
rationale of partition itself. However, the partition plan on Kashmir that was not adopted 
should be studied further as one of the causes of the dispute.  
Another historical aspect introduced by Indian scholar Dr. H.L. Saxena, is to 
study Kashmir by linking it to the nefarious ‘Anglo-American’ designs, whereby a 
portion of Kashmir was deliberately given to Pakistan in order to maintain the strategic 




check post at Gilgit to serve as a ‘Central Asian outp st’ or a bulwark against the spread 
of communism (Lamb 1991). This is also an absurd idea considering the fact that at the 
time of independence, neither the British, nor the Americans had any clue of the future 
ties of India and Pakistan with either the communist or the capitalist blocks. By leaving 
these perspectives aside, I will briefly explain the historical facts in order to allow the 
Kashmiri discourse to emerge on its own.  
The history of Kashmir can be divided into three phases. The first phase is from 
1846-1947 when Kashmir was under the rule of the Mahar ja [King], the second phase is 
from 1947-1989 when it was divided between India and Pakistan, and the third phase is 
the post-1989 period when armed struggle started in Kashmir. I will briefly examine the 
historical facts of these three phases. 
            In 1846, the British sold the valley of Kashmir, the most prized part of Kashmir, 
to the Raja of Jammu, Gulab Singh. At that moment, the ‘State of Jammu and Kashmir’ 
came into existence (Lamb 1991). The Maharaja as well as his descendants ruled 
Kashmir with utter disregard to the rights and liberties of its citizens (Bazaz 1987). The 
rule of the Maharaja and his dynasty is referred to as the Dogra Rule in the history of 
Kashmir. During this period, abject poverty could be found throughout Kashmir. Wide 
scale protests against atrocities committed by the Maharaja started in 1931. In order to 
quell the protests, the Maharaja had to form an independent commission under the 
chairmanship of an Englishman. After conducting an investigation, the commission ruled 
in favour of the Kashmiri people and upheld their claims for rights. In short, the plight of 
the Kashmiri people was despicable by the time the British announced the division of the 
subcontinent in 1947. 




            At the time of independence for the subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir was one of  
562 ‘princely states’ in India (Lamb 1991). These states were autonomous and were 
governed by independent rulers who had a special agreement with the British. Among 
these princely states, Kashmir was significant because of its vast territory [80,000 square 
miles] and a population of 4 million people in 1947 (Lamb 1991). Strategically, the 
undivided Kashmir in 1947 had borders with half a dozen countries which included 
Afghanistan, China and the former USSR. The 1947 plan for the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent gave three options to all princely state . They were given the choice to join 
the future India, or the future Pakistan or to remain independent. Kashmir was 
predominantly Muslim [over 90%], but it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. He first signed 
a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan in order to retain autonomy for 
Kashmir. However, the Muslim majority in Kashmir resisted this violently and demanded 
accession to Pakistan. Upon seeing unrest in Kashmir, the Hindu Maharaja signed an 
‘instrument of accession’ with India in 1947 [the exact details and date of which are still 
disputed]. This led to the beginning of a local uprising against his rule in the same year. 
This local uprising coupled with the covert military support of the Pakistan army and the 
ensuing India-Pakistan war resulted in the division of Kashmir. One third of Kashmir was 
held by Pakistan, while India retained the rest along with the most precious part, the 
Kashmir valley.  
            In 1948, India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council 
and agreed to conduct a plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of 
Kashmir for their future. This plebiscite was never allowed to be held by India, despite 
the best mediatory efforts of the United Nations. A United Nations Security Council 




Resolution in 1948 urged both India and Pakistan to make efforts “to create proper 
conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to deci e whether the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan” (Lamb 1991: 183). The Security Council 
Resolution 47 stipulates “that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India 
or Pakistan should be decided through democratic method of a free and impartial 
plebiscite” (Khan 1994: 513). However, if India was reluctant to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir, why then was Pakistan insisting on its inclusion in its territory? In order to 
answer this question, we have to define the material interests of Pakistan on Kashmir 
from a realist perspective. 
            The rivers of Pakistan, including the Sind, the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Ravi 
come from the Himalayan Mountains and after passing through the Kashmir valley end in 
the Punjab [Pakistan]. Along with the rivers, all the major highway links of Kashmir with 
the outside world were through parts of present day P kistan (Bazaz 2003). It was part of  
the British ‘great game’ to keep the Russians at bay from the subcontinent and for that 
purpose an out post at Gilgit was acquired from Kashmir’s Hindu Raja in 1935 with a 
sixty year lease. After independence this region became the northern part of Pakistan. It is 
interesting to note that in that strategic area Pakist n and China developed the Karakorum 
highway. Paradoxically, the same outpost which was used by the British to keep the 
communist threat away has now become the bridge between communist China and 
Pakistan. Kashmir now consists of two parts, one is the Pakistan held Kashmir and the 
other is the Indian held Kashmir. Demographically, the Indian held Kashmir again 
consists of three very conspicuous areas. One is the mountainous Jammu where the 
Hindus are dominant. The other is the Muslim majority valley or the vale of Kashmir and 




the third is the Buddhist area of Ladakh. Yet overall 80% of the population of the Indian 
held Kashmir is Muslim. The area of Kashmir that Pakist n occupies is also 
predominantly Muslim. Therefore, realistically speaking, on the eve of 1947, all  
communication networks, the Muslim majority population of the princely state of 
Kashmir, water ways, as well as its economy “was bound up with what was to become 
Pakistan” (Lamb 1991: 12). 
            The armed struggle for freedom started in Indian held Kashmir in 1989. The 
reasons why this armed struggle began vary. These reasons include, the Indians 
preventing the people of Kashmir from holding a plebiscite, the instigation of the 
Pakistani armed forces and the fraudulent elections that were conducted in Indian held 
Kashmir. All these causes will be explained in detail in section five of this chapter. For 
the Indian authors, the realist explanation of the security problem of Kashmir is the result 
of the ‘institutional’ instability of the Indian state and increased ‘political mobilization’ of 
the Kashmiris in lieu of opportunities given to them by the Indian democracy (Ganguly 
and Bajpai 1994; Ganguly 1996). Although the democrati  credentials of the Indian 
polity might have provided opportunities to Kashmiris to excel in public life, because of 
the failure of institutions in Kashmir like flawed elections, central government governor’s 
rule to dissolve the state legislature, many of the various avenues for opportunity have 
been curbed for them (Ganguly 1997).  
            The materialistic solutions of this conflict have so far proved futile over the years. 
They oscillate between proposals of international arbitration or holding a ‘regional 
plebiscite’ in the three distinct regions of Kashmir depending upon their demographical 
profile. This involves the Hindu dominated Jammu, the Buddhist dominated Ladakh and 




the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley. Ultimately it will result in the Hindu dominated 
Jammu and the Buddhist dominated Ladakh going to India, while the Muslim dominated 
Kashmir valley will join Pakistan. It is not a novel idea. This option was already 
presented by Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent Australian Jurist and the UN representative on 
the Kashmir issue, in his report to the UN in the 1950’s. It asked that “regional 
plebiscites” be conducted. However, it was conceived a little differently. It was suggested 
that the Kashmir valley where Muslims are in a majority should be given the chance of a 
plebiscite to vote for India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Similarly, Pakistan held 
Kashmir should also be given this choice. Since the Simla agreement of 1972 between 
India and Pakistan, any international mediation on the dispute is an anathema for India 
which insists on bilateral negotiations of all conflicts between the two states.  
            To ‘craft peace’ in Kashmir the material considerations include making the line of 
control between India and Pakistan an international border, giving a ‘third option’ of 
autonomy or independence to Kashmiris while exerting their right of self determination 
(Koithara 2004). Some authors have called the 1947 partition plan of India and Pakistan 
an ‘incomplete partition’ of the subcontinent because the issue of Kashmir was never 
settled (Lamb 2002). A new dimension of terrorism has also been added to the dispute. 
India now blames Pakistan for supporting the terrorist activity in Kashmir. Without 
refuting or debating these charges, it can safely b said that realist assertions of this 
dispute are presently focused on power dynamics in the region. The problem with all 
these realist perspectives is that they are tainted with the nationalist agenda of India or 
Pakistan and are being solely confined to the material significance of Kashmir. The most 
‘flexible’ stance until now was presented by the ex-President of Pakistan Musharraff 




known as Musharraff’s formula (2004-2005) which is a ‘four point’ solution to the 
problem (Jones 2009). These four points are as follows: 
• The geographical demarcation of the Kashmir dispute. 
• The demilitarization of the disputed territory. 
• The power of self governance given to the people of Kashmir. 
• “Some parts of Kashmir be subject to joint Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri 
supervision” (Jones 2009: 136). 
 
            But after the ousting of President Musharraff in 2008 and the ‘cold’ response by 
the Indian elites, the whole idea was abandoned (Jones 2009). Moreover, after the 
Mumbai attacks by Pakistani based Kashmiri militants i  2009, all talks or negotiations  
between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue were stopped.  
            My argument is that these materialistic olutions based on realist assertions of the 
dispute do not uncover the ideational socio-cultura components of this dispute. I do not 
intend to present the familiar realist versions of this dispute, but to offer a social 
constructivist reading of the conflict. Therefore, after providing a cursory overview of 
these materialistic assertions, I will look at the socio-cultural components in the next 
section of this chapter. 
 
5.3 The ideational component of the Kashmir conflict  
            How these competing narratives of India and Pakistan help to conflate the 
Kashmir conflict between these two states? The ideation l component attached to the 
Kashmir dispute has made it a very hard nut to crack and this has led to its irresolvable 




nature. The ideational components I am referring to are the socio-cultural aspects which 
are central to the identities of India and Pakistan that vow to hold on to Kashmir. It has 
led to the intractability of this territorial dispute which means that it not only involves the 
material interests of the contesting states, but also refers to the “entrenchment” of these 
disputes for normative reasons (Hassner 2006). Hassner defined entrenchment as “the 
process by which disputes become increasingly resistant to resolution over time, marked 
by an enhanced reluctance to offer, accept, or imple ent compromises or even negotiate 
over territory” (Hassner 2006: 109). Although there appears to be no tangible material 
benefits attached to long irresolvable disputes among states, the states become 
‘entrenched’ to intractability because of their own ‘material, functional and symbolic’ 
entrenchments (Hassner 2006). In the case of the Kashmir dispute, there is no lack of 
negotiation, but the net results show that there is entrenchment. The material and 
functional entrenchment means the difficulty of separating the disputed territory from the 
host country due to economic reasons. The symbolic entrenchment is defined as the 
process through which emotional, cultural and religious colours are deliberately added to 
the dispute leading to its entrenchment (Hassner 2006). In the case of Kashmir, these 
socio-cultural narratives are being added so that i has now become a dispute transfixed to 
the identities of India and Pakistan. For example, Kashmir is often seen as the symbol of 
Pakistan’s Islamic identity, while others view Kashmir as the jewel of Indian secularism. 
Both these metaphors are used by the elites in Pakistan and Indian to make this dispute 
seemingly irresolvable. The ‘territory’ of Kashmir is being ‘metaphorically’ treated as a 
human body where the loss of Kashmir means ‘death’ for Pakistan and ‘amputation’ for 
India (Inayatullah 2008). 




            The Kashmir issue has entangled the identiti s of India and Pakistan. The social 
norms of animosity used for their own identities have enmeshed this dispute as an 
extension of their own identity discourses. For example, the Indian claim on Kashmir is 
incomplete without maligning Pakistan for promoting terrorism in the valley. Similarly, 
Pakistan’s identity based on a separate abode for Muslims of the subcontinent resists the 
Indian hold on the Muslim majority Kashmir. This Indian hold is considered as the 
reason for the negation of Pakistan. These social norms do not offer an alternative 
explanation of the dispute. These norms are the actual ause of the dispute which is not 
adequately taken into account by the realist materialistic explanations of the dispute 
(Forsberg 1996). They not only become ‘concrete intrests’ of the states involved, but 
also act as “threats to identity crucial to the disputants” involved in a conflict (Ross 1997: 
300). Kashmir is entangled to the point of being a hostage and has been unable to come 
up with an identity of its own. The state narratives embedded in identity discourses are 
being used frequently as “psycho-cultural dramas” (Ross 2001). These are analytical 
‘tools’ of ‘cultural identity’ which helps us to understands and resolve the ‘ethnic 
conflicts’ ‘constructively’ (Ross 2001: 157). In the Kashmir dispute, such ‘psycho-
cultural dramas’ are constructed by the social practices of both states’ elites.  
For example, the loss of the Holy relic/ hair of the Holy Prophet in Hazarat bal 
(Srinagar) in Indian held Kashmir in 1964 was one of the many incidents after which 
large scale riots broke out not only in Kashmir, but in the rest of India as well. After some 
days, it was found and its sacredness was authenticated by a board of religious scholars. 
This issue was linked to the identity of the contending states. The Kashmir problem 
reflects the contrasting identities of India and Pakist n, but there is also an indigenous 




identity of Kashmir. The next section explores this distinct identity of Kashmir and how 
its non-rendition by Indian and Pakistani elites led to this distress in Kashmir.  
 
5.4 ‘Kashmiriyat’: the essence of an indigenous identity of Kashmir  
This section will explore the identity of Kashmir independent of the parameters 
designed by Indian and Pakistani elites. The Kashmir problem emerged due to the 
convergence of three factors. Varshney identifies th e three factors: “religious 
nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomized by India, and ethnic 
nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris call Kashmiriyat” (Varshney 1991: 999). 
Kashmir has a specific culture and identity of its own. The history of Kashmir from 
medieval times until the present is important for uncovering certain peculiar socio-
cultural norms broadly subsumed under the rubric of ‘Kashmiriyat’. Kashmir was 
dominated by four centuries of “imperial rule, from Mughal (1586-1757) and Afghan 
(1757-1819) to Sikh (1819-1846) and Dogra (1846-1947)” (Cockell 2000: 326). 
Therefore, the desire for self rule has always been th  core ‘valuational’ determinant for 
the identity of Kashmir (Cockell 2000). “The essenc of Kashmiriyat ethnicity is the 
network of socio-cultural, historical and linguistic es that bound all Kashmiris, 
regardless of religion, into an interdependent social collective” (Cockell 2000: 327).  
            During the rule of the Dogra Raj, the Kashmir valley remained geographically 
isolated from the rest of the subcontinent. This helps to explain why the Kashmiri identity 
is different from the identity of the Muslims and the Hindus of the subcontinent. While in 
the subcontinent religious differences and divergent cultures led to a communal divide, in 
Kashmir religious diversity has created a common colle tive identity. As I will explain 




below, this identity complex has four distinct components which include religious 
tolerance, desire for freedom, socio-cultural distinctiveness and linguistic similarity. 
            The religious norms include “rishi’ whic  focused on the development of “mutual 
tolerance and non orthodox devotion” especially among co-religionists, the Hindus and 
the Muslims (Cockell 2000: 327). It is ironic that in contrast to other regions in India, the 
spread of Islam was peacefully introduced to the Kashmir by mystics and Sufis referred 
to as ‘Rishis’ (Khan 1994). Muslim rule in Kashmir was established without any blood 
shed. Islam was propagated in Kashmir peacefully through the efforts of Mir Sayyid Ali 
and his followers in the medieval period (Bazaz 2003). The reason behind this is that 
Sufism in Islam and Shaivism ‘Trika’ of the Hindus in Kashmir were akin to each other 
(Bazaz 2003). Both focused on respect for co-religionists and they believed in ‘religious 
Humanism’ (Khan 1994). In Kashmir, the saints of Islam are revered by both Hindus and 
Muslims alike, e.g., Lalla, Lal Ded, Sheikh Norruddin called ‘Shazanand’ by the Hindus 
(Bazaz 2003). After the death of Sheikh Norruddin in 1808 AC, his followers formed a 
religious order called the ‘Rishis or Babas’ in Kashmir (Bazaz 2003). It is based on 
“Religious Humanism under the veneer of Islam” (Bazaz 2003: 87). Although the basic 
tenants of the Quran remain the same, there was a peculiar synthesis of Islamic traditions 
with the regional socio-cultural norms of Kashmir (Bazaz 2003).  
            The spread of Islam in Kashmir during the 13th and 14th centuries was neither 
abrupt nor violent, but rather it subtly altered “the social structure of the Kashmiris”  
(Iqbal and Nirash 1978: 15). The Hinduism practiced in Kashmir is peculiar to the region 
when compared to the orthodox Hindus in other parts of India. It all transpired in 
Kashmir during medieval times and continued for centuries. For instance, the Kashmiri 




pundit eats meat in contrast to the ‘vegetarian Brahm ns’ of the rest of India (Iqbal and 
Nirash 1978). There were conversions in Kashmir as the Hindus accepted Islam, but with 
conversion there also came the ‘exchange of two cultures’ (Kalla 1978). Marshall 
explains that, “seldom in the history of mankind, has the spectacle been witnesses of two 
civilizations, so vast and so strongly developed yet so radically dissimilar, as the Hindus 
and [the] Muslims, meeting and mingling together” (Kalla 1978: 27). There is also free 
participation of the Hindus and the Muslims in each ot er’s social events like marriages. 
Even today the annual Hindu pilgrimage to holy Amarnath shrine in mountains of 
Kashmir valley has been arranged among others by local Muslim maliks. They are also 
given their due share from the offerings of the shrine by the Hindus. The site became 
controversial in 2008 when the governor of Kashmir appointed by the Indian state gave 
an adjoining forest area to the shrine board for pilgrimage use. The local Kashmiri 
Muslims protested against this decision because they feared the resettlement of Hindus in 
Kashmir would change the demographic profile of the valley.  
            These characteristics of Kashmiri social norms have inculcated in the Kashmiris 
the desire for freedom and independence. However, this desire among the Kashmiri 
people has been thwarted since the nineteenth century, when Kashmir along with its 
inhabitants was sold by the British to a foreign Maharaja Gulab Singh for the paltry price 
of 75 lakh in 1846. The harmonious ‘ethno-national’ and ‘religio-cultural’ relations 
between different communities in Kashmir make up the essence of ‘Kashmiriyat’ (Bazaz 
2003). The narrative of Kashmir obtaining its freedom is still vibrant and can be gauged 
from the following couplet.8  
                                                
8 Note the emphasis here is on obtaining freedom, rathe  than joining either India or Pakistan. However, 
this is always shoved under the carpet by both India and Pakistan elites. 




“I have accepted the burden of ages on my hand 
The angels of the heavens have shuddered at my dogge ness 
I have chewed steel, I have braved fire; 
But thus my head has not, till this day 
Bent low before anyone else but thee” 
                                                                  Poet Azad Kashmiri (Bazaz 2003). 
 
            The spirit of ‘Kashmiriyat’ explains why the Kashmiris prefer freedom over 
independence. They have chosen the benevolent rule of foreign masters rather than the 
despotic attitude of their own kings (Bazaz 2003). Twenty-eight dynasties have ruled 
Kashmir since 1339 A.C and ten of these were from outside Kashmir (Bazaz 2003). The 
reign of Dogra Sikh Maharaja Gulab Singh started in 1846 and from this period on the 
transformation of Kashmiri identity began (Bazaz 2003). However, this change only 
became apparent in the 1930’s when the tyranny of the outsiders was so despotic that the 
Kashmiris not only started demanding freedom, but independence as well (Bazaz 2003: 
121).  
The socio-cultural norms of the Hindus and the Muslim  in Kashmir also differ 
from others ‘outside Kashmir’ (Iqbal and Nirash 1978). The ‘composite’ Kashmir  
culture is made up of ‘Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist’ characteristics making it a 
‘synthetic’ one ‘with unity in diversity’ (Kalla 1978: 26, 32). The social caste system of 
the Hindus in Kashmir was not as ‘rigid’ as what was being practiced in other parts of the 
subcontinent (Singh 2000). In Kashmir, ‘many Hindu converts’ did not even change their 
‘old surnames’ like ‘Bhatts’ ‘Mantus’ or ‘Rathores’ (Singh 2000: 2). This practice was in 
direct contrast to converts of the rest of the subcontinent. There was no communal clash 
between the Hindus and the Muslims during the ‘Muslim rule in Kashmir’ which was 
quite divergent from the history of strife between the Hindus and the Muslims of the 
subcontinent (Singh 2000). The only clash was during the reign of Sultan Hasan Shah 




and apart from that there was wide spread tolerance, mutual amity as well as incidents of 
‘inter-marriages’ among the Hindus and the Muslims of Kashmir (Singh 2000: 43). 
            Finally, as far as linguistic similarity s concerned, the ‘homogeneous’ Kashmiri 
culture has over 89% of the people who speak ‘Kashmiri’ as their ‘mother tongue’ (Puri 
1995). This language is called ‘Kashur’ by the Kashmiris and is “one of the oldest spoken 
and literary languages of modern India” having a ‘Drdic origin’ (Puri 1995: 58). The 
following comment made by Sufi demonstrates the composite influence of cosmopolitan 
Kashmiri culture. While discussing the Kashmiri language, Sufi pointed out that “the 
original Dardic language has supplied the skeleton, Sanskrit [Hindu dialect] has given it 
flesh, but Islam has given it life” (Puri 1995: 58). The ‘unity’ of all the faiths of Kashmir 
is the essence of Kashmiriyat and any effort to divide this socio-cultural part on 
rationalist lines has met with great opposition from the Kashmiris (Ellis and Khan 1995). 
For example there was a proposal by the ex-prime minister of the Pakistani held Kashmir, 
to divide Kashmir between India and Pakistan at the C nab river which originates in 
Kashmir, but this proposal was met with strong opposition by the Kashmiris (Ellis and 
Khan 1995). This distinct culture of the Kashmiris has developed unique social 
relationships among the Hindus and the Muslims in Kashmir. 
            In his thought provoking work, Bazaz explains that “the people of the valley have 
evolved through ages a distinct culture of their own which they are loath to part with” 
(Bazaz 2003: 733). He explains further that the Hindu pundit of the Jammu region has no 
problem with a Kashmiri Muslim of the valley and in fact would feel more at home with 
him than with a Hindu from mainland India. Similarly, the Muslim of the Kashmir valley 
is comfortable in the company of the Hindu pundit of the Jammu region (Bazaz 2003). 




The question arises, how have the socially constructed identities of the Hindus and the 
Muslims in Kashmir become opposed to each other afthave such a long history of 
friendship and amicable relationships? The self fulfilling prophecies of the elites of India 
and Pakistan have mutilated the entire concept of an indigenous Kashmiri identity. 
Ironically, neither the Indian secular image, nor Pakistan’s pseudo-religious profile, 
applies to the Kashmiri identity (Bazaz 2003).  
 
5.5 The social practices of India and Pakistan elites 
            The socio-cultural part forming the interests of Indian and Pakistani elites over 
Kashmir is based on their own struggle for identities. Fearon explains that “ethnic 
violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic identities in order to 
strengthen their hold on power” (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 853). In social constructivism 
the process of “primordialism” or the given nature of self interest is often rejected and 
criticized, but seldom is there an alternative explanation offered for the construction of 
identities during times of violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Sometimes it is the process 
by which the identities of two groups are constructed in a way that it ‘yields violence’ 
(Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). In other words, the process of the construction of 
identities entails in it the seeds of violence. Buthow is this process formed and by 
whom?  
            In the case of Pakistan, Muslim ideology was used by Pakistani elites to shape the 
identity of the Kashmiri Muslims. However, Kashmir’s history and indigenous culture 
demonstrates that Muslims and Hindus have lived in harmony. Yet after the creation of 
Pakistan, the identity of Kashmir was aligned to the identity of Pakistan based on their 




common religious moorings. Similarly, the Indian state established institutions in 
Kashmir which failed to coalesce the common identity of the Kashmiris. In his 
constructivist analysis of ethnic conflicts in South Asia, Chatterjee explains the clash 
between the nationalist discourse of identity and the sub-nationalist identity discourse 
(Chatterjee 2005). He found that “throughout South Asia, the discourse of territorial 
nationalism has been used by the state to counter the ‘threat’ of assertive and divisive 
ethnic identities with an aim to create monolithic construction(s) of nationhood” 
(Chatterjee 2005: 85). How have the Indian and Pakist n  elites adopted such a 
discourse? This section will explain chronologically the social practices of the Indian and 
the Pakistani elites.  
The Indian and Pakistani elites adopted social practices for their own political 
gains in Kashmir which was evident during their struggle for independence prior to the 
partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The people of Kashmir wanted to get rid of the 
Maharaja rule and in order to achieve freedom started their own independence struggle in 
the 1930s. They invited the leadership of both the Muslim League and the Indian 
National Congress [party] to help them in their struggle for freedom. But the leadership 
of both the Indian National Congress [party] and the Muslim League wanted Kashmir for 
the sake of bolstering their own identities. At theinvitation of Kashmiri leadership, both 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, nd Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
founding father of India, visited Kashmir in 1944 and 1940 respectively. They both spoke 
of Kashmir in the context of the wider struggle forreedom without considering the 
demand of the ‘fight for freedom’ started by the Muslim Conference [party] of Kashmir 
(Blinkenberg 1998: 60).  




            Nehru’s secularization credentials were becoming popular in 1940 and the 
Kashmir struggle led by Muhammad Abdullah completely aligned itself with the Indian 
National Congress [party]. This period of history also witnessed a split in the Muslim 
Conference of Kashmir, with the pro-Pakistani leadership led by Ghulam Abbas 
remaining under the banner of the Muslim Conference i  alliance with the Muslim 
League. The secularists led by Muhammad Abdullah formed the National Conference to 
instil the secular credentials of the Indian National Congress [party]. Nehru referred to his 
trip to Kashmir in 1940 as the ‘beloved visit’. Nehru was himself born as a Kashmiri 
pundit. While Jinnah asked the people of Kashmir to “awaken and instil life in the dead 
bones of the Muslim Nation” (Blinkenberg 1998:61). Jinnah saw the struggle in Kashmir 
as part of a wider Muslims struggle in the subcontinent. Gandhi also visited Kashmir in 
August 1947 days before the partition of the subcontine t and stated that “The people of 
Kashmir should be asked whether they want to join Pakistan or India. Let them do as they 
want. The ruler is nothing. The people are everything” (Wolpert 2001). The pre-
independence speeches of Indian and Pakistani elites refl ct how they were seeing the 
struggle in Kashmir through the prisms of Indian-secular and Pakistani-Muslim identities.  
            After independence, Nehru had reiterated time and again the solemn pledge of 
India to the people of Kashmir to ascertain their wishes by holding a plebiscite in 
Kashmir. When in 1957 he was taunted for going against his pledge made before the 
United Nations Security Council for a plebiscite in Kashmir in 1948, Nehru stated that 
“Kashmir is not ours but it is of the Kashmiris. We cannot stay in Kashmir for a moment 
without the consent of the Kashmiris. It is not ourproperty” (Abdullah 1964: 532). The 
Kashmiri leaders in Indian held Kashmir, like Mohammad Abdullah [the Lion of 




Kashmir], had thought of independence from both India and Pakistan as a third option. 
They wanted to make Kashmir “the Switzerland of the East” (Lamb 2002). After its 
accession to India, Kashmir was led by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the Jammu and 
Kashmir National Conference, who became Prime Minister in 1948. However, after he 
reminded Nehru of his pledge before the United Nations Security Council to hold a 
plebiscite in Kashmir, Abdullah was dismissed as Prime Minister of Indian held Kashmir 
in 1953 and was subsequently arrested. The Indian government in the 1950s was also 
accused by Abdullah of abusing the terms of the ‘Accession of Kashmir’ in which it is 
explicitly stated that apart from defence, communications and foreign affairs, every other 
state function had to be performed by the Kashmir government itself (Nayyer 2010). For 
speaking out, he was put behind bars for eleven years. A local pro-Indian leader Bakhshi 
Ghulam Muhammad was installed as Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1953. The cause for 
self-determination in the 1960’s and 1970’s was carried out by another popular political 
party the Plebiscite Front. Another important junction in the political history of Kashmir 
came after the death of Nehru in 1964. Any semblance of secularism maintained by 
Nehru for the Indian state also vanished with his death.  
            In the post-independence phase in Pakistan, the elite’s social practices vis-à-vis 
Kashmir can be divided into two categories. One is the civilian elite and the other is the 
military elite. The civilian elites of Pakistan have tried to wade their way through the 
marshy waters of Kashmir by engaging in dialogue, but they were given less 
manoeuvrability by the military elites as principal stake holder due to the army’s 
stranglehold on Kashmir. The military elites have kept their hold on power by 
deliberately raising the issue of Kashmir every now and then (Acharya and Acharya 




2006). Kashmir lies at the critical junction of India and Pakistan’s ‘contesting national 
identities’ with both not willing to accomodate Kashmir’s own distinct identity discourse 
(Acharya and Acharya 2006).  
            Moreover, whenever the military elites came to power in Pakistan, from General 
Ayub to General Musharraff, they have always adopted a proactive military strategy in 
Kashmir. This resulted either in the direct involvement of Pakistan’s army or with the 
active support of the militant factions in Kashmir in their fight against the Indian might. 
This helped the Pakistan army in primarily two ways. First, it helped the army to 
construct its place as the sole guardian of state identity and the saviour of its founding 
ideology; and second, it helped engage half of the Indian military in Kashmir. In 1965, 
General Ayub Khan launched the ‘Gibraltar Operation’ and ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to 
liberate Kashmir from India by force. Similarly, the ‘Kargil Operation’ was the brain 
child of General Musharraff in 1999. These historical examples support the proactive 
military strategy of engaging the Indian army in Kashmir. However, it should also be 
noted, that the actions of Pakistan’s army in 1965 did not result in a popular uprising 
among the Kashmiri population to stand up against the Indian army. Similarly, in 1971, 
when India and Pakistan went to war, there was no popular struggle against the Indian 
army in Kashmir. This may be because of two reasons. Fir t of all, it was the precise 
timing of the event. Kashmir’s identity in 1965 and 1971 was not radicalized enough to 
take up arms against India. Secondly, the older generation of Kashmiris including pro-
nationalist secular leaders like Abdullah still had enough influence so that they could help 
keep peace in the valley. 




            However, this state of affairs changed altogether after the infamous Indira- 
Abdullah pact was agreed upon between the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 
Kashmir Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullah in 1975. The special status of Kashmir in 
the Indian Union was forgiven and tacit approval was given by the central government of 
India to integrate Kashmir firmly into mainstream India. After this pact was adopted the 
autonomous character of Kashmir changed. The post of Prime Minister of Kashmir was 
re-designated as the Chief Minister. Abdullah was given Chief Minister-ship of Kashmir 
as his reward. This was a turning point, because after 1975, the local Kashmiris became 
disillusioned with their nationalist Kashmiri leadership (Bazaz 1978). The fears of the 
Kashmiri people were justified after the flawed and fraudulent elections that were 
subsequently held in the 1980s (Ganguly 1997). Democracy in Kashmir was conducted 
by ‘intimidation and terror’ (Bazaz 1978). The Kashmiris feared annihilation of their 
indigenous culture under the dominance of India. The new generation of Kashmir, now 
better informed and qualified, became disenchanted with Indian state practices and took 
up arms against the Indian army in 1989 (Ganguly 1997). The hopes of Kashmiris for the 
establishment of democratic norms by the largest democracy in the world were crushed 
by the despotic autocratic rule in Indian held Kashmir (Bose 2003). The centralist 
practices of the Indian state’s institutions had disillusioned the Kashmiris. India often 
blame Pakistan for the militant insurgency that erupted in the Indian held Kashmir in 
1989. All Indian governments routinely accuse Pakist n of instigated the problem by 
sending militant infiltrators to the Kashmir valley. However, it can also be seen as the 
failure of the state apparatus in Indian held Kashmir to respect the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people. The centralist policies of keeping Kashmir in a nationalist fray and the increase in 




political mobilization, imbued a sense of deprivation among Kashmiri masses (Ganguly 
and Bajpai 1994; Ganguly 1996). The struggle was exac rbated by the failure of Indian 
institutions to satisfy local demands for autonomy because of the implementation of 
central government policies, the imposition of the governor’s rule in the 1980s, as well as 
the fraudulent state elections held in 1987. The agency responsible for the entrenchment 
of this dispute is both leadership of India and Pakist n. It is useful to highlight some of 
the social practices of the elite by examining institutional policies developed for the sake 
of governance in Kashmir. 
            The ethnic nationalism in Kashmir presented an interesting deviation between 
state interests and the indigenous ethnic nationalist movement (Cockell 2000). The core 
values and norms of Kashmir directly clash with the institutions developed by the Indian 
state (Cockell 2000). The social practices of India elites were based on the nationalist 
discourse of an Indian identity whose corner stones ar  complete subordination to the 
nationalist cause with minimum recognition of cultural autonomy amid central control. 
While, the social practices of Kashmiris are based on the indigenous and autonomous 
discourse of a distinct identity of ‘Kashmiriyat’. The ‘state discourse’ rejects the 
‘recognition of nationalist movements’ due to its own vested interests in national unity 
(Cockell 2000: 321). 
            The post-colonial Indian threat that seeks to engulf and draw this distinct 
Kashmiris identity into the main folds of the nationalist cause has resulted in ‘existential 
fear of anxiety’ and ‘ontological insecurity’ among the Kashmiris (Kinnvall 2004). In 
India, the central government policies paid no heed to the Kashmiris’ “shared socio-
cultural values and identity referents” (Cockell 2000: 321). The repressive measures 




taken by the Indian central government to control militant activities in the valley of 
Kashmir invariably led the local Kashmiris developing a strong adherence for freedom 
and independence as a part of their core identity (Cockell 2000). The problem with both 
India and Pakistan is that they have inherited the post-colonial system of their foreign 
masters which was totally alien to the local culture and traditions. The only advantage of 
this colonial structure was its ability to extract the maximum amount of revenues from its 
colonies by allowing the local population few avenus for governance. They had set up 
the state apparatus accordingly and built institutions which had a centralist control and 
had no room for the recognition of autonomous local bodies based on the cultural 
traditions particular to that region. This inheritance of post-colonial rule by the state elites 
after 1947 carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. The violence in Kashmir is one 
such example. Cockell points out that “subaltern ethnic minorities are excluded from this 
centralized definition of national identity, and often have circumscribed avenues for 
political mobilization” (Cockell 2000: 322). The Indian quest for a secular identity, 
versus Pakistan’s emphasis on an all pervasive Islamic identity, has led to ethnic 
insurgencies in Kashmir. It has led to the impositin of  “a monological definition of 
national identity, and links this with the political closure and coercive control structures 
of national security” (Cockell 2000: 323). 
            The Indian constitution of 1950 gave Kashmir a special status in Article 370 by 
giving the state of Jammu and Kashmir all powers except defence, currency, external 
affairs and communications (Teng, Bhatt et al. 1977). This acceptance of the de jure 
autonomy of Kashmir was infringed upon and was erodd time and again by the Indian 
elites under pressure from the discourse of its secular Indian identity and it has now 




virtually ceased to exist. These social practices of the Indian elites in the shape of direct 
central government rule, the abrogation of the Kashmir legislature and manipulating 
elections resulted not surprisingly in violence in the valley of Kashmir (Tremblay 2002). 
In reality between 1954 until 1975 when the Kashmir accord was signed which formally 
abrogates the special status of Kashmir, there was in total 28 constitutional orders passed 
in one form or the other to integrate Kashmir with India and 262 Union Laws [laws 
applicable in other Indian states] were adopted in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir (Guha 
2007). The utter disregard shown by the central government of India towards the rising 
demand for autonomy and the local population’s desire for the right of self determination 
ultimately had a spiralling centrifugal affect. 
            Without going into the legal framework of the constitutional history of India, the 
point which I want to reiterate is that Kashmir has never been allowed by both states to 
develop its own ethnic cultural identity. Both India and Pakistan have tried to 
superimpose their own identities of secularism or Islamic identity respectively so as to 
keep their own nationalist agendas on the table. Pakistan looks at Indian held Kashmir as 
the negation of its own identity. If a peaceful Kashmir can exists within India then the 
whole reason of the partition of the subcontinent on c mmunal lines falls to the ground. 
For Pakistan supporting the Kashmir cause is like gvin  a new lease of life to its own 
identity.  
            This has developed a ‘contested concept of justice’ wherein Pakistan felt 
incomplete without Kashmir on account of its Muslim credentials and principles of the 
partition of the subcontinent (Forsberg 1996). Similarly, India contests on the basis of its 
secular credentials to thwart the secessionist trends in multi-ethnic and pluralist India. 




But who has suffered in such conflicting and contested versions or viewpoints? It is the 
local Kashmiri population whose third generation has grown up bearing the brunt of this 
dispute that has lingering on unabated since 1947 some sixty three years after the 
independence of India and Pakistan. Some authors like M tra have used cultural 
nationalism as a rational approach to study the ethnic movements in South Asia (Mitra 
1995). He is of the view that the direction of the sub-national movement is guided by 
rational interests while the resources used by its protagonists are linked to cultural causes 
of identity (Mitra 1995). The Kashmir struggle is guided by cultural factors the essence 
of which is a separate identity based on “Kashmiriyat”. It is not directed by rational 
interests or material determinants, but rather an ideat onal component has inculcated a 
sense of an “imagined community” which a Kashmiri cannot resist (Anderson 1983). In 
short the contemporary checkered history of present day Kashmir is full of elites’ 
highhandedness. But the state of Jammu and Kashmir “was not monolithic: it contained 
many peoples with divergent pasts, traditions and patterns of life ” (Lamb 1991: 217). 
The next section explains some of the popular percetions of the Kashmiri people 
regarding the action of the elites of India and Pakist n. The popular social practices draw 
attention to the distinct identity of Kashmiris as practiced by the indigenous population. 
This also explains the tussle between elites’ perceptions and popular perceptions of the 
Kashmir identity. 
 
5.6 The popular social practices of Kashmiris 
            The tainted visions of India and Pakistan through the prism of their own identities 
have torn apart the socio-cultural fabric of the mutual coexistence of Kashmiris. Some 




authors are sceptical of the existence of any distinct cultural identity for the Kashmiris 
especially in the aftermath of violence that has led to the polarization of the various 
cultural identities (Hewitt 1995). Furthermore, Pakistan’s support for militant activities in 
Kashmir and Indian’s attempt to label the freedom struggle in Kashmir as state terrorism, 
has resulted in quashing these common norms. It is diff cult to come up with any 
statistical data concerning the popular perceptions of the Kashmiri people about the 
actions of the Indian and Pakistani elites due to the instability in the region. However, 
increased militancy in the region by Pakistan, as well as the flawed general elections by 
India in Kashmir both have disillusioned the Kashmiri people (Jones 2009). The militant 
groups also vary with some supporting an active pro-Pakistani stance and a religious 
outlook, while others are fighting for their independ nce (Jones 2009).  
            A survey conducted by a ‘British company, MORI’ in a sample of 850 Kashmiris 
found that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of them wanted themselves to be ‘at the forefront 
of the search for a settlement’ (Jones 2009). The question of independence was not asked 
in the survey (Jones 2009). Another survey was carried out by the ‘International Crisis 
Group (ICG)’ in 2002 on a smaller sample of 80 peopl  in ‘the Kashmir Valley and 
Srinagar’ (Jones 2009: 131). In that survey many viewed Indian rule as ‘oppressive’ and 
they believed the fight of Kashmiri militants was ‘justified’, but at the same time ‘they 
were also exhausted by the conflict and sceptical of Pakistan’s motives in Kashmir (Jones 
2009: 131). However, ‘70 percent’ were in favour of opening the Kashmir border 
between India and Pakistan for economic and ‘cultural’ reasons (Jones 2009). The results 
of these surveys are ‘disputable’ but time is stillthe testimony (Jones 2009). For example, 
in the past 63 years, the elites’ social practices of India and Pakistan have so far not borne 




any tangible results for peace in the region. The difficulty lies in the disharmony between 
the popular social practices [Kashmiri people] and the elites’ social practices of India and 
Pakistan.  
            India and Pakistan both have sidelined th  Kashmiri leadership in their 
negotiations, though in rhetoric, both states’ elites have desired the resolution of the 
Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, 
the chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) a conglomerate of diverse 
political parties in Indian held Kashmir, complained against this fact. Farooq pointed out 
that:   
“ The main purpose of our visit is to reiterate our stance that without involving  
Kashmiris of both sides in dialogue, the issue could not be resolved and no  
durable solution could be reached. Kashmir is not a territorial or border area  
issue. It involves lives of 13,000,000 Kashmiris” (Dawn 22.6.2008) 
 
            Another question which arises is whether  popular social practices based on the 
norms of ‘Kashmiriyat’ still exist in the turbulent part of Kashmir itself? Is there still a 
viable option that such norms can be propagated given the recent turmoil in Kashmir? 
Nasreen Ali has studied the distinct Kashmir identity in the diaspora Kashmiri 
community in Great Britain (Ali 2002). She has concluded that the “discourse of 
Kashmiriyat emerges in a diasporic space” (Ali 2002: 146). This diaspora community in 
Britain came mostly from the Mirpur district of Pakistan held Kashmir. In Britain, they 
found the space necessary to foster their own distinct identity that they were not able to 
have in Indian and Pakistani held Kashmir. The underlying message of the research 
carried out on the diaspora is that Kashmir is a natio  in every sense of the word with a 
distinct culture and identity (Ali 2002). The disharmony between the elites and the 
popular social practices has resulted in the ‘tragedy over Kashmir’ in which ‘the voices’ 




of the Kashmiris “have been drowned out by the Islamists, nationalists and ideologues in 
both Islamabad and Delhi” (Jones 2009: 139). 
            In a ‘content analysis’ of 46 proposals introduced for the resolution of the 
Kashmir issue between 1947-2008, Yusuf and Najam found that ‘autonomy to 
Kashmiris’ has been the recurring theme among all such proposals (Yusuf and Najam 
2009). Furthermore, they also identified the ‘virtual consensus’ on ‘catalysts’ leading to 
its resolution which involves ‘soft borders’, the ‘involvement’ of Kashmiris in the 
resolution of the dispute and the ‘demilitarization’ f the region (Yusuf and Najam 2009). 
This sounds somewhat familiar to the Musharraff formula introduced previously and 
points towards enhancing harmony between the elites and the popular social practices. 
But in reality we see that the ideological commitments of Indian and Pakistani elites 
towards their respective state’s identity discourses have never allowed this to be 
actualized.  
            The tension within India due to the pressures of the centripetal forces demanding 
a common identity under the canopy of secularism and the outward centrifugal forces 
demanding more autonomy in the region has caused rel ntless struggle in Kashmir. The 
Bharatiya Janata party, as flag bearer of Hindu domination, has also proposed that the 
special status given to Kashmir by Article 370 in the Indian constitution be eliminated 
(Dutt 1998). Even though such a guarantee only remains in de jure, while Kashmir is 
being treated e facto as one of the ordinary states within an Indian Union. For India, the 
fundamental question being asked is can “a Muslim-majority state exist, without undue 
fuss or friction, in a Hindu-majority, but ostensibly “secular” India?”(Guha 2007: 249, 
emphasis of the author ). The answer seems to be ‘no’. It was the government of India 




which took the matter of Kashmir to the United Nations Security Council and now it has 
backed down from both the United Nations Resolutions 47 and 211 to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir (Malik 1993). 
            Kashmir’s own identity discourse based on popular social practices that have been 
around for centuries was never allowed to come at the forefront. As Bazaz points out, 
“the prerequisites to attain that ideal [free Kashmir] is a mental revolution”(Bazaz 2003: 
737). This demands the propagation of social norms for peaceful coexistence based on 
Kashmir’s indigenous culture of ‘Kashmiriyat’. Only with the “assertion of a nationalist 
Kashmiri identity” will the dispute be resolved (Ellis and Khan 2008). The identity of the 
two main actors India and Pakistan have submerged the indigenous composite Kashmir 
identity in their own nationalistic discourses. Weldes explains, “insecurities are cultural 
in the sense that they are produced in and out of the context within which people give 
meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives ” (Weldes, Laffey 
et al. 1999). The social practices of Indian and Pakist ni elites have up until this point 
formed their particular narratives on Kashmir based on their own national identities and 
have sold them to their respective audiences. The population of both states has conformed 
to this as the sole reality of the dispute. The materi l disposition of this dispute may 
include many resolutions, but it is its cultural context which renders all such settlements 
null and void. The partitioning of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has sacrificed its 









            The lack of space given to the Kashmiris for the propagation of their own 
indigenous social norms of peaceful coexistence as well as the parallel irredentist claims 
of both India and Pakistan have led to the security issue of Kashmir. The rival discourses 
of the identities of India and Pakistan have had a spill over affect on Kashmir which has 
been forced to lay down its own specific identity in lieu of an Indian or Pakistani version. 
The Kashmir dispute can be better explained if we abandon these nationalist discourses 
of the secularism of India and the Islamic identity of Pakistan and instead focus our 
minds on the construction of an identity for Kashmir. The distinction between the 
security dilemma in a realist sense and in a constructivist one is over the material versus 
the ideational components. The explanation of the ideational component of a security 
dilemma requires “taking seriously the parties’ culturally rooted interpretations and the 
fears and threats underlying them” (Ross 1997: 317). The various strategic solutions to 
the dispute based on realist explanations have not achieved the desired results (Winner 
and Yoshihara 2002).  
            The security dilemma over Kashmir examined from a social constructivist 
perspective shows that Indian and Pakistani elites have contributed to the aggravation of 
this dispute. What was formerly a territorial dispute in Kashmir, has now evolved into an 
intractable identity crises. There are “very few movements in the world [which] have 
been so determined and so sustained” (Nayar 11.6.2010). The Kashmiris are in search of 
their own identity by looking for its roots in their indigenous culture. As Adler explains 
“people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders 
run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end” (Adler 




1997b: 250). Kashmir has made the whole environment of South Asia into an insecurity 
quagmire. The Muslim leadership in Kashmir wants tripartite negotiations among the 
principal stakeholders India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris for a solution to this problem.  
            The denial of space for the recognition of Kashmiriyat norms by way of India-
Pakistan elites’ social practices is the major cause of the present stalemate over Kashmir. 
The Kashmiriyat forms the socio-cultural norms underlying the traditional popular social 
practices of the Kashmiri people. The elites social pr ctices in the shape of flawed 
elections, the lack of impartial enforcement of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and 
the use of excessive force in the shape of the Indian army, as well as Pakistan’s support 
for the militants, has so far not allowed the popular social practices of the Kashmiris to 










6: India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry: the influence of ideology upon elites’ 
social practices 
 
This chapter seeks to answer the following question. Why did India and Pakistan 
become overt nuclear states one after the other in 1998? More specifically, why did India 
suddenly shed its former ambiguous nuclear posture on the 11th of May 1998 only to be 
followed by Pakistan after barely two weeks? The nuclear rivalry between India and 
Pakistan is often studied with the realist approach of IR which looks at the nuclear 
discourse of a state in an environment of the ‘survival of the fittest’. Without assigning 
any major role to these materialistic premises or mini izing their scope, I will explain 
this rivalry based on the ideational components of both states’ identities. I will argue that 
it was the ideologically based routines or the social practices of both states’ elites which 
contributed to their decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. If we assume ‘security as 
practice’ and believe that the identity discourse of a state is directly related to the social 
practices of a state’s elites, then the argument can be made that these practices can 
influence and change the security discourse of a state (Lene 2006). 
            The discourse analysis of the speeches of the elites in India and Pakistan show the 
importance of religious myths as well as cultural symbols and how they are used by the 
elites in constructing a ‘social reality’ (Nizamani 2000). The elites further sell this 
constructed ‘social reality’ by disguising it under popular social practices. This led to the 
creation of a synchronized intersubjective environme t between popular social practices 
and elite social practices which further paved the way for India and Pakistan to make the 
decision to go nuclear in 1998. The Bharatiya Janata P rty (BJP) in India and the army in 




Pakistan have emerged as the principal actors in the r respective state’s nuclear discourse. 
Hindutva as a distinct ideological slogan was incorporated by the BJP and applied to the 
Indian nuclear discourse, while Indo-centric myths along with the acquisition of an 
Islamic bomb were being constructed around Pakistan’s nuclear discourse. Due to the 
vastness of the subject, the time frame of this study is primarily, though not exclusively, 
focused around the social practices of the elites during the decade of the 1990s. 
            This chapter is divided into seven sub-sections. The first section deals with the 
standard narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan concerning their 
respective nuclear discourses. The second section provides an historical perspective and 
looks at some of the realist explanations for the em rgence of the nuclear programmes of 
India and Pakistan. The third section defines the ideational or socio-cultural framework 
of this rivalry. The fourth section deals with the k y aspects of my argument regarding 
the centrality of elites’ social practices in the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. 
The Indian nuclear discourse is explained through the all pervasive ‘Hindutva’ identity of 
the Indian polity. This section also elucidates the routines of Pakistani elites by revealing 
the underlying discourses of otherness towards India as well as the attainment of an 
Islamic bomb. The fifth section illustrates the socio- ultural component of this rivalry in 
the context of India and Pakistan’s missiles programmes. The sixth section elaborates on 
the popular social practices of Pakistanis and India s towards their nuclear programme. 
These popular social practices show that a dichotomy exists regarding the nuclear issue, 
since at times we find people’s derision towards conducting such nuclear tests while 
other times these tests are actively supported by the people. This section further 
emphasizes that this dichotomy is due to the lack of public knowledge in this crucial 




security matter and the mystery surrounding both state ’ nuclear discourses. Finally the 
seventh section concludes this case study by arguing that the social practices of the elites 
and their conflict with popular social practices can be seen as central to the nuclear 
rivalry between India and Pakistan.  
 
6.1 India and Pakistan narratives on the nuclear isue 
            Pakistan is the only Islamic country in the world which has the nuclear bomb. It 
will make Pakistan the fortress of Islam for the fifty plus Islamic states in the world. The 
nuclear bomb is essential for the safety of Pakistan against the evil designs of India. India 
has been the nemesis of Pakistan’s existence and has never accepted the independent 
status of Pakistan. The nuclear bomb is the ultimate price for state survival paid by the 
people of Pakistan by sacrificing their comforts and needs. This is a standard Pakistani 
narrative which can be easily found with only minor differences of words in the majority 
of Pakistan Studies text books. The books are published by the Pakistan state and 
studying them is compulsory for students [Pakistan Studies for the Tenth Class, Sind Text 
Book Board, Karachi, 2009]. 
            This type of typical Pakistani narrative has been used by the elites to build support 
for their decision to establish a Pakistan nuclear programme. Not only is this programme 
particularly Indo-centric, but Pakistan’s entire security discourse has always been formed 
as a reaction to and linked with Indian security practices. For example, the following 
statement by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakist n, to a Guard Commander of 
the Pakistan Navy in March 1948, offers further testimony to this Indo-centric threat 
construction approach. Jinnah told the Commander: 
 




“Pakistan has been created and its security is now your responsibility,  
I want them to be the best soldiers in the world, so that no one can  
cast an evil eye on Pakistan, and if it does we shall fight him to the end  
until either he throws us into the Arabian Sea or we drown him in the  
Indian Ocean” (Khan 2005). 
            The reference to the ‘Arabian sea’ and the ‘Indian ocean’ is clearly intended to 
apply to India as the sole enemy of Pakistan. But these were the initial years of 
independence and Jinnah had fought a bitter war with the Indian National Congress 
[party] to win over Pakistan. He could be given the benefit of doubt. It was barely a year 
after the independence of Pakistan in 1948 that Jinnah passed away. In subsequent years, 
the increased army’s influence in the state’s body politics has resulted in the state’s 
security practices being directly focused on India. This Indo-centric myth has been the 
corner stone of all military regimes in Pakistan. The third law of the motion of physics 
holds that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”. If we alter this law 
slightly it can also be applied to the context of Indian-Pakistani relations since “for every 
Indian action there is an equal Pakistani reaction, but in the same direction”. It has been 
ingrained in the mind set of every Pakistani that India has never accepted the identity of 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s security practices are designed by the ruling political or military 
elites based on this kind of logic.  
            At the outset, the reasons for Pakistan w ting a nuclear bomb seem to be rational 
considering the presence of its neighbouring arch rival India. I will not deny this 
rationality, as I have explained in the beginning of this chapter. The reasons that Pakistan 
established a nuclear programme are no doubt rational and can in part be explained by 
realism. However, there are two ideational components of this narrative that are under 
emphasized. One is the Islamic nomenclature of the bomb, the other is the military elites’ 




Indo-centric approach which is constructed through Pakistani identity. I will explain this 
is detail in section four of this chapter.  
            Now let us consider the Indian narrative, India is the sixth nuclear power in the 
world. The attainment of the nuclear bomb is purely an indigenous and highly scientific 
endeavour of the nuclear scientists of India. It has given India a definitive and qualitative 
role among nation states. India’s history as a great civilization has given it this ‘shakti’ 
[pride]. India’s impregnable defence with nuclear technology will not allow anyone to 
‘vivisect the motherland’ of India again. India has removed the ‘nuclear apartheid’ 
created by a few ‘haves’ against the ‘have-nots’ in nuclear technology. This is the 
standard Indian narrative which, with only few changes in phraseology that every Indian 
student has to study in the compulsory text books of Political Sciences and Social 
Sciences. These books are published by the Indian state [National Council of Educational 
Research and Training, NCERT, New Delhi]. The roots of this discourse can be found in 
the speeches of the Indian founding fathers. 
            At the first Constituent Assembly of India, Prime Minister Nehru presented a bill 
on the Atomic Energy Act [1948] for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission. 
After the bill was passed with some opposition, Nehru culminated the debate by stating: 
 “I think we must develop it for purpose of using it for peaceful purposes.  
 It is that hope that we should develop this. Of course, if we are compelled 
  as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any  
  of us will stop the nation from using it that way”.  
                                                      (Perkovich 1999:20 italics by the author). 
 
            The speech above shows a persuasive mixture of the realist and ideational 
components of the Indian nuclear programme. At one tim it sets out the reason for 
obtaining nuclear technology as for ‘peaceful purposes’, but at the same time it also 
explicitly states that ‘no pious sentiment’ can deter India from going down the path to 




acquiring nuclear weapons which is a realist outlook based on the balance of power 
politics. This ‘ambivalence’ or ‘ambiguity’ surrounding the Indian nuclear programme 
remained the hallmark of Indian nuclear discourse fom the 1950s until the 1990s and it 
also effected India’s decision to declare an overt nuclear posture that was adopted in 1998 
(Perkovich 1999). These issues will be elaborated on further in section 2 and section 3 of 
this chapter. Before I look at the ideational components of this rivalry, I will first briefly 
explain the history of the nuclear discourse of India and Pakistan and I will then examine 
some of the realist explanations provided for the exist nce of these nuclear programmes.  
 
6.2 The historical and some realist explanations 
            The founding father of India, Mahatma Gndhi was the great preacher of ‘ahimsa’ 
[non-violence]. His ideological commitment to non-violence was the cornerstone of the 
Gandhian philosophy of life. Gandhi explained the horror of nuclear bombs in the 
aftermath of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagaski [1945] in these words: 
 “The only moral which can be legitimately drawn from the supreme  
 tragedy of the bomb is that it shall not be destroyed by counter-bombs” 
                                                                                  (Gandhi 2001: 25-26). 
 
            Indian political horizon has been for the most part dominated by its founding 
party, the secular Congress party from independence in 1947 until 1996. There were a 
few brief interludes of the Hindu religious fundamentalist party Baharatiya Jana Sangh 
[the predecessor of the BJP] which ruled from 1977 to 1979 and of the National Front 
coalition which ruled from 1989 to 1991, but primarily the Congress party dominated the 
political scene until the mid-1990s. The Congress party has produced many national 
leaders including Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. 




The nuclear discourse under the secular Congress party showed remorse for a proliferated 
nuclear policy. Nehru asked for a “Standstill Agreement” to suspend the future testing of 
nuclear weapons in the 1950s.  
            India’s first nuclear explosion was in 1974, but it was disguised under the cloak of 
“Smiling Buddha” and was claimed for peaceful purposes. It was conducted under Indira 
Gandhi’s Congress party ministry in 1974 and was refer d to as PNE [Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion]. Moreover, after conducting this test, the successive Indian governments up 
until the 1990’s did not actively pursue massive nuclear weapons build up as compared to 
the situation which developed after its overt nuclear policy was adopted in 1998. 
Although the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme [IGMPD] was started 
during Indira Gandhi’s rule in 1983, it was not purs ed on a massive scale. There was no 
sign at that time that India’s secular Congress party intended to create a nuclear rivalry 
with Pakistan. In fact, in 1982, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposed a 
“Program of Action on Disarmament” during the UN Second Special Session on 
Disarmament. And in 1988, her son Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asked for an “Action 
Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Vi lent World Order” at the Third 
Special Session in UN. Ostensibly, the proposal was rejected and no heed was paid to it 
as it involved renunciation of nuclear weapons by all five major nuclear powers. Yet here 
the aims of the secular Congress party for global pe ce and the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons are quite evident. The secular Indian i entity prescribed by the Congress 
party eschews the role of religious myths based on cultural norms in the security 
discourse of the state at that time.  




            The nuclear policy of the ruling Congress party governments from 1974 until 
1989 can be termed as ‘ambivalent’ (Perkovich 1999). It was tied to the universal moral 
principle of ‘ahimsa’ [non-violence] as advocated by Gandhi, but at the same time the 
real-politick of Nehru demanded that India should also strive for its true share and 
prestige in the world. India became a nuclear state in 1974, but remarkably there was 
little effort made by the state to pursue the rapid production of nuclear weapons 
(Perkovich 1999). This appears to contradict realist predictions concerning the behaviour 
of a nuclear state surrounded by its enemies.  
            Pakistan’s nuclear programme was initiated in 1954 in collaboration with the 
United States ‘Atom for Peace’ programme. In 1956, the Atomic Energy Research 
Council was established in Pakistan which later on became the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission [PAEC]. It was established purely for peaceful energy purposes. In the era 
of President General Ayub Khan [1958-1969], it gained momentum, but largely remained 
focused on satisfying the energy requirements of the country. However, things changed 
drastically in the aftermath of India’s test of a nuclear bomb in 1974. After getting the 
news that India had conducted a nuclear test, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto gathered the country’s top 50 scientists at Multan and challenged them “to build a 
nuclear bomb that would help restore Pakistan’s strength and reputation” (Nawaz 2008: 
339). In his former capacity as a cabinet minister for Ayub Khan, Bhutto had hinted 
earlier in an interview to the Manchester Guardian in March 1965 that if India went 
down the path to nuclear weapons then “we should have to eat grass and get one, or buy 
one, of our own” (Nawaz 2008: 340). This indicates the centrality of the Indian nuclear 
program in the security discourse of Pakistan. However, this is not just a rivalry between 




two enemy states, but it is a rivalry that has been formed around the identities of the two 
states. The link between these identities and ideologies has already been explained in 
Chapter 4, however I will further trace this link with Pakistan’s nuclear discourse by 
looking at the speeches of the Pakistani elites in section 4 of this chapter. 
            After the Indian nuclear test in 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto laid the foundation 
for the Kahuta Research Laboratories [KRL] in 1976, an autonomous body separated 
from its parent organization the PAEC. There appeared to be an urgent desire to match 
India in its nuclear quest. The finances for the nuclear programme were generously being 
sent by Muslim countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya 
(Nawaz 2008). The Islamic summit at Lahore in 1974 paved the way for financing the 
nuclear programme in the face of sanctions from the West. Bhutto’s rhetoric and national 
cry was instrumental in luring Abdul Qadeer Khan, the famous Pakistani nuclear 
scientist, to come to Pakistan in the mid-1970 from the Netherlands. However, Bhutto, 
who was the only civilian Prime Minister with a firm control over Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme, was ousted by a military coup in 1977. From this point on, it is the military 
elites in Pakistan who have kept a stronghold on Pakistan’s nuclear policy.  
            It is important to understand the central role that military elites play in Pakistani 
nuclear policy. Although the nuclear programme of Pakistan was initiated by the civilian 
government of Prime Minister Bhutto, after his execution in 1979, the programme was 
carefully guarded and nurtured by the army. The domination of Pakistan army’s control 
over state government and thus over the nuclear programme, is evident after thirty years 
of direct military rule during only its sixty three years of existence since independence. 
Because of the inferiority of Pakistan’s conventional defence forces when compared to 




Indian forces, the military elites in Pakistan have tri d to establish a ratio of 3:1 of 
conventional man-power between India and Pakistan. However, during the years of 
military sanctions [1989-1994], it became difficult for the Pakistani military to buy the 
essential military hardware it needed from the West in order to maintain this prescribed 
ratio. Furthermore, there was the economic rise of India in the 1990s which gave India 
more room to spend on defence allocations. This diverted the attention of the Pakistani 
elites who desperately looked for non-conventional means to counteract the Indian might. 
Therefore, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities to deter India seemed the only 
plausible solution. This course of action was also motivated by Pakistan’s geo-strategic 
proximity to India.  
The military elites developed the idea of an ‘Indian threat’ and the need for 
‘countervailing nuclear weapons’ to get popular legitimacy for their regimes (Ahmed 
1999). The martial law regime of General Zia ul Haq exploited the lenient clauses of 
European legislatures in countries like Germany and the Netherlands in the 1980s in 
order to get ‘uranium enrichment technology’ (Ahmed 1999). Pakistan’s nuclear 
discourse show a ‘symbiotic relationship’ with the Indian nuclear programme (Zahra 
2000). This special relationship was keenly followed by Pakistan since the Indian nuclear 
test of 1974. The aim of acquiring a minimum nuclear deterrence in the wake of the 
Indian explosion was helped by geo-strategic changes in the region. These include the 
Afghan war during the 1980s, as a result of which Pakistan got military assistance from 
the USA. The United States also turned a blind eye towards clandestine Pakistani efforts 
for the procurement of fissile materials for nuclear tests. The clandestine nuclear 
programme in Pakistan continued uninterrupted under all governments no matter whether 




it was martial law or a democratic regime. As a result, Pakistan tested its nuclear weapon 
in 1998 in reaction to the Indian tests. 
After this brief history of the India and Pakistan nuclear programmes, let us now 
examine some plausible and some non-plausible realist explanations of this rivalry. 
A state’s decision to go nuclear is most often explained in rationalist terms and 
based on the cost benefit calculations of its material interests. According to realists, a 
state will be more likely to pursue nuclear options if its vital national interests are 
threatened by rival states. However, with the absence of any external threats to its 
security, this does not explain why India took such rgent actions to conduct nuclear tests 
in 1998 followed shortly thereafter by Pakistan (Cohen 2000: 340). India’s decision to go 
nuclear has strong links to the belief system which influenced the ruling elites of that day. 
These cultural and social influences are not adequat ly ddress by traditional theories of 
nuclear deterrence (Cohen 2000). The behaviour of India can neither be explained as 
coercive politics of a state in anarchy, nor a state under the duress of international 
institutional norms or regimes of non-proliferation. Thus, a single theoretical straitjacket 
cannot be universally applied to every state’s nuclear discourse on account of various 
constraints [domestic and regional] faced by the state . 
 The realist theories of nuclear deterrence explain that in the case of a security threat, 
a state will always keep a minimum nuclear deterrence level. Yet this theory does not 
account for the large number of nuclear stock piles in the possession of the USA and the 
former USSR that exceed far beyond the anticipated minimum deterrence level 
(Perkovich 1999). Waltz acknowledges this fact when  stated that “the United States 
and the Soviet Union have multiplied their weaponry far beyond the requirements of 




deterrence” due to military and political pressures (Perkovich 1999: 316). Again, it is 
interesting to note, that deterrence theories can not explain why India and Pakistan are the 
only democracies engaged in such nuclear competition (Perkovich 1999). 
 Neo-realism has generally predicted that states in an anarchic system will seek 
nuclear weapons if there is a threat to their survival. But this general assumption does not 
define ‘how and when’ states choose the nuclear push b tton, because neo-realism 
renders all states as ‘like units’ (Perkovich 1999). Realists generally presume that it is 
because of insecurity that states desire to go nuclear. This ‘abstractness’ and 
‘timelessness’ in the neo-realist approach makes it ineffective to predict the ‘real-time’ 
effectiveness of the nuclear discourse of states (Prkovich 1999). It does not explain why 
India waited for thirty-four long years after the Chinese test in 1964 to start a massive 
nuclear build-up or proliferation (Perkovich 1999). The Chinese threat was imminent 
considering the fact that India lost a war to China in 1962. There are always a host of 
factors involved in a state’s decision to go nuclear and among these factors a state’s 
national identity discourse plays a dominant role. It xplains how the elites have 
‘identified, constructed, and followed the state’s “national interest” in nuclear policy’ 
(Perkovich 1999: 454 emphasis of the author himself).  
            Another realist argument which can be critically analyzed is that the nuclear 
rivalry between India and Pakistan is a sort of vicious cycle whereby India went nuclear 
because of the Chinese nuclear programme, and Pakistan went nuclear because of Indian 
nuclear ambitions. Kanti Bajpai, a leading Indian security expert, explains that any 
‘realistic’ Chinese threat towards India is a figment of the imagination, as history is 
testimony to the fact that no Chinese Emperor ever attacked Indian soil during ‘thousands 




of years’ of their ‘close co-existence’ (Ghosh 1999: 4). India was always invaded from 
its eastern side, the area that today is the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhawa [K-P] province of 
Pakistan where the famous Khyber Pass lies. It was historically the main route for all the 
Turk and the Afghan invasions into mainland India. At present, however, there exists a 
rivalry between India and China in the Indian Ocean with regard to their development of 
naval bases. Furthermore, there are India-China border disputes in Aksai Chin in Ladakh, 
in Arunachal Pradesh in India, as well as in Tibet and the eastern area of India adjoining 
Bhutan. The border between India and China is 2,520 miles, one of the longest borders in 
the world. However, my focus is not on Indian and Chinese territorial dispute, what I 
want to point out is that there was no imminent Chinese threat that could have influenced 
India’s decision to go nuclear in 1998. Even the 1962 India-China war was localized at 
the disputed border region of Aksai Chin. The Chinese did not attempt to impose a full 
scale war on any other Indian city at that time. Therefore, it can be argued that India’s 
defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and the subseqent Chinese nuclear test in 1964 are 
among some of the contributing factors that may have partially influenced India’s 
decision to go nuclear 1974. However, China’s nuclear posture in the 1990s never cast its 
shadow over the reinvigoration of an Indian nuclear proliferation program in 1998. Both 
countries enjoyed good diplomatic relations during that period. Just a few days before 
India conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998, the C inese Chief of General Staff General 
Fu Quanyou was the guest of his Indian counterpart. At the time, pleasantries were 
exchanged between the two leaders and there was no talk f war (Roy 2001).  
            In an opinion poll conducted by The Times of India in April 1995, one year prior 
to the Indian tests, 79 percent of the population plled in urban cities of India believed 




that ‘Pakistan’s possession of a nuclear bomb is a ‘serious security threat to India’ while 
only 47 percent believed that the Chinese nuclear programme is the real threat to Indian 
security (Balakrishnan and Chatterjee 22.4.1995). Let us examine the realist argument 
regarding the perception of threats concerning Pakist n’s nuclear programme from an 
Indian perspective. 
            The realist policy of ‘robust countervailing’ measures was not followed by India 
in the 1980s (Perkovich 1999). At that time, Pakistan was getting massive military aid 
from the United States, because of the Afghan war (Pe kovich 1999). According to the 
realist theory, given the geo-strategic situation and the clandestine advancement of 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the 1980s, it was expected that India would have 
pursued a policy for the rapid build up of its nuclear arsenal. India, however, continued to 
follow a policy of nuclear ambivalence or ambiguity towards its nuclear programme in 
the 1980s. That is why it is important to look at what may have been some of the 
domestic changes in the 1990s which could have influe ced a change in the course of this 
decades old policy concerning India’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, realists’ define 
the ‘strategic interests’ of states based on the mat rialistic capabilities of states in the 
region (Tellis 2001). However, these variables do not explain in the first place the 
particular context in which a state becomes nuclear.  
            The prevalent nuclear discourse in Pakist n is always retaliatory or reactionary in 
response to India without any regional or global influences of its own. In a realist sense, 
there is no doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear discourse is ‘unambiguously’ derived from its 
security concerns (Perkovich 1999). Pakistan’s decision to conduct nuclear tests just two 
weeks after the Indian nuclear tests, confirmed the wid ly held belief that Pakistan 




already had achieved the weapons grade uranium level at this point. But the nuclear 
discourse of Pakistan is also linked to the wider struggle of both states’ contrasting 
identities, as well as to its attainment of an Islamic bomb. Any potential roll back of 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme is contingent upon India’s course of action. Both are like 
‘Siamese twins’, whereby, the initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the mid-
1970’s was a reaction to the Indian nuclear test of 1974 (Perkovich 1999). It is this kind 
of obsession with India that has become a routine in determining Pakistan’s security 
practices. So it is crucial to understand the role of Indian elites, when contemplating the 
reasons behind this nuclear rivalry.  
            Why should one focus on the elites and not other forms of cognition which can 
also influence public opinion? The security dilemma between India and Pakistan is being 
constructed by elites’ social practices [as argued in Chapter 3]. The elites of India and 
Pakistan have manipulated the religious norms of their societies by using them as 
metaphors or constructing symbols of animosity in their speeches in order to create this 
nuclear rivalry. Pakistan’s foreign policy or state’s rhetoric always revolves around India 
and the elites have never been able to escape this feeling of otherness. These feelings of 
animosity are propagated by the elites at all times and when the crunch time came to 
respond to Indian nuclear tests, there was no other way than a tit for tat response by 
Pakistan. The complexities of cultural myths in India and religious norms in Pakistan are 
so profound that the elites in both countries find it easier to manipulate public opinion for 
their own gains by constructing the image of ‘the Other’. I will focus on the political 
elites in India, specifically of the BJP which was the party in power at the time of the 
Indian nuclear explosion in 1998, and on the political, as well as the military elites in 




Pakistan. The nuclear politics of the 1990s in India and Pakistan also revolve around 
global non-proliferation issues but I will not touch upon these. My objective is to explain 
the decision of both states to go nuclear in 1998 and to explain how their rivalry is based 
on intersubjective social norms. 
 
6.3 The ideational component: the role of soft power variables  
            The nuclear discourse of India-Pakistan is woven around the wider discourse of 
the identities of the Hindus and the Muslims of India and Pakistan respectively. Identity 
with regard to the security discourse has become ‘securitized subjectivity’ (Kinnvall 
2006). The subjects in a state desire securitization when they are afraid or when they feel 
a threat to the existence of their identity. In such situations, every self identity requires a 
threat from others. The threats to self identity are socially constructed by carefully 
selecting the narratives of threat constructions. The elites in both countries are 
responsible for the construction of threats. In a constructed world, identities are in a state 
of ‘flux’, but according to Robert Cox , “there may be periods and places where 
intersubjective understandings of these social facts re stable enough that they can be 
treated as if fixed and can be analyzed with social scientific methods” (Abdelal, Herrera 
et al. 2006: 700). The decision to go nuclear made by both countries in 1998 is one such 
instance of a period of stability in the hostile intersubjective understandings of India-
Pakistan. This intersubjective environment was strengthened further by social norms 
which helped to influence the decision making of the elites.  
            At one time, norms not only inform the p rceptions of political leaders but also 
help to shape the national identities of the state (Jackson 2008). This does not mean that 




the international structure or material factors are not important in a state’s decision to go 
nuclear, but the point to be emphasized here is the causal relations of cultural factors in 
influencing such a decision. Bourdieu has added the concept of ‘habitus’ to explain the 
cultural orientation of actors which is “a semi-conscious (though not innate) orientation 
that individuals have of the world [forming] a basis for practice ” (Jackson 2008: 164). In 
other words, every political actor has been working u der the influence of certain norms 
of the society. Bourdieu explains that such norms act as an “effective constraint” on the 
behaviour of actors (Jackson 2008: 167). But it is pertinent to mention here that all such 
norms are continuously contested and re-contested by the elites in their respective ‘fields’ 
of action (Jackson 2008). We can define such norms by linking them with the social 
practices of the elites.  
Soft power variables like religious myths, socio-cultural norms, belief systems and 
the ideological commitments of the elites have great salience in the nuclear discourses of 
India and Pakistan. Joseph S. Nye has defined soft power as “the power of attractive 
ideas” that can appeal to people and make them comply which includes “intangible 
power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions” (Nye 1990: 166). The 
constitutive norms derived from culture, described as formal and informal rules, identify 
the characteristics of a group (Abdelal, Herrera et l. 2006). The ‘contestation’ of a 
group’s identity explains the degree to which a particular norm influences the actual 
social practices while ‘context’ refers to the main ttributes of a group’s identity 
(Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006). If we examine the ‘context and contestation’ of BJP’s 
identity under the influence of ‘Hindutva’ norms, we can explain the social practices of 
the Indian state at the time of the nuclear test explosions in 1998. With an established 




collective identity of the group, the elites of this group engage themselves in social 
practices that are appropriate to their group characte istics. When such elites arrive at the 
forefront of state politics, then they have the clear aim of imposing their view of national 
identity of the state. They come up with a world view of their own and they try to 
construct the same view at the level of national politics. As a result, the social practices of 
the state are being influenced by this particular elites’ identity. The elites’ practices 
before obtaining state power can be viewed as social practices. However, after these 
elites become state elites, then their practices becom  security practices of the state. The 
above argument can be split into three tiers in order to clarify the ideational framework 
behind the Indian nuclear decision of 1998. 
• By understanding the social norms underpinning the identity of a political party. 
For India, it is the BJP and the socio-cultural norms are “Hindutva”. 
• By linking the social norms of BJP to the social practices of the political elites 
[The speeches of the elites when they are outside the helm of affairs]. 
• By explaining the social practices of Indian elites r lated to a state’s security after 
the party elites become national elites. [The speech s of the elites when they are 
at the helm of affairs]. 
 
For Pakistan the same scheme can be adopted while only slightly altered. 
• By linking the state’s identity discourse in the speeches of the elites to the broader 
context of the ideological commitment of Pakistan’s identity towards Islam and 
         the ‘Two Nation Theory’. [See also Chapter 4]. 
• By understanding the social norms of identity constructed by the political elites at  




the initiation of the nuclear programme. For Pakistan, it is the Indo-centric myth 
and the attainment of an Islamic bomb. [The political elites’ speeches after they 
became state elites]. 
• By understanding the social practices of the military elites when they become 
state elites and linking them with the security discourse of the state.  
 
These social practices of elites are principally derived from the soft power of 
religion such as the use of ‘Hindutva’ politics in India and the use of Islam in Pakistan 
(Haynes 2008). The ideologically committed use of ‘Hindutva views’ or social norms has 
‘influenced’ the Indian elites “in relation to Pakistan, Kashmir terrorism and nuclear 
weapons” (Haynes 2008: 155). Some analysts dismiss the relationship between the BJP’s 
Hindutva ideology and the nuclear decision of India state in 1998 (Corbridge 1999). But 
I assert that if we link the identity of the BJP by exploring its ‘constitutive’ and 
‘regulatory norms’ then we can see that they form a causal link to the state’s security 
practices which in turn can explain the reasons behind India’s nuclear decisions in 1998 
(Katzenstein 1996).  
 
6.4 The social practices of India and Pakistan elites  
             Indian civilian leadership is firmly in control of its nuclear programme with little 
influence by India’s military. Nevertheless, from 1974 until 1998, India’s nuclear 
programme was more or less ad-hock and was devoid of any institutional mechanism like 
a National Security Council or other supervisory body. In May 1998, the Indian Prime 
Minister Deve Gowda stated, “ The decision to conduct the nuclear tests is not a military 




decision. It is a political decision…made by two or three persons in your cabinet” 
(Perkovich 1999: 377). There was no long term policy or institutional body to formulate 
and implement any nuclear security doctrine until 1998. These decisions were made by a 
few political elites who were at the top echelons of power. Most of the time, the elites’ 
mind set was influenced by domestic conditions and their nationalist agenda to satisfy the 
voters. The social practices of the elites affect state security practices when these elites 
arrive as state elites in the political arena after winning elections. Obviously, any prior 
ideological commitments to party norms by these elites can transform the state’s security 
practices, especially if there is an absence of any institutionally designed decision making 
or regulatory bodies to put a check on the change i policy direction. This state of affairs 
was exploited by the Hindu fundamentalist party the BJP in favour of pursuing the bomb 
after it assumed power in 1996. 
            The foundational norms of secularism were established by the founding fathers of 
the Congress party almost five decades after independence. A novel phenomenon 
occurred in the decade of the 1990s with the resurgnce of religious fundamentalist 
parties in India. The BJP elites arrived on the natio l political scene in the 1990’s with a 
new ideology and a new vision for the state’s identity and security discourses. They 
believed that an overt nuclear posture would “deliver to Hindu India, the international 
status as a great civilization and nation” (Perkovich 1999: 377). The reasons behind the 
successful electoral campaign of the BJP which ultima ely led to the nuclear decision are 
varied. First, their success was partly due to the degeneration of the secular identity of 
India as formulated by Nehru [1947-1964]. Second, because of India’s history of 
uninterrupted democracy, there was an increase in the political mobilization and 




participation of the masses at this time (Kinnvall 2006). The third reason was the glaring 
economic disparity between a few wealthy elite groups and the poverty stricken masses. 
And finally, the fourth reason for their success was the Hindu fundamentalist party’s 
successful propagation of mythical religious stories to gain popular support among the 
people (Jaffrelot 2005). It was this last reason that played a dominant role in influencing 
the Indian nuclear discourse and will be elaborated on in more detail in the section 
discussing popular social practices.  
            The cultural appeal of BJP’s revitalized Indian identity with the reconstruction of 
religious myths, deviated from the long established s cularist social practices of Indian 
elites. According to Cohen, the reasons for the success of the Hindu fundamentalist party 
at centre stage include “social and caste tensions, the stresses of rapid and uneven 
economic growth, and the erosion of traditional caste norms spur on it” (Cohen 2001: 
121). While discussing the identity politics of BJP, Cohen notes that “the nuclear 
program is one in a series of important symbolic projects that the centre has undertaken 
to develop a sense of Indian nationhood and identity” (Cohen 2000: 26). India’s decision 
to go nuclear in 1998 is culturally and symbolically constructed in order to carve out an 
Indian identity based on religious nationalism [Hindutva]. The ‘Hindutva’ ideology 
emerged in India after the Hindu fundamentalist paries gathered together to form what is 
commonly called the ‘Sangh Pariwar’. Gandhi’s secularist ‘ahimsa’ vision of Gandhi was 
discarded by Sangh’s new ideology which considered ‘ahimsa’ tantamount to 
‘emasculating Hindu manliness’ (Bidwai 2001). 
            The Sangh Pariwar is made up of different Hindu fundamentalist parties which 
include the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh], the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and 




VHP [Vishwa Hindu Preshad]. The RSS is the primogenitor of all the Hindu 
fundamentalist parties in India. It’s well knit organization has provided the cadre and 
ideological tools necessary for all subsequent Hindu fundamentalist parties in India. The 
BJP is one such party whose leadership comes from the cadres of the RSS even though 
publicly these connections are denied (Jaffrelot 2005). The difference between the BJP 
and the other parties of the Sangh Pariwar is that the other fundamentalist parties never 
achieved major electoral successes. They only held power briefly from 1977 to 1979 
while the real power remained with the Congress party until the mid-1990s. If we look at 
the history of the Sangh Pariwar, then first comes th  RSS, followed by the BJS and only 
after that there was the rise of BJP from the 1980s onwards. Today the RSS and the BJS 
still exist. However, the BJP is the only religious f ndamentalist party in India that has 
come to power three times and it is still the main opposition party in India which enjoys 
vast popularity. Because the majority of the party elites of the BJP, including the former 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and stalwarts like L.K. Advani, came from the 
cadres of the RSS, it is fruitful to take a closer look at the core ideology of the RSS. 
            The RSS was founded in 1925 and drew its main inspiration from Vinayak 
Damodar Savarkar’s book ‘Hindutva’ [1923]. The book described Indian national 
identity in terms of Hindu culture, Hindi language and the worship of the sacred land 
‘India’ under the influence of the ‘Vedic Golden Age’ (Jaffrelot 2005).  
The major beliefs of Hindutva are explained by D.R. Goyal as follows: 
“Hindus have lived in India since times immemorial;  
 Hindus are the nation because all culture, civilization and  
life is contributed by them alone; non-Hindus are invaders  
or guests and cannot be treated as equal unless they adopt  
Hindu traditions, culture etc.” (Guha 2007: 646). 
 




            The centrality of ‘Hindus’ in the political, cultural and civilizational discourses of 
India is evident in the speech. A critical discourse analysis shows the macro structural 
components of this quotation as ‘Hindu culture’, ‘traditions’ as well as timelessness in the 
shape of ‘times immemorial’. These opaque as well as powerful themes constructed by 
the RSS elites demonstrate the biased discourse of Indian identity heavily tilted towards 
being solely a Hindu identity. It explains why it is difficult for the Muslims of India to 
accept the culture of Hindus. It is a monolithic perspective of the domination of one 
community over all others. The Muslims in Pakistan co sider the Muslim invaders of 
India to be their forefathers, yet these same people are thought of as the plunderers of 
‘mother India’ by Hindus in India. These are two opp sing myths of identity with no 
point of convergence.  
            The BJP derives its Hindutva ideology from its mentor the RSS which has a 
distinct view of Indian state identity. Hindutva identity is based on the social norms of 
Hinduism and it is believed that if a large section of Indian society practises these norms 
then they will help form a distinct identity for the Indian state. The question may arise 
what then is wrong, if the BJP has an indigenous Hindu identity as a road map for the 
progress of India? If Pakistan can be for the Muslim , why can India not be for the 
Hindus? It can be corroborated that Indian society is predominantly Hindu, with the next 
largest minority being Muslim that constitutes 14 percent of the population. According to 
the 2001 census, India has the third largest Muslim co munity in the world with 138 
million Muslims.  
            The problem with BJP’s road map is its anti-Muslim agenda in contrast to the 
secular, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and pluralistic identity of Indian polity. Since 




Muslims are still in the minority, the BJP policies generally win the support of the Hindu 
majority. In spite of the BJP’s ideology, there is no homogenous Indian identity. Even 
among the Hindu community there exists diversity since Indian society is riddled with the 
caste system. Thus, there is no monolithic culture as such for either the Hindus of India or 
the Muslims of Pakistan (Kinnvall 2006). This means that there are various types of 
Hindus among the Hindus and Muslims among the Muslims in India and Pakistan 
respectively. The Hindu society is divided into four distinct castes and every caste has a 
role to play according to its social significance in society. The upper most or the most 
revered caste is the ‘Brahmins’ who according to Hindu mythology are created from the 
head of the Hindu god and they are the teachers as well as the guardians of the religious 
places like ‘Mandirs’ [temples]. Second in line areth  ‘Kushtarayas’ who are born from 
the hands of the god and they are the warriors and kings. Then comes the ‘Vaishyas’ or 
the peasant class born from the stomach of the god and their role is to feed the masses. 
The last are the ‘Shudras’ who are born from the feet of the god and who are intended to 
serve the other castes by conducting all the menial work for them. There are also the 
outcastes or the untouchables who are outside the domain of the caste system and they 
are looked down upon in society on account of not being Hindus. This caste system or 
strict compartmentalization of humanity is still being practiced is many parts of India 
today.  
            Hindutva identity is based on ‘Bharatiy sanskriti and maryyada’ [language and 
tradition] (Puri 2005). These social norms speak the specific language understood by the 
Hindu masses at large. This is reflected in the idea of ‘cultural nationalism’ (Kampani 
1998). The attributes of cultural nationalism refers “to build a grand, powerful, and 




masculine national security state that will emerge as the symbol of national mythology 
and the converging point of high science, national identity, and achievement” (Kampani 
1998: 18). The cultural socialization of the BJP elites “constructed the notion of a 
civilizational Indian nation based on the myth of an unbroken brahamanic traditions, 
language, and symbols” (Kampani 1998: 18). It brought a new niche for Indian state 
identity based upon the ideal of an ‘imagined community’ and norms of ancient Hindu 
civilization (Anderson 1983). This socially constructed, new Indian identity of 
‘Hindutva’ was reinforced by state’s security practices during BJP reign and led to an 
intersubjective understanding of hostility between India and Pakistan. How did it happen? 
           After only a brief taste of holding power for fifteen days in 1996, the BJP was able 
to win broad support among the electorate for its populist slogan of Hindutva identity and 
formed the central government in India in March 1998. The new Prime Minister 
Vajpayee met with Indian nuclear scientists before his inauguration on the 20th of March 
1998 (Perkovich 1999). The ‘adhocism’ in nuclear decision making and the absence of 
any institutional framework for nuclear decisions, allowed the BJP party elites to make 
the decision to conduct a nuclear test (Perkovich 1999: 389). Only a ‘handful of the BJP 
elites’ who now became state elites actually knew about the impeding nuclear tests 
(Perkovich 1999: 404). These state elites included Vajpayee [the Prime Minister], 
Brajesh Mishra [the National Security Advisor], L.K. Advani [the Home Minister], 
Jaswant Singh [the Foreign Minister] and one or two others (Perkovich 1999). The few 
top Indian nuclear scientists who knew about the tests were referred to as the ‘strategic 
enclave’ (Perkovich 1999). In the absence of any institutional body to formulate and 
decide the core national interests of the state, the s ate’s lack of institutional capacity 




became quite evident. A few Indian elites made the decision to go nuclear in the face of a 
pristine security question of not only regional importance, but also of global significance. 
It was only in 1998 that the idea of the formation of a National Security Council was 
introduced by the Prime Minister Vajpayee and was subsequently established in 
November 1998 after the nuclear tests. This body now has the mandate to review the 
political, economic, energy and strategic concerns of India with proper structural 
mechanisms involving a strategic policy group, an advisory board, a joint intelligence 
committee and a national security advisory board. 
            After conducting the Pokhran tests II, the ruling BJP committed itself to building 
a national monument at the site where India detonated its nuclear device in 1998. 
Furthermore, the Vishva Hindu Perished [VHP], a political party whose norms or ideals 
are also shared by the BJP, wanted to distribute the radioactive sand from the Pokhran 
desert as ‘Prasad’ to all the nooks and corners of India (Roy 2001). ‘Prasad’ has a special 
significance in Hindu culture, since at every religious or culturally significant occasion 
[like marriages or religious festivities] sweets are distributed to all participating people as 
‘Prasad’. It is considered to be a good omen and its ea ing is obligatory for all 
participants. The link between ‘Prasad’ and the nuclear security discourse of the state 
shows the conflation of cultural identity with Indian state security.  
            The conflation of cultural norms with the strategic culture of India was explained 
by Jaswant Singh, the External Affairs Minister of India in the BJP’s government during 
India’s nuclear tests in 1998, as: 
 “an intermix of many influences: civilization, cultre, evolution,  
 and the functioning of a civil society, etc. It is a by-product of 
 the political culture of a nation and its people; an extension of the 
 functioning of a viable state more importantly its understanding of 
 the ways in which the power of a state can be used”(Singh 1999: 2).  




The ‘influences’ of Indian strategic culture includes various components of ‘civil 
society’. These components include the ‘political culture’ as well as the ‘people’ 
themselves. More importantly, it shows how powerful elites ‘use’ popular 
‘understandings’ to carry forward their own construc ed discourse. The speech was 
delivered a year after India’s nuclear test and it explains the power of the state linked to 
political culture and the social practices of the peo le [‘functioning of civil society’]. This 
is a distinct vision of India as well as of the Hindus in the eyes of BJP elites. The rhetoric 
used by BJP called for an overt nuclear weaponisation policy for India with a full fledged 
nuclear doctrine. The tool kits employed in the election campaign were cultural ones in 
order to construct a favourable environment for conducting nuclear tests. The Indian 
nuclear policy had never been part of any political party manifesto until 1990 and there 
were few discussions about it in the election campaigns (Cortright and Mattoo 1996). It 
only came up for public discussion after the pro-nuclear stance of the BJP was set. The 
Hindutva tool provided the BJP, a vision of Hindu ientity, based on Indian cultural 
themes and religious myths and as a means to formulate an assertive jingoistic national 
security policy (Datta 1999).  
            While addressing the Parliament, the India  BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee 
defended the rationale of having nuclear weapons as “the right of one-sixth of humanity” 
(Kothari and Mian 2001: 18). The speeches of the BJP state elites show the extent to 
which Indian prestige had been tied to the detonati of nuclear devices. The renewed 
Indian identity under ‘Hindutva norms’ has tied India’s prestige and status to nuclear 
explosions as compared to the economic well being of the Indian state. After the nuclear 
tests, Vajpayee explained that “the greatest meaning of the tests is that they have given 




India shakti [prestige], they have given India strength, they have given India self-
confidence” (IndiaToday 1998). The symbolic reference to shakti has a rich cultural 
history in Hindu mythology where it refers to wealth, goddess and material well being. In 
the words of the psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, “it is called nuclear numbing, the 
process by which we domesticate these [nuclear] weapons in our language and attitudes, 
rather than feel their malignant actuality, we rendr them benign” (Mian 2001: 102). 
            After the nuclear tests, the Indian political elites defended their reasons for 
pursuing nuclear weapons with primarily two arguments. One line of argument focused 
on the discriminatory attitudes of the nuclear “haves” towards the “have-nots” resulting 
in a “nuclear apartheid” (Singh 2004). While the second argument dealt with the 
construction of an environment of fear and external threats for the domestic Indian 
audience by justifying the social norms of Indian identity. The norms of the BJP party 
played a special role in the construction of such outside threats. 
            In short, the ideological components of ‘Hindutva’ identity can be seen as playing 
an important explanatory role in India’s decision t go nuclear in 1998. The social 
practices of the Indian elites especially the rise of the BJP in the 1990s shows the 
underlying resolve of the party elites to acquire nuclear capabilities in line with their 
vision of a renewed Indian identity. This identity shattered the ambiguity and 
ambivalence common to the nuclear discourse in India since 1947 by transforming it into 
an overt nuclear power. The vision of great India under Hindutva norms conferred the 
Hindu state identity. In his magnum opus entitled India’s Nuclear Bomb: The impact on 
Global Proliferation, Perkovisch concludes that, apart from the materialistic variables of 
insecurity faced by the states, two other factors motivated Indian elites to go nuclear. 




According to Perkovisch the first factor was the prssure that was being exerted by 
India’s ‘strategic enclave’ which included India’s nuclear scientists. While the second 
factor was related to the “the normative/ national identity interest in achieving major 
power status” (Perkovich 1999: 452). It is again interesting to note that Perkovich did not 
equate the rational, material interests to ‘great power’ status, but rather he focussed on the 
normative identity-nuclear nexus as the prime motive behind the Indian decision to go 
nuclear.  
            Before beginning to analyze the nuclear discourse of Pakistan, I would like to 
point out again that when compared with India, Pakist n’s nuclear discourse shows more 
realist than ideational tendencies. However, along with the realist assertions, there are 
also two ideational components. The first component r lates to the pledge of the Pakistani 
elites to make Pakistan’s bomb as an ‘Islamic bomb,’ and the other it its offshoot, which 
ties the bomb to the struggle of identities between th  Hindu-India and the Muslim- 
Pakistan. I will deal with these two ideational components side by side during the 
discourse analysis of the speeches of Pakistani elites. 
 The first ideational component is regarding the Islamic bomb. While discussing 
the Islamic bomb, Bhutto, who was the architect of the nuclear bomb in Pakistan, noted 
that:  
“The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have nuclear capability  
               along with communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without 
               it, but the situation was about to change” (Bhutto 1979: 136).  
 
            This discourse is carefully constructed an  linked with the pseudo-Islamic identity 
and cultural roots of Pakistan. The connection of anuclear security discourse with the 
cultural renaissance of the glory of Islamic civilization shows how the leaders cautiously 
constructed and strode upon the nuclear path by making  link with culture and religion. 




            The second ideational component is regarding the struggle of identities between 
the Muslim-Pakistan and the Hindu-India. In another parliamentary debate, Bhutto 
reiterated the centrality of India. Bhutto noted that:  
“India is acquiring nuclear weapons at very great costs and to intimidate  
              and blackmail Pakistan (…) That has been the purpose (…) to brandish the 
              nuclear sword at Pakistan (…) Pakistan c nnot rule out the possibility that  
              India will use the nuclear device if the war was there” (Das 2008: 54).  
 
This is called the “Indo-centric” approach of Pakistan’s nuclear policy (Hoodbhoy 
1998). Bhutto made this quote in a brief interlude of civilian control over the nascent 
nuclear programme of Pakistan, after the debacle of the 1971 war with India and the 
demoralization of Pakistan’s army. In the subsequent d cades of Pakistan’s history [after 
1970], the military emerged as the sole guardian of its nuclear programme. Pakistan 
army’s image as the sole saviour of the state has been carefully orchestrated by all the 
military elites who ruled Pakistan. After the coup of General Zia ul Haq in 1977 and the 
subsequent hanging of Bhutto in 1979, Pakistan’s army never allowed the civilian leaders 
to get a hold on the nuclear programme. Zia’s military junta was afraid of holding 
elections after hanging Bhutto. The nascent nuclear programme started by Bhutto came in 
handy for the military elites in order to justify their hold on power by alluding to the 
same ‘logo centric logic’ of otherness towards India (Nizamani 2000). In a countrywide 
address on the 30th of August 1979, Zia stated: 
“The acquisition of nuclear energy [is] (…) a matter of life and death for  
  the country (…) unholy plans are being promoted to estroy our research  
  program (…) the true mettle of the Pakistani nation and its spirit of self respect  
(…) the Pakistani nation is convinced that acquisition of atomic technology (…) 
is its basic right, which cannot be denied by any foreign power nor can  
             any government in Pakistan surrender it” (Nizamani 2000: 102). 
 
 




The discourse analysis of this speech points to three important variables regarding 
Pakistan’s nuclear path. First, it was linked to the identity of the state, a matter of ‘self 
respect’. Second, it was linked to the security of the state and third it was correlated with 
the Islamic character of the state’s identity. This Islamic character could also be 
augmented by propagating otherness towards India. During his reign, General Zia walked 
on a nuclear tight rope. He kept on denying Pakistan’  nuclear ambitions to the Western 
media and at the same time he was involved in clandestine efforts to enable Pakistan to 
acquire a nuclear bomb to counter the Indian threat. He constructed Indo-centric logic for 
the domestic audiences to perpetuate his own authoritarian rule. Geo-strategically he was 
helped by the Afghan war of 1979 and he could easily bluff the Western leaders. Zia 
continued the nuclear security discourse of Pakistan by reiterating the already existing  
myths of political culture (Nizamani 2000).  
            Thus, the era of Zia gave a new impetus to the culturally constructed theme of 
“Otherness” towards India and the formal recognitio of Pakistan’s army as Allah’s army 
with its motto ‘Jihad in the name of Allah’. These culturally constructed ‘regimes of 
truth’ were primarily based upon religious traditions and cultural norms (Foucault 1994). 
The security politics of the regime merged this nuclear discourse with the wider discourse 
of Pakistan’s identity. The rationale of having a bomb became akin to Pakistan’s Islamic 
identity and soon the bomb was being referred to as the ‘Islamic bomb’. The financial 
funding of Pakistan’s nuclear programme by Islamic states like Libya, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia tended to lend credence to the belief that te bomb was in some sense an ‘Islamic 
bomb’. But more importantly, the military elites’ social practices during the regime of 
General Zia established this norm. The aim of Zia was to develop an Islamic identity of 




Pakistan by using rhetoric and creating an ‘Indo-Jewish conspiracy’ as an external threat 
to Pakistan’s nuclear programme (Shaikh 2002). These types of threats were being 
constructed by the military elites in Pakistan through out the 1980s. They even 
speculated, in 1984-1985, that the connivance between the Indian and Israeli air forces 
might be used to sabotage Pakistan’s nuclear facilities at Kahuta. The bomb was being 
projected as a ‘bulwark against Zionism’ (Shaikh 200 ). Pakistan is one of the few 
countries in the world that does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, the 
passport of every Pakistani broadly states ‘this pass ort is valid for every country in the 
world except Israel’. Pakistan is also the only ideological Muslim state in the world. 
            The central role of the Pakistani army in nuclear politics can also be demonstrated 
by the structure of command and control over the nuclear programme. The former 
President General Musharraff founded the National Command Authority [NCA] in 2000 
which has oversight of the nuclear programme. Since 2009, it is being headed by the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, however, de facto, the director general of the Strategic 
Planning Division (SPD), headed by a retired army general is in charge of the nuclear 
assets. The key involvement of the military in Pakistan’s nuclear programme was also 
further illustrated when in 2008 the [civilian] President Zardari’s pledged that Pakistan’s 
was abhorrent to the idea of a first strike, only for this to be dismissed by Pakistan’s 
military establishment. Moreover, the strategic analysts and policy makers of India also 
received the news about ‘no first strike’ with scepticism since this policy did not have the 
support of the army (Naqvi 2008).  
            Pakistan’s army has been able to rise to the echelons of power, by not only 
constructing an image of India as an enemy state, but by also projecting its own image as 




the custodian of Pakistan’s identity. Security policy, or to be more precise, nuclear policy 
has primarily remained the exclusive ambit of Pakist n’s army with civilian elected 
leaders having only a marginal role in guiding the nuclear discourse (Ahmed 1998). 
Some Indian authors have argued that it in the “vested interest” of Pakistan’s army to 
keep the Indo-Pakistan rivalry in tact (Thakar 2006). Whatever may be the explanation, 
the reason for this continued rivalry stems from the clashing norms of the two states, 
making up their respective identities.  
            In fact, the direct beneficiary of Pakistan’s Indo-centric identity is the Pakistani 
army. Pakistan’s former army chief from 1996 to 1998, General Jehangir Karamat 
commented on the eve of India’s nuclear tests that the BJP’s aim was to “cut Pakistan 
down to size” (Talbott 2004: 63). According to General Zia, Pakistan could only “be kept 
together by the armed forces and not by politicians” (Nawaz 2008: 359). The repeated 
interventions of Pakistan’s army in the political discourse based on the pretext of saving 
the country has instilled among the population the “fe lings of fear and loathing” (Nawaz 
2008).  
            The nuclear brinkman ship between India and Pakistan led to an interesting 
episode in 1990. In 1987, India initiated a war exercis  with the name of ‘Operation 
Brasstacks’ at the Rajasthan border, a place close to Sind province in Pakistan. In 1990, 
Pakistan started its own border exercise in retaliation code named ‘Zarb-e-Momin’. Here 
the phrase ‘Zarb-e-Momin’ demonstrates the centrality of religious norms. ‘Zarb-e-
Momin’ refers to the final punch or blow from a devout Muslim; hence the security 
practices were neatly camouflaged in religious myths by the elites. In May 1990, these 
events resulted in an ‘upsurge of nationalist violence’ in Kashmir and it took frantic 




efforts by the USA to defuse the simmering tensions between the two states. The nuclear 
programme of Pakistan continued in the 1990s with the overall aim of counteracting 
India’s threat despite US sanctions [Presler’s amend ent, Glenn amendment]. 
            India detonated five nuclear devices on the 11th and 13th of May 1998. The central 
place of India in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan is evident from the speech that the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif delivered on the occasion of Pakistan’s nuclear 
tests on the 28th of May 1998 only two weeks after India conducted its tests. Sharif said: 
“ I am not the representative of a cowardly and submissive nation.  
The series of provocative statements that the Indian le ders have  
been giving after the nuclear explosions is becoming intolerable for us.  
Pakistanis are a self-respecting and honourable people who can sacrifice  
their lives to protect their honour and dignity. If these people were able  
to tolerate anyone's hegemony and arrogance, this country would not  
have come into existence at all. Bowing and submitting to others is not  
our wont. When the enemy resorts to challenging the Pakistanis, they do  
not flinch from offering any sacrifice” (BBConline 1998). 
 
            The use of phrases like ‘submissive nation,’ ‘arrogance,’ ‘hegemony,’ and 
‘enemy’ were all carefully selected. This type of phraseology alludes to Pakistan’s 
‘chosen traumas’ and helps to support the elites socially constructed belief, i.e. “otherness 
towards India.” Again, after the Pakistani tests on the 28th and the 30th of May, Prime 
Minister Sharif announced, “today we have settled scores with India by detonating five 
nuclear devices of our own.” He further explained, “We have paid them back” (Ahmed 
1999: 195). This all shows the reactionary nature of Pakistan’s nuclear programme to 
India. Thus, the Indo-centric approach remains the hallmark of Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme and its civilian and military leaders have used the socio-cultural norms of the 
society to further strengthen it. 
            The first anniversary of the nuclear explosion by Pakistan in 1998 was declared 
“Youm-e-Taqbeer” [a day of greatness] and had clear r ligious cultural connotations. 




Before every prayer, a Muslim says taqbeer [Allah o Akbar] to acknowledge the 
greatness of Allah. The government of Pakistan had hel  contest through out the country 
to choose the best name for the anniversary and this name was finally selected by the 
state elites.  
 
6.5 Nomenclature of missile programmes  
            Another socio-cultural aspect of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry is the naming 
of the missile programmes. What is important here is not just what name is given to the 
missiles, but the underlying narrative which creates y t more hostility in an already tense 
intersubjective relationship between India and Pakist n. For example, the Indian missile 
programme uses names such as Agni, Trishul, Prithvi, Nag, Shakti, among others. All of 
these names allude to various Hindu Maharajas and Hi u gods and goddesses. The 
narratives are reconstructed to glorify ‘mother India’ based on Hinduism. The identity 
and security discourses of both the countries converged in their respective spheres. By 
naming the missiles Akash or Agni the attempt is being made to identify India with 
Hindutva.  
            Prithvi in Hindu mythology refers to the “mother earth” but Prithvi is also the 
name of a Hindu raja who ruled over the subcontinen. If we look for a corresponding 
name in Pakistan’s missile programme, we find “Ghaznavi”. This missile is named after 
the Muslim conqueror Mahmud of Ghaznaavi who destroyed a Hindu temple at 
Somnaath in 1024. Similarly another nuclear capable missile in Pakistan is the Ghauri. 
This missile is named after Mahmud Ghauri who was rival to the Hindu ruler ‘Prithvi”. 
Prithvi Raj Chauhan was the greatest Hindu raja in the last decade of the 12th century on 




the subcontinent. An eminent nuclear security expert on South Asia, Strobe Talbott, when 
referring to the names of the two countries missile said, “even the nomenclature of the 
weaponary accumulating in South Asia kept alive, on b th sides, vengeful and largely 
mythologized memories from nine centuries earlier” (Talbott 2004: 22). In the Asia 
Times online Hassan Askari Rizvi, a leading military and security analyst of Pakistan, 
noted that “the names of some Indian missiles - Agni and Prithvi for instance - appear to 
have cultural and historical reference points” (Ramachandran 2005). The author of the 
report went on to add that these names of the missiles have special significance and 
people in both the countries are incited by such symbols and this symbolism conveys 
with it a special feeling of hatred towards each other. The elites in both the countries 
carefully selected the names of the missiles from religious narratives and myths in order 
to reconstruct the whole rivalry on cultural norms. These were not mere symbols given to 
the nuclear capable missiles, but rather were carefully constructed identity discourses 
based on feelings of “Otherness” towards each other. 
            Nizamani categorized the discourse of India’s nuclear programme over the years 
as from “nuclear celibacy” (1947-1964) to “nuclear ambiguity” [1964-1998, with the 
exception of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion PNE in 1974] towards “overt nuclearisation” 
(1998-onwards) (Nizamani 2000). I rephrase the last stage as “overt culturisation”. By 
overt culturalisation I mean the synthesis of the nuclear programme with cultural factors.  
 
6.6 The popular social practices of Indians and Pakistanis  
            The popular social practices of Indians towards the nuclear tests vary a great deal. 
After the explosion of the nuclear device in 1998, the opinion polls in six Indian cities 




showed a 91 percent approval rating for the tests in May 1998 (Perkovich 1999: 416). But 
by October 1998 in a data set of two thousand urban voters the support rate fell to 44 
percent and the BJP suffered defeat in four union state  elections (Perkovich 1999). There 
may be many factors which contributed to this fall in public support, yet two things are 
crystal clear. First, most people in India do not know enough about India’s nuclear 
programme. It is interesting to examine why there is so much ignorance among the 
masses about India’s nuclear programme as well as non-proliferation issues such as the 
NPT and the CTBT. While interviewing BJP elites in 1996, Perkovich was able to 
illustrate this mass ignorance using the words of a BJP elite who claimed:   
“Security is a very important issue (…), but to an average man, security  
relates to violence in a village or communal strife. We politicians can affect  
a tie between Pakistan and security or China and security - we can create  
rhetoric to win elections, as politicians do in all countries. But the people  
do not know anything about CTBT (…) People read about sex, crime and  
corruption, but do not know anything about CTBT (…) Pakistan and India  
are the only countries in the world now where you cld organize public  
protests for the bomb. Atavism can be readily tapped here (…) we  
democracies take initiative due to compulsions of our domestic agenda”  
                                        (Perkovich 1999: 372 itallics of the author ) 
 
Second, the change from nuclear ambivalence towards an overt nuclear posture 
exhibited by Indian elites led to some confusion among the wider population. By using 
cultural slogans the BJP carried out its decision to go nuclear in front of the Indian public 
which became ‘confused’ over India’s changing nuclear posture from ambiguity to overt 
nuclearisation (Perkovich 1999: 450). The root cause of this change was also attributed to 
the identity politics of BJP in the 1990s. The ignorance on the part of popular social 
practices gave room to the elites to carry forward their own agenda of creating a renewed 
Indian identity. The pledge towards an overt nuclear posture was the cornerstone of this 
Hindutva identity being envisaged by the BJP in the 1990s. The nexus of a revitalized 




Indian identity and its nuclear discourse are based upon norms of Indian moral 
superiority and a desire to achieve a great power status (Perkovich 1999). The political 
regimes prior to BJP had adopted an ambiguous and ambiv lent stance towards the 
Indian nuclear discourse. But there is an inherent tension between morality and obtaining 
a great power status since having a great power status is mainly connected to a state’s 
military might. Hence the BJP policies followed the “great power” norm but, 
interestingly, they also did not denounce the ‘normative’ aspect (Perkovich 1999). This 
normative aspect was spearheaded by slogans calling for complete nuclear disarmament 
worldwide (Perkovich 1999). I further argue that the normative cushion was also 
disguised in the shape of the renewed identity politics of Hindutva. The popular 
perceptions are derived from these identity politics. 
            The reactionary nature of Pakistan’s nuclear programme in response to the Indian 
tests is evident from a survey conducted by Kroc Institute of educated ‘elites’ to gauge 
the factors influencing its nuclear programme. The survey concluded that 94 percent of 
the educated people in Pakistan “based their tacit or overt support of the nuclear option 
on the perceived threat from India” (Ahmed and Cortrigh  1998: 17).  
            The survey further explained that the perceived threat from India and Pakistan 
army’s domineering role in state building has “resulted in widespread acceptance of the 
military’s threat perception and their proposed means of countering it” (Ahmed and 
Cortright 1998: 17). The same Kroc Institute conducted a research study in India to see 
what were the perceptions of Indian “educated elites” in response to the Indian nuclear 
posture. In 1996, the results were published a book nearly two years before the Indian 
nuclear explosions in 1998. The survey found that among the educated Indian elite the 




two most important considerations regarding India’s nuclear posture were the threat from 
Pakistan and the “possibility of a time bound plan for global nuclear disarmament” 
(Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 11-12). The survey was conducted at the time when the BJP 
had already started to push the nuclear issue and hd already created an environment of 
hostility before the actual tests. The educated elites in the survey were referred to the 
academicians and educated masses in India and Pakistan. The official Indian explanation 
that China was the most significant factor contributing to India’s decision to go nuclear 
was corroborated by only 17 percent of the total people surveyed while 48 percent linked 
it to the threat from Pakistan (Cortright and Mattoo 1996). The study reiterated that “the 
perceived nuclear threat from Pakistan was the single most important factor motivating 
Indian elites to consider the nuclear option” (Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 17).  
            Pakistanis have always exhibited an ‘inferiority’ complex concerning Indians and 
this is in part due to their long turbulent history (Perkovich 1999: 367). It is the desire of 
the average Pakistani to be one up against their Indian counterpart in every aspect of life. 
Whether it is a game of cricket or nuclear rivalry it has always been ingrained in their 
mindset to beat India. But this desire by elites is not totally independent of the reality on 
the ground. The discriminatory social practices of the Indian state elites conform to this 
reality. For example, the treatment today given to Muslims in India who make up almost 
20 percent population demonstrates this type of elites’ policies. Despite the large number 
of Muslims in India, there is only 3 percent Muslim representation in the Indian Civil 
Service, 1.8 in the Foreign Service and only 4 percent in the Police services (Mehmood 
20.6.2010). The popular perceptions of their nuclear riv lry are obviously the result of 
this identity. But it is also facts that like their Indian counterparts, the majority of the 




Pakistanis care little about the nuclear gobbledygook including terms like CTBT, NPT 
and deterrence. There has been no effective means adopted by the state to educate the 
people about the use or misuse of nuclear weapons. This has helped the cause of the elites 
to promote their own agenda of ‘reactionary syndrome’ towards India (Zahra 2000: 168). 
The politicians can easily sway public opinion in favour of the bomb based on the simple 
pretext that India has already done this. The rivalry constructed by the elites was attuned 
to the popular perceptions of Indian power in the wake of the 1998 explosions. It was 
effectively endorsed by the social practices of the Indian elites where leaders like L.K. 
Advani [Home Minister during the BJP government] publicly declared that Pakistan 
should forget Kashmir (Zahra 2000). The Pakistani people naturally asked “Qadeer Khan 
bumb nikalo!” [“Qadeer Khan take out the bomb”] (Zahr  2000: 147). 
On the eve of the test the Pakistani Observer wrote, “five nuclear blasts have 
instantly transformed an extremely demoralized nation into a self-respecting, proud 
nation of 140 million people, having full faith in their destiny” (Talbott 2004: 71). 
Ironically, the Pakistani elites got themselves trapped by the weight of their own myths 
constructed against India in order to get popular support. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy 
Secretary of State during President Clinton’s second term, visited Pakistan in order to 
dissuade the Pakistani Prime Minister from following I dia’s lead in 1998. He explained 
the dilemma of Prime Minister Sharif, who stated that “I am an elected official and I 
cannot ignore popular sentiments” (Talbott 2004: 64).
            To conclude, it can be argued that the Pakistani nuclear discourse is transfixed on 
India and that it also has ideational components. The coup-prone Pakistan will never 
accept the hegemony of India or the role of India as the regional policeman since this 




runs up against the role of Pakistan’s military norms as the sole saviour of Pakistan. 
When commenting on the Indian threat, the former army chief of Pakistan General Aslam 




            This chapter examined the ideational component of India and Pakistan nuclear 
discourses which is based on socio-cultural norms. These norms include Hindutva, Indo 
centric myths and attainment of an Islamic bomb. In the nuclear rivalry between India 
and Pakistan there is a close nexus between material va i bles, such as power and 
prestige, and soft cultural variables like norms, beliefs and religious myths. The central 
argument illustrates how conflicting socio-cultural norms of identity were constructed by 
elites’ social practices. The BJP in India is bent upon reinvigorating cultural norms based 
on the ideal of ‘Hindutva’ meaning, thereby, one culture, one identity and one nation at 
the expense of marginalizing the minorities in India and propagating feelings of 
animosity in Pakistan. The same is true for the elit s of Pakistan who used animosity 
against India as well as its attainment of an ‘Islamic bomb’ as corner stones in 
constructing this nuclear rivalry. There exists a causal relationship between India and 
Pakistan’s nuclear rivalry and domestic cultural variables which can be unearthed in the 
propaganda of the BJP in India and the speeches of political and military elites in 
Pakistan. India and Pakistan’s nuclear discourse is closely intertwined with the identity 
discourse of the two states. The elites of the two states discursively contested the 
religious myths embedded in culture when forging this discourse. This was being 




accomplished by the elites at the expense of exclusion of the ‘Other’. The states’ security 
practices augmented this belief system of the elites leading to an intersubjective 
understanding of hostility. It is quite evident even today when the elites, of both states, 
find it convenient to point the finger at the other side for being behind every terrorist act 
taking place in their own state. Whether it is the Marriot suicide bombing in Islamabad, 
Pakistan [September 2008] or the Mumbai terrorist attacks in India [November 2008], 
lapses in both states’ security apparatuses have been conveniently let off the hook by 
such blame games. The detrimental effects of these policies are clearly visible in the 
abysmal security relations between both states. The already fragile peace process has 
been abandoned and confidence building measures hav been lost because of these blame 
games. There is no eagerness shown by the elites of both states to improve the 
environment of mistrust between them. Moreover, no concerted effort is being made by 
these states to curb the menace of terrorism in the region. This is because they cannot yet 
unravel themselves from the confiscatory nature of norms which they themselves have 
propagated and now find that they have become their hostage. The rivalry between India 
and Pakistan was created by elites who dredged up particular cultural myths in order to 
cause friction between people, rather than championing conciliatory norms of peaceful 
coexistence among them. 
            The analysis of the security relations f India and Pakistan requires a different 
paradigm. We have to understand the cultural underpinnings of the rivalry. This will lead 
us to focus on the socio-cultural norms of the society and will help us to find the right 
norms for peaceful coexistence. Norms in the context of nuclear rivalry between India 
and Pakistan are culturally constructed and discursively propagated by the elites. The 




popular social practices of both states sometimes respond favourably to the nuclear 
decisions of the elites’ and other times they are opposed. This change in people’s 
opinions may in part be due to the fact that most people do not have sufficient knowledge 
about their states nuclear programmes. It can also be because of the experiences of shared 
chosen traumas in the shape of social and violent upheavals during independence that 
was faced by the populations of both states. The people still have to grapple with these 
traumatic experiences in their recent common history. There are enough undercurrents of 
these chosen traumas in the nuclear programme of both states constructed by their 
respective elites. The religious myths used for this purpose by the elites sometimes trap 
the elites themselves and they have no other alterntive than to follow the dictates of 
these myths. The decision to go nuclear by both states was one such instance of the 
stranglehold of these ideational components that were constructed by the elites. The 
tragedy of these discourses was even acknowledged by the elites of the two states 
themselves who still hope that the popular social pr ctices will bridge the trust deficit 
found at the elite level. For example, at recent talks held in Islamabad in June 2010 
between the foreign secretaries of both states, Mrs. Ni upama Rao India’s Foreign 
Secretary stated:  
“We owe it to our people to chart a way forward, to narrow  
differences and ensure collaborative engagement ” (Dawn 2010). 
 
            These were the first talks held between India and Pakistan since the Mumbai 
terrorist attacks in November 2008 and the first bilateral talks between both states’ 
foreign secretaries since May 2008. How to ‘chart the way forward’ will be the theme of 
the next chapter which will hypothetically propose a security community between India 
and Pakistan based on common social norms and popular culture.  




7: Exploration of norms for a hypothetical security community between 
India-Pakistan and its comparative analysis with the EU and ASEAN 
 
The emphasis of my argument in the preceding chapters has been primarily 
focused on the tussle between elites’ and popular social practices that has contributed to 
the current security dilemma between India and Pakist n. The case studies of identity and 
ideology [Chapter 4], the Kashmir dispute [Chapter 5] and the nuclear rivalry [Chapter 6] 
were discussed in the context of elites’ routines or ocial practices. These chapters also 
present the states’ narratives constructed through educational curricula by the elites for 
their respective masses. For example the use of the phrase ‘attotang’ [inseparable part] or 
jugular vein are just some of the ways Indian and Pakistani elites refer to Kashmir and 
this type of phraseology has always been an integral pa t of the national educational 
curriculum of both states. Moreover, Chapter 4 discus es the Two Nation Theory as has 
been taught in the educational system of Pakistan. This last chapter focuses on these 
educational norms in much greater detail by employing the same line of argument [elites 
versus masses]. This is intended to envision a hypot etical security community based on 
ideational norms between India and Pakistan. This capter will utilize the methodology 
of the popular culture approach within an interpretive exploratory framework. At the elite 
level, it will explore ‘negative norms’ constructed by the elites’ social practices in both 
India and Pakistan. Some of the norms that will be examined include: the educational 
policies of both states; the rhetorical practices of maligning ‘the Other’ during election 
campaigns; and ruling state elites’ censorship policies imposed on the mass media. These 
social norms have so far proven to be an obstacle for the formation of a security 




community. At the popular level, this chapter will explore ‘positive norms’ constructed 
by popular social practices in both states. These include literary classics written by 
acclaimed writers of both societies that depict nostalgic feelings of each other; religious 
practices [Bhakti movement] of the subcontinent andcontemporary media initiatives by 
private mass media conglomerates of the two states wi h the code name of ‘Aman ki 
Asha’ [Desire for Peace]. 
This chapter will also make a brief comparative study of hypothetical India-
Pakistan security community with two existing security communities the European Union 
[EU] and Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASE N]. It argues that every security 
community has an implicit normative structure. This normative structure works as a 
foundation by formulating regional ideational interests as well as creating the collective 
identity of a security community. This final argument will demonstrate that a security 
community is a ‘context’ bounded construct and thatits applicability and possible 
replication in other parts of the world is largely unfounded. This means that every 
security community is based on its own regional normative structure and there is no 
simple way of duplicating a successful security community arrangement from one region 
to another region without first understanding its own particular regional socio-cultural 
normative order. Similarly, the word security community has different meanings and 
different connotations for the people involved in making it. This all depends upon the 
socio-cultural norms of the respective regions. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections with each having three sub-
sections. The first main section exclusively focuses on the hypothetical India-Pakistan 
security community. Its first sub-section elucidates the path dependence model of 




security communities. The second sub-section deals with elites social practices by 
examining the negative norms which are impediments to he formation of an abstract 
India-Pakistan security community. The third sub-section explains some of the positive 
norms by highlighting popular social practices. This section at the end sums up the 
arguments on hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. The second main section 
briefly juxtaposes the EU and ASEAN security communities with the India-Pakistan 
abstract security community. The first sub-section is on the EU. The second sub-section 
identifies the normative structure of ASEAN. The third sub-section presents a 
comparative analysis of the three security communities. This section concludes the 
argument by emphasising the context bounded-ness of security communities. 
The primary sources used for this chapter includes th  examination of the 
compulsory history text books taught at primary schools and high schools in India and 
Pakistan. I have established no limit of time frame for the content analysis of these text 
books since regarding questions of identity, ideology and India-Pakistan security 
relations there has been little change in the syllabi of these text books published by the 
state. Another primary source is the study of commercial Indian films in the last decade 
of 1990s until the present. The popularity of these films is gauged from the mass media 
reports and from the national recognition they received in the shape of awards from the 
state. It can be argued that there may not be a line r effect of films on the masses. But 
watching commercial Indian [Bollywood] films in India and particularly in Pakistan is 
not only a favourite pastime for the ordinary citizens, but it has become part of the daily 
practices of the people in both states. Another souce was the study of novels written by 
acclaimed Indian and Pakistani literary giants on themes of partition and community.  




7.1 A path dependence model of a security community 
 A path dependence model refers to the understanding of i stitutions according to 
their normative behaviour by historically tracing their roots in their respective regional 
cultures (North 1990). For the establishment of a security community, two states may 
develop a ‘path dependence model’ which means that there should not be a fixed 
correlation between cause and effect, but rather thei security ties should be strengthened 
step by step and in any direction (Waever 1998). The formation of a security community 
thus “remains precariously balanced on a constellation of a large number of factors” 
(Waever 1998: 76). Protagonists of a security community have singled out 
‘desecuritization’ as the prime reason behind security community formation (Waever 
1995). This means that once a state joins a security community its contentious security 
concerns will ‘progressively’ decrease in favour of other mutual benefits (Waever 1995). 
By accepting identity and security as a discourse, I further examine the path dependence 
model of a security community by arguing:  
• That it is dependent upon the shared experiences of chosen traumas in the psyche 
of the population. Elites can construct experiences positively for a community’s 
sake or negatively for their own vested interests. 
• That the public rhetoric of the elites plays a role in security community formation. 
Weaver has already defined ‘desecuritization’ as the prime reason for security 
community formation. However, this is not only about desecuritization. Perhaps 
more importantly, it also has to do with the formation of a collective identity for 
the sake of desecuritization. States which are involved in a conflict will only 




lessen their guard towards each other, if they see an alternative progression of 
collective identity formation in a security community.  
• That there is a confluence between the socio-cultural norms of a society and the 
regional norms of the security community. Most often studies of security 
communities are aimed at the level of norms compliance by the participating 
states. However, I will argue that a lot is also at st ke in obtaining a better 
understanding of the socio-cultural norms of societies that are involved and 
participating in such a security community.  
• That there is a hidden normative structure based on the socio-cultural norms of 
societies which can bind the states together, such as set rules for inclusion and 
exclusion in a security community, which further acts as a deterrence for its 
norms compliance. 
 
Therefore, the formation of a security community is a long gradual process and 
more importantly, it is not strictly related to security at all. This path dependence model 
of security communities will be comparatively examined in the third sub-section of this 
chapter. It will examine how this path or some of its features are being followed by the 
security communities and what are the lessons to belearned for the formation of a 
hypothetical India-Pakistan security community from the particular experiences of the 
EU and ASEAN security communities. 
I argue with regard to the formation of an India-Pakistan security community, that 
there is little possibility of having an ‘amalgamated’ security community, since this goes 
against the rationale of creating an independent Pakistan in the first place. Instead, I argue 




for the creation of a ‘pluralistic’ security community hypothetically conceived at the 
popular level which would have enough potential to change the elites’ constructed 
security dilemma which exists between India and Pakist n. Ideationally, there is enough 
normative ground to unite the two countries in a security community framework of their 
own. This is due to the fact that the people of both states know each other very well with 
a shared experience of living side by side as communities before the partition of the 
subcontinent. The popular social practices based on the socio-cultural norms of these two 
countries share much in common.  
An important factor in the context of the formation f a security community is the 
ruling elite’s behaviour with regard to their ‘speech acts’. One argues of ‘speech acts’ or 
‘discursive practices’ when the elites discursively construct an issue (Waever 1995). The 
elites’ discursive practices can play an important role in a state’s security discourse since 
at critical junctions they help to create an intersubjective understanding of either hostility 
or cooperation among states. So my conception of a security community lies at the 
junction of elite and popular social practices.  
A hypothetical India-Pakistan security community refe s to some intangible or 
abstract factors. These factors have been discussed in t rms of ‘negative norms’ at the 
elite level and are seen as being responsible for preventing the formulation of a security 
community (Khoo 2004). Among these negative norms, I will particularly focus on the 
educational policy of both states, the elite’s electoral behaviour and the popular culture of 
Indian film industry. I mean by educational policy the history books illustrating state 
narratives of identity which are published by the state and are being taught at all levels of 
education. The elites’ social practices in popular culture also include their role in 




imposing a ‘censorship regime’ on popular Indian cinema. At the popular level, the 
positive norms I will be examining include the conte t analysis of literary classics, 
religious norms of Sufism and mass media initiatives for friendship between the two 
countries.  
 
7.1.2 Elites social practices and propagation of negative norms  
 Among social norms, the educational text books used at the primary and the 
secondary school levels are of considerable importance. It is at this level that young 
minds are exposed to the outside world for the first time. These young minds come to 
know their existential identity by learning various national narratives that are being 
taught to them in their history text books. On averg , a child begins school at the age of 
four and finishes high school at age sixteen. In India and Pakistan, the curriculum, 
prescribed books and the publication of history books at both the grade school and higher 
school/ college level are under governmental control. In Pakistan, history has been taught 
under the subject label of ‘Social Sciences’ since 1961. History is a compulsory subject at 
school and the officially prescribed text books are  way of imparting historical 
knowledge. The content analysis of these books illutrates that up to this point the text 
books have been used as a means to create the image of India and Pakistan as “Us versus 
Them’. The relational aspects of social identity in the young minds of these students are 
being formed in these texts by positively attributing a Pakistani identity and negatively 
describing an Indian one or vice versa. By the time children reach adolescence, almost 
every Indian child is fervently anti-Pakistani and every average Pakistani is ardently anti-
Indian. From high school to the graduate college lev l, history changes its taxonomy to 




“Pakistan Studies”. Every student must pass these obligatory courses in this subject area 
and the subject material comes only from the officially prescribed text books. 
 The pedagogical culture that uses these text books is al o very interesting, since in 
both India and Pakistan the knowledge provided in text books is largely unexamined and 
is often considered sacred. In order to pass their examination, students are required to 
memorize the subject matter by heart. The critical ev luation or cross examination of the 
material is discouraged in the class room (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997). It seems that the 
history is not being taught with unbiased views or with objective facts, but rather 
teaching has become a useful conduit for the state elites’ to superimpose their biased 
nationalist ideas on young minds. I start with the case study of the educational practices 
in Pakistan. 
A distinguished historian of Pakistan K.K. Aziz, in his text entitled “The murder 
of history”, surveyed the history text books of Pakistan that are prescribed for educational 
institutions (Aziz 1998). The following are some of the examples taken from his book. 
The excerpts from a history text book published at Peshawar [Khyber- Pakhtoonkhawa 
province] in Pakistan states:  
“The Hindus wanted to control the government of India after independence.  
The British sided with the Hindus. But the Muslims did not accept the decision”  
                                                                                               (Aziz 1998: 13). 
More extracts from the Grade 4 text book: 
 “The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things… 
Hindus did not respect women” (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997). 
 
 
 “Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark  
places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the 
temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims  
can say their prayers together” (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997). 
 




 Another prominent Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, quotes from a compulsory 
history text book used for college students written by Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali 
Sayyed entitled the “Introduction to Pakistan Studies” which states that “the coming of 
Islam to the Indian subcontinent was a blessing because Hinduism was based on an 
unethical caste system” (Jalal 1995: 78). As Aziz has pointed out, the titles of the 
chapters in these text books also make interesting reading. Some of the chapter names 
include: “Differences in Muslim and Hindu civilizations,” “The need for the creation of 
an Independent State,” “The Ideology of Pakistan” and “India’s Evil Designs against 
Pakistan” (Aziz 1998: 16). 
Invariably, in almost all history books, whether they are grade school text books 
or academic history books, what is common among them is the tendency to label Hindus 
as ‘unclean’ and their culture as ‘inferior’ (Aziz 1998). The treatment of the history of the 
post-independence years of Pakistan is not that much different either. For example, it is 
claimed in the texts books in Pakistan that the India-Pakistan war of 1965 was a success 
for the Pakistani army and that it was initiated by Indian forces. This is in spite of the fact 
that there is now a general consensus among various Paki tani intellectuals that the 1965 
war was started by Pakistan in the Kashmir region under the code name “Operation 
Gibraltar” which sought to liberate Indian held Kashmir, but that the conflict ended in a 
stalemate with neither side accomplishing anything (Nawaz 2008). The same is true for 
the 1971 war with India. The Pakistani text books frequently refer to India’s involvement 
in the separation of East Pakistan which may be true, b t seldom are there references 
made to the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and the social practices of the 
political elites leading to the chaotic situation in 1971.  




The Pakistan Studies text book for Grade 9 and 10 [Secondary School level] 
states: “In 1971 while Pakistan was facing political difficulties in East Pakistan, India 
helped anti-Pakistan elements and later on attacked Pakistan” (Aziz 1998). 
           The processes involved in writing, publishing and printing these text books reveals 
the involvement of state’s ruling elites. For example, the government of Pakistan selects a 
panel of educational advisors who devise the syllabi and curriculum. The advisors have 
themselves acknowledged that there are set policy ‘guidelines’ given to them that indicate 
which historical aspects are to be emphasized (Aziz 1998). Moreover, they are advised to 
write these books with the ideological framework of the establishment of Pakistan in 
mind. The ideology of Pakistan, obviously, demands the marginalization of Hindus or 
India and promoting Islamic ideology or highlighting Muslim rule of the subcontinent. 
After the submission of drafts by the educational advisors, their work is again reviewed 
and revised by the government before it is sent for final publication (Aziz 1998). The 
policy guidelines given to the writers of these text books include, the development of an 
awareness of Hindu-Muslim differences among the students, evaluating the role of Indian 
aggression towards Pakistan and the reinvigoration of the Kashmir dispute by elaborating 
the evil designs of India (Naseem 2006). 
 There is a strong connection between historiography nd the state’s identity 
concerning the writing of these history text books. It eems as if the state’s elites are 
involved in a self-fulfilling prophecy that seeks to glorify the identity of the state while 
sacrificing objective historical facts to the altar of nationalism and patriotism. This is 
done despite that fact that people in both India and Pakistan have a common history and 
ancestral heritage. The majority of Pakistanis are the descendents of Hindus who later 




converted to Islam. But it is a strange fact that in all the history text books of Pakistan the 
genealogy of Pakistanis is linked to the Turk militias and Afghan war lords who invaded 
India time and again. The educational norms have becom  a cultural repository for the 
state’s identity. 
 This shows the ways in which the social practices of elites have an influence on 
educational policies and demonstrates how Pakistan’s identity is being discursively 
constructed at the cost of portraying India as the sol nemesis of Pakistan’s identity and 
stability. I am not saying that there are no differences between the Muslim and the Hindu 
culture or civilization. There is no doubt that both have distinct cultures and that this 
difference is one of the basic reasons for the independence of Pakistan. However, to 
emphasise on the differences when teaching young mids these socially constructed 
historical narratives is not unlike germinating conflict for future generations. At the 
educational level, the teaching of history can serve as a tool to instruct the future 
generations of society what is wrong and what is right. Currently the educational norms 
in both states serve to promote malice when constructing each others identities. Once 
these identities are carved out and formed then the arration of history becomes the 
conflict between the ‘righteous Muslim’ or Pakistanis and the ‘idolatrous Hindu’ or 
Indians (Jalal 1995). 
 What is common between the various regimes [democratic or totalitarian] in 
Pakistan is the historiography of Pakistan under th tutelage of its ideology. This has 
helped to formulate the state’s identity under the broad rubric of Islamic nationalism on 
the one hand and the ‘Otherness towards India’ on the o her hand. How does identity 
based on an ideology strengthen the elites who profess it? Apple points out that it 




“distorts one’s picture of social reality and serves the interest of the dominant classes in 
the society” (Apple 1979: 20,21). For a Pakistani student the ‘social reality’ is 
constructed by distorting the facts of history. The national symbolism of Pakistan’s 
identity is paraphrased below from some of the history ext books used in Pakistan. Some 
of the text books claim that:  
1. Pakistan came into being when Muhammad Bin Qasim enter d Sindh in 712 AD. 
Sindh is referred to as the ‘Bab-e-Islam’ or gateway to Islam in the text books. 
The symbolism used to create a common ancestry between Muslims of the 
subcontinent and former Arab rulers is being connected by the naming of ‘Bab-e-
Islam’. However, Islam was not spread throughout India by Arab invaders. Islam 
was in fact spread throughout India by ‘Sufism’. 
2.  Akbar, the great Mughal Emperor who ruled India, is denounced as a ruler of the 
subcontinent since he practiced many ‘Hindu’ traditions and married Hindu 
‘ranis’ or ladies. 
3. The freedom movement of India is symbolized by the struggle against Hindu 
domination and the search for an Islamic identity of the state. The emphasis has 
been placed on the struggle against Hindu dominatio rather than on the attempts 
by the people to throw away their common colonial yoke (Ali 2.11.2002) 
4. The post-independence period in the text books is repetitive with symbolic 
phrases of ‘our neighbouring enemy state’ casting an ‘evil design’ on our 
statehood. Thereby, holding India responsible for being behind all the misery of 
Pakistan. 




Let us now take a look at the educational policies of India. In many ways, the 
basic tenants for a biased historiography remain the same with the categorization of 
Muslims as “violent, despotic and masculine” while th ir Hindu counterparts are 
portrayed as “indolent, passive and effeminate” (Chaturvedi 2001). The history text 
books for schools and colleges in India have been produced by the National Council of 
Educational Research and Training [NCERT] since 1970s. NCERT is a central body 
formed by the Indian government in New Delhi. Some books for school children are also 
published by the respective states’ boards. An interes ing episode occurred in 2002 when 
NCERT issued four new text books under a revised curriculum. A supervisory 
organization that was intended to watch the development of Indian history ‘The Indian 
History Congress’ [not to be confused with Indian Congress Party], scrutinized the new 
text books especially on the question of how new “values” are being indoctrinated 
through the “education in religion” by the elites (Habib, Jaiswal et al. 2003: preface). The 
Indian History Congress was established in 1935 to oversee the development of Indian 
history. It published its detailed report in 2003 which heavily criticized the history text 
books being used in Indian schools and colleges. It i  interesting to read the report which 
states:  “the text books draw heavily on the kind of pr paganda that the so called Sangh 
Parivar [a group of Hindu fundamentalist parties] publications have been projecting for 
quite some time” (Habib, Jaiswal et al. 2003: 3). 
In the text books the Hindu leaders were being portrayed as ‘true patriots’ during 
the freedom struggle to throw away the colonial yoke, while all the Muslim leaders were 
portrayed as communalist separatists. The narratives about Muslim rulers on the 
subcontinent depicts them as ‘invaders’ and ‘temple-destroyers’ with nothing positive 




brought by them to India in terms of monuments and cultural heritage (Habib, Jaiswal et 
al. 2003). 
The revised curriculum was issued when the BJP was in power and its slogan of 
“Hindutva” or cultural revitalization of India was in vogue. Educational norms were 
being used here as a vehicle to promote the Hindutva values of the BJP. An explanation 
of these ‘new values’ and their indoctrination in educational norms will help us to better 
understand the constructed nature of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. 
Text books in India are easily accessible and are a che p source of knowledge and history 
which play a fundamental role in ‘transmitting’ cultural values to future generations 
(Pandey 2006). The cultural myths spread about Muslims in Indian text books portray 
them as being arrogant, belligerent and prone to fundamentalism (Nandy 1997). 
In almost all history text books in India the symbolism used for the partition of 
the subcontinent and the independence of Pakistan i punctuated with phrases like 
‘entirely inevitable’, ‘with a heavy heart’, ‘was allowed to happen’, ‘a blow to 
nationalism’, ‘to allow the scourge of communalism’. A Grade 10 text book, published 
by NCERT, states: “the nationalist leaders agreed to the partition of India in order to 
avoid the large scale bloodbath that communal riotsthreatened…but they did not accept 
the two-nation theory” (Kumar 2001: 207). 
According to renowned Indian historian R.C. Majumdar, the primary reasons for 
distortions of objective history in these text books was because of the government’s 
directives to the historians who were put in charge of writing them (Majumdar 1970). 
These directives from the government included the repudiation of Muslim rulers of the 
subcontinent and their portrayal as invaders and destroyers of Hindu temples which led to 




the ‘politicisation of history’ (Bhargava 22.1.2000). In other words, it is evident that a 
deliberate policy was adopted by the political elites at the helm of affairs to hold hostage 
the various means of disseminating knowledge by concealing the true facts and distorting 
the adequate portrayal of historical events. This paved the way for the development of 
distrust between the people of both countries and trust is the fundamental edifice required 
for building a security community. In spite of having a common cultural past and having 
struggled together for independence from colonialism, the ‘official’ historians of the two 
countries are at loggerheads with each other. One despises the ‘Other’ while portraying 
their competing national narratives of the past. The aim is to forge a nexus between 
historiography and the national identity of the Indian state (Bhargava 22.1.2000). The 
paradox of history text books is self explanatory, where in, the Indian text books often 
reject the ‘Two Nation Theory’, the basis of the independence of Pakistan, and the 
partition of the subcontinent is only being accepted under the cloak of dire circumstances. 
It is the demand of Indian identity to marginalize sentiments toward the partition and 
keep the communalist forces at bay, while in Pakistn the incessant clinging to Islamic 
ideology at the expense of Hindu alienation is an alternate projection (Kumar 2001). 
To summarize, the elite guided educational policies of India and Pakistan have 
encouraged the establishment of intersubjective feelings of hostility between India and 
Pakistan. The identities of the states are conflated with the reconstructed myths from the 
socio-cultural norms of society. The presence of this kind of material in the educational 
curriculum has long lasting effects on the minds of impressionable school children. India 
as ‘the Other’ becomes an easy scapegoat to imbibe ethnic and regional fissures within 




Pakistan. The same is true for India, where lessons are being taught on the futility of the 
founding of Pakistan along communalists lines in a multi-ethnic pluralistic India. 
Now the question arises, how does the trust deficit spread to every nook and 
corner in India and Pakistan, given the high illiteracy rates of the huge population of both 
countries? In this regard, the role of the mass media, specially popular Indian films, and 
electoral norms, which disseminate hate towards each other, must be taken into account 
as significant contributing factors. Starting with the electoral practice of maligning 
Pakistan, I will focus on the electoral campaign and the related atmosphere during the 
15th general Lok Sabha [lower house] elections in 2009 that was created by the BJP and 
the Congress party [as the two major main stream parties]. Due to periodic martial law 
regimes in Pakistan, I overlook the case study of Pakistan’s political parties’ electoral 
campaigns. However, one common focus of all main stream Pakistani political parties in 
their election campaigns is engaging in dialogue with India regarding the settlement of all 
out-standing issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The shadow of both states’ identities looms large in all electoral campaigns in 
India, but has particularly become a more prominent f ature in Indian election campaigns 
since the 1990s. It is cultural in the sense that te contested socio-cultural norms of 
Hinduism are being deliberately rejuvenated by political parties and used in their 
electoral campaigns in order to re-vitalize the Hindu identity of India. This all started 
after the demolition of the Babari Mosque in 1992 and various communal riots between 
the Hindus and the Muslims in India, i.e. the Ayodhya riots in 1992 and the Gujarat riots 
in 2002 and 2005. The state’s identity became more na rowly defined and based on the 
idea of one people - one community. The secularist fervour during the Congress party 




governments’ before the 1990s nose dived with the em rgence of ‘Hindutva” at the 
centre stage of politics. 
With the rise of the BJP in the 1990s, Indian election campaigns took on a more 
belligerent tone toward Pakistan. This is because the BJP quite often use the anti-
Pakistani card to stir nationalist feelings among the electorate. Even the secular Congress 
party which was in power in India before the 2009 general elections cannot break away 
from the established electoral norms of maligning Pakistan. It is pertinent to see what the 
elites of these parties propagated through their social practices towards Pakistan. 
The Manifesto of BJP was released in April 2009 under the title ‘Good Governance, 
Development and Security’ for the 15th general elections in India (BJPManifesto 2009). 
The opening pages explained the rich cultural history of India from 900 AD to the present 
times, evading the period of Mughal rule in India. It states, with regard to cultural 
heritage that is irrevocably linked to Hindu mythology, that: “The civilisational 
consciousness of India has been well defined by the sag s and philosophers and has its 
roots in Bharatiya or the Hindu world view… Hinduism is the most ennobling experience 
in spiritual co-existence” (BJPManifesto 2009: 5). Here India’s cultural heritage is being 
directly linked to the ‘Hindu world view’, without any regard to the cultural influences of 
more than 300 years of Muslim rule during the Mughal period. It is a conscious effort on 
the part of the BJP party leaders to reinvigorate Hindu norms leading to animosity with 
Pakistan and the abhorrence of Muslim rule in India. It is akin to ‘the return of culture’ in 
the identity politics of the state (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). The Manifesto further 
pledged that if the BJP were elected it would pursue the construction of the contentious 
Ram Temple at the site of Babari Mosque which had previously been demolished by 




Hindu mobs that were actively supported by the elites of the BJP in 1992. It is interesting 
to explain the role of the elites in this episode. The Liberhan Commission Report 
officially recognized the role played by the BJP elites in the demolition of the Babari 
Mosque. This one man commission headed by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan was 
established in 1992 to probe and find the reasons behind this gory incident. The report 
was submitted and later on was leaked to public after 17 years in 2009. The report 
formally indicts the ex-BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee, the ex-Home Minister of the BJP 
Advani and some other BJP stalwarts behind the ‘meticulously planned’ demolition of 
Babari Mosque (TheTimesofIndia 1.7.2009; Gilani 24.11.2009). This formal indictment 
shows the centrality of the elites’ social practices b hind the India-Pakistan rivalry. 
 Coming back to the Manifesto, it reiterated that te special status granted to 
Kashmir under Article 370 of the constitution of India would be withdrawn along with 
the promulgation of a uniform civil code of India. This would mean that Muslims would 
no longer settle their family disputes according to Muslim social laws and customs. All 
these issues were bracketed together in a chapter in the Manifesto entitled “cultural 
nationalism” (BJPManifesto 2009: 8). Cultural terms like “Ramjanambhoomi' [birth 
place of Hindu god Ram] and ‘Hindutva’ have seeped into the society’s vernacular after 
their propagation. The BJP elite’s belief in “Hindutva” raises a new level of mistrust 
between India and Pakistan as is evident in the electoral norms which form another 
component of the [in]-security community between the two states. The bashing of 
Pakistan was one of the central points in the electoral campaign of 2009 in India. 
Pertaining to security, the BJP Manifesto states: “terrorism sponsored by Pakistani 




agencies is only one of the reason behind the fear that grips the people in cities, towns 
and villages” (BJPManifesto 2009). 
 The other major party that participated in the 2009 elections was the Congress 
party. The Congress party does not profess ‘Hindutva’ credentials and labels itself as a 
‘secular and nationalist’ party. It was the party in power [2004-2009] before the general 
elections and it highlighted various achievements i its Manifesto for the 2009 elections. 
Among its achievements, it listed the government of Pakistan’s formal acceptance of the 
involvement of a Pakistani national behind the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 as a 
‘notable victory’ in foreign policy for the Congress party government (INCManifesto 
2009). During an electoral campaign speech the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
reiterated, “We all know the epicenter of terrorism in the world today is Pakistan. The 
world community has to come to grips with this hars reality” (Naqvi 1.4.2009). It is not 
just communal politics within India, when analyzing the broader context of India-
Pakistan security relations it becomes readily apparent that what happens to Muslims in 
India has far reaching affects in the security relations between the two states. In addition 
to elites’ rhetoric, popular culture is another medium of the propagation of negative 
norms constructed by elites. 
 The cartoon shown below was published on the 26th of December 2008 in the 
Daily Jang [the leading Urdu daily in Pakistan which has the largest circulation in 
Pakistan as well as in the UK and Europe] in the aft rmath of the Mumbai terrorist 
attacks that occurred in India one month earlier (November 2008). This cartoon shows 
the crux of the India and Pakistan security dilemma. The right side of the pictures shows 
the official policy statements of the ruling elites of the two countries lambasting each 




other. While, the left side shows the more popular image of people in their homes in 
Pakistan being glued to their TV sets watching the lat st Indian film on the cable TV 
network and listening to popular Indian songs at marriage ceremonies (Iqbal 26.12.2008) 
 
  
Popular culture includes the mass media, films, and print media, among other 
things. Mass media in the form of electronic and print media are fairly independent in 
both countries when compared to the film industry. As an offshoot of popular culture 
approach, I will examine the role of Indian elites in the film industry in establishing 
norms of animosity towards Pakistan. I dian films are one of the largest sources of 
entertainment for the population of both states and millions watch them in their leisure 
time. Yet the film industry is not completely free in India. It is under the control of 
political elites who use state censorship policies to control and limit what is being 
produced. I will elaborate on this in significant detail. 




 My selection of Indian films as representative of p pular culture is due to their 
significance in terms of their global reach, industrial status, popular following in Pakistan 
and the interference of the elites in their production. It is the only mass medium where all 
these factors have converged. All other forms of mass media, like print media and 
television, are relatively free from government contr l, however, due to government 
censorship policies elites’ have a sort of leverage on films. Popular cinema is a vast 
medium with huge mass appeal irrespective of high illiteracy rates in both states. When 
compared to other forms of popular culture, Indian f lms share certain commonalities 
with Pakistani audiences and so what is being depict d in them has a direct impact on the 
psyche of the people across the border.  
 To understand the role of Indian films it is important to appreciate the global and 
domestic reach of the Indian cinema industry. The Northern Indian film industry is called 
Bollywood from the historic city of Bombay which is now called Mumbai in India. It is 
the biggest industry in the world in terms of viewers and budget allocation (Rajadhyaksha 
and Willemen 1999). It is estimated that the yearly p oduction of films in India is 
between ‘800 to 1000’ films with ‘10-15 million’ tickets sold daily (Srinivas 2002). The 
Bollywood film “Slumdog Millionaire” won eight Academy Awards [Oscars] in 2009. 
For the majority of people in India and Pakistan watching Indian films is part of their 
regular social activities. More importantly, Indian films are easily available throughout 
Pakistan and since the language is perfectly understood with only small variations in 
dialect, no translation is required. In Pakistan, the language is called Urdu and in India it 
is referred to as Hindi or Hindustani. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, Indian 
films were banned in Pakistan, but pirated CDs and cassettes of Indian films are easily 




available (B.B.C.online 23.1.2006). In 2006, the Pakist ni government lifted the ban on 
Indian films to allow that they be viewed in cinemas (B.B.C.online 23.1.2006). 
It is interesting to mention here that Bollywood films are the ones which need ‘no 
passport, no visa’ to cross the border and reach Pakistan (Sen 2005). It is the major 
source for knowing the identity of the ‘Other’. In contrast to it, the Pakistan film industry 
is very weak and they have few viewers even within Pakistan. Currently, the Pakistani 
film industry is almost ‘non-existent’ with only ‘12 films per year’ being produced (Tahir 
3.7.2010). Therefore, how the Bollywood film industry portrays Muslims and Pakistan in 
its movies has an important link with the social norms of society, since there is very little 
contact between the populations of both states. The cinema in India is an important 
indicator for understanding the social milieu of Indian society. It can be taken as ‘a 
metaphor for society’ (Ahmed 1992). 
 Since 1990 onwards, India witnessed two phenomenal rises in two sectors of its 
polity. One is the rise of the right wing orthodox Indian party the BJP and the other is the 
growth of mass media in the shape of numerous television channels along with the surge 
of high budget Indian movies. A close nexus is established between the values and norms 
articulated by the orthodox right in India and the interpellation of these norms by the 
mass media. Prior to the 1990s, there were very few films made on contentious subjects 
like the partition of the subcontinent, security issues, the Kashmir dispute and the identity 
issues of the state. For example, ‘Garam Hawa’ [HotWind] was released in 1973 and 
Indo Pakistan wars ‘Hindustan ki Kasam’ [Pledge to India] was released in 1973. 
However, the decade of 1990 saw the popularity of ‘martial themes’ in Bollywood 




increase (Athique 2008). The state elites strongly used the right of censorship on 
Bollywood films while ‘Policing Hindi cinema’ (Bose 2009). 
 I have taken my data on Indian films from the ‘Encyclopaedia of Indian cinema’ 
(Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). This encyclopaedia is an authoritative account of the 
Indian film industry published in joint collaboration with the British Film Institute and 
the National Film Archive of India. It includes national film entries from 1896 through 
1995 along with all the major regional language films of India [Tamil, Telugo, Bengali, 
Gujarati and Marathi]. The statistics are also staggering stating that ’23 million Indians 
go to the movies everyday’ (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). The statistics regarding 
the number of viewers of Indian films in Pakistan cnot be easily determined. However, 
the popularity of Indian films in Pakistan can be gau ed by taking into account their 
accessibility on the cable television network in major parts of Pakistan as well as the 
presence of pirated CDs in the open market and the proj ction of Indian films in Pakistani 
mass media. There are many ‘blockbuster’ Indian films based on anti-Pakistan and anti-
Muslim themes such as Roja, Mission Kashmir, Pukar, G dar, LOC, Bombay and  
Border, among others films. I referred to these films as ‘blockbusters’ since they were a 
commercial success at the box office as reported in the encyclopaedia of Indian cinema 
(Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). 
 These types of films caused resentment among Pakistanis because of their 
negative propaganda. It seems that these sorts of films are only being produced to spread 
the elites’ agenda of constructing negative norms concerning Pakistan. The availability of 
cable television in almost every part of Pakistan and the frequent airing of new Indian 
films has made the accessibility of watching Indian films easier for the people of 




Pakistan. The Indian films also witnessed a change in their cr dentials. From the 
romantic and melodious films of the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, the tone and tenor 
of Indian films changed in the 1990s so that they wre more action packed, more 
nationalist and increasingly anti-Pakistani. The connivance of the social norms of 
Hindutva explicated by the Indian elites and the majority of Indian films released since 
the 1990s has helped to produce ‘a monolithic India identity that is Hindu’ (Malhotra 
and Alagh 2004). Such an exclusive identity has margin l spatial place for the Muslims 
of India. In most of the films produced since the 1990’s, Muslims are stereotyped as 
traitors, terrorists, insurgents and brutal in order to create a ‘phobia’ in Indian society by 
portraying ‘negative images’ of Muslims (Jinabade 2009). In the post-independence 
period, many Muslim stars in Indian cinema adopted Hindu names to receive acclaim in 
order to pass implicit norms of the ‘All India League of Censorship’ (Hijri 2008). Some 
of these big names include “Dilip Kumar” [Yusaf Khan], “Menna Kumari” [Mahjabeen 
Bano], “Madhubala” [Mumtaz Jehan Begum Dehlavi] (Hijri 2008: 60-61). The 
Bollywood films that are based on the nationalist dcourse derive their themes 
extensively from Hindu ‘mythology and symbolism’ in spite of India being a multi-
cultural secular country (Hijri 2008). Many films are produced on thematic issues of the 
confrontation with Pakistan [films like Fiza, Soldier, Border, Bombay, Gadar, etc.] in 
order to reify the Hindu identity. 
 For example, ‘Bombay’ is a Bollywood film released in 1995, after being 
censored many times by the Indian government (Bose 2009). The film was released amid 
the social milieu of the demolition of the Babari Mosque (1992) and the role played by 
the Hindu religious parties. The film portrays the role of Mr. Bal Thackeray, the Hindu 




fundamentalist leader of “Shiv Sena”, an anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani militant party 
from Mumbai. The film is based on a love story between a Muslim girl and a Hindu boy 
and was shown during the heightened religious and communal tensions in India at that 
time. The Indian Censor Board deleted the words “Pakist n”, “Islamic state”, “the visuals 
of Babari Mosque” under the pretext of suppressing communal violence which might 
ensue after the release of the film (Bose 2009). But this did not help its cause, since after 
the film was released its director had to run for his life and his home was bombed. 
‘Bombay’ was also boycotted by Muslims in India and its release was banned in many 
Muslim countries on account of its incorrect portrayal of Muslim social norms. 
Bollywood films like ‘Bombay’ have the power and social recognition of disseminating 
the views of powerful groups or elites at the expense of ‘misrepresenting’ Muslims who 
are in the minority in India (Mallhi 2005). 
 Indian films that deals with Kashmir dispute tend to emphasise India’s claim on 
Kashmir, include ‘Mission Kashmir’ and ‘Refugee’. These films were banned by the 
Pakistani government, but pirated cassettes and CDs were still available and were 
watched by people of Pakistan with a ‘pinch of salt’ (A hique 2008). Another Bollywood 
film “Roja” was one of the most popular films in 1992 in India. It was based upon the 
India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir when the Kashmir separatist struggle started in 1989 
in Indian held Kashmir. The film has long sequences to convince viewers of the 
‘righteousness’ of the Indian claim over Kashmir and has many scenes which are anti-
Pakistani. In one dialogue in the film the viewer is told, “India has already been 
partitioned once and now we will not allow it to divi e again”. The Indian claim over 
Kashmir was supported with powerful national narratives and Pakistan was depicted as 




the source of evil and the aggressor state behind te Kashmir separatist struggle. Dirks 
explains that ‘Roja’ was used as medium for “a particular set of political arguments about 
the state” (Dirks 2008: 142). The film was officially recognized by the state. The film 
won three national awards and surprisingly, it also won the award for the “Best Film on 
National Integration”. Here Indian national integration is forged at the expense of 
maligning Pakistan and vice versa. In other words, the Indian identity gets an ‘identity 
signifier’ through films by castigating Pakistan’s identity. The aim of films like ‘Roja’ is 
for the ‘manufacture of consent’ of the people on state’s practices which are disguised 
with cultural contestations (Bharucha 1994). ‘Border’ is another Indian film released in 
1997 and was a blockbuster in India, receiving many national awards. The songs of the 
films were an instant hit. The film is based on the t me of the 1971 war with Pakistan. 
Naturally the Pakistan army was on the losing side in the film and the image of Indian 
army was projected with valour and dignity. The anti-Pakistani dialogues in the film are 
its hallmark, punctuated with nationalist melodrama to impress the Indian audiences. 
However, it may be asked, what message is being conveyed to the Pakistani audiences? It 
reflects the stereotyping of Pakistan as the “Other”. It is important here to elaborate 
further on the ‘manufacture of consent’ by censorship policies in Indian films and how 
these films contribute in developing norms of animosity towards Pakistan. 
 There is a long history of the involvement of the state’s elites in lieu of the 
‘censorship policies’ on Indian films. Significantly, the influence of elites is more 
prominent in those films where the image of Pakistan is being portrayed as an enemy of 
the state or the “Other”. Every film in India requires a certificate from the Central Board 
of Film Certification (CBFC). The Board is a statutory body organized under the Indian 




Cinematograph Act of 1952. Even though the first amendment of the Indian Constitution 
grants people’s ‘Right to the Freedom of Speech and Expression’, the constitution also 
grants special powers to the executive to impose retrictions on the mass media if what is 
to be aired is deemed detrimental to the security of he state (Bhowmik 2002). The 14th 
amendment to the Indian constitution also gives more authority to the state to impose 
‘reasonable restrictions’ on forms of expression on the pretext of the sovereignty and the 
integrity of India (Granville 1999). It is also interesting to note that other forms of 
expression like print and electronic media manage to secure their freedom because of 
their “political clout” and it is only the popular cinema which ‘remained vulnerable’ 
(Bhowmik 2002). Here political clout refers to the involvement of Indian political elites 
who are sometimes the owners of the various media channels or in other cases there are 
media conglomerates which finance the election campaigns of the ruling political elites in 
India. Every film meant for public viewing, be it a commercial venture, documentary film 
or an art movie has to be reviewed by the state to ge  a CBFC certificate before it can be 
shown publically. Appeals against any arbitrariness lie with the Indian Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting. Even the appellate body is a government ministry and it is 
like ‘an appeal from Caesar to Caesar’ (Noorani 1983). A film is given a certificate for 
ten years and it can be renewed after that period. This shows the arbitrary and impulsive 
attitude of the executive to keep forms of mass media in check and control (Noorani 
1983). All the guidelines, principles and policies of the CBFC are framed by the 
government. Section 5B of the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952 sets the ‘Principles for 
guidance in certifying films’ as:  
“ A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion  
of the authority competent to grant the certificate, th  film or any part  




of it is against the interest of the security of the state, friendly relations  
with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or involves  
defamation or contempt of court, or is likely to incite commission of any  
offence” (Bhowmik 2002: 3576). 
 
 Along with the above ‘set guidelines’ for film certification the central government 
also has the discretion to issue ‘directives’ to the competent authority, i.e., the CBFC. 
The members of the CBFC are politically appointed an re not selected based on their 
expertise in the field of cinema (Bhowmik 2003). 
In 2002 the CBFC refused to give a certificate to Anand’s documentary film‘Jung 
aur Aman’ [War and Peace]. The committee made the following recommendation to the 
director to ‘delete the scenes showing Pakistanis burning India’s national flags. But 
nothing was said regarding ‘Indians burning Pakistan’  national flag’ (Bhowmik 2002: 
3575). Many critics of Indian films have questioned this governmental role as ‘cultural 
police’(Bhowmik 2002). 
 Similarly in March 2003 the CBFC also refused to give a certificate to the 
documentary film ‘Aakrosch’ [Cry of Pain] based on the communal violence directed 
against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. This incident caused a communal frenzy in India and 
led to increased tension between the two countries. The state police did not even allow 
private showings of the film since it did not have th censor certificate by the CBFC 
(TheHindu 2003). In any case, most private television channels i  India do not even dare 
to air documentary films on political issues (TheHindu 2003). 
 Nevertheless, Indian films that portray violent scenes usually go uncensored by 
the CBFC when they show the bravery of the Indian armed forces at the humiliation of 
the Pakistan army (Bose 2009). An example worth mentioni g here is the film ‘LOC’ 
[Line of Control] released in 2003. This is a film about the Kargil war between India and 




Pakistan. ‘LOC’ was released during a heightened military stand off between the 
Pakistani and Indian armed forces in the year 2001-2002. At this time, India had rapidly 
mobilized its military to the border under the code name of ‘Operation Parakaram’, only 
for Pakistan to reciprocate by sending its military. In the film, Pakistan was treated as a 
rogue state and an overtly hostile one with General Musharraff being portrayed as the 
main architect of the Kargil war among Indian audiences. Another film, “Gaddar: Ek 
Prem Katha” [Mutiny: A Love Story] was released in 2001 and depicts the turbulent 
partition period of 1947. In this film, the Pakistani Muslim father of a girl is the villain 
behind an otherwise love story of a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl. ‘Pukar’ [Cry Out] is 
another film based on theme of cross border terrorism. 
 ‘Lamhaa’ [Moment] is another film based on Kashmir struggle. In the movie 
previews it promised ‘to tell the story of violence in the region as never seen before’ 
(Dawn 30.6.2010). The film faced stringent censorships before its release in July 2010. 
The Indian censor board objected that the narration on Kashmir in the preview of the film 
should not start with ‘the most dangerous place in the world’ (Dawn 30.6.2010). The film 
explains the post-partition traumas in Kashmir and wide spread corruption in Indian held 
Kashmir, and was at loggerheads with the Indian film censor board. 
 The censorship of films in India and Pakistan are firmly controlled by the 
government in power. The Indian Supreme Court’s decision regarding the state’s right to 
censor, as not only ‘desirable, but also necessary’ is quoted in all the annual reports of 
Indian certification board (Bose 2009). It is evident from this analysis of India’s 
censorship policies that they are significantly influenced by the ruling elites who are 
‘politically motivated’ in constructing social norms of hatred towards Pakistan (Bhowmik 




2002). The connivance of CBFC with state elites shows state patronage of anti-Pakistan 
‘jingoistic films’ like ‘Roja’, ‘Gadar’ or ‘Sarfrosh’ that incite audience to shout ‘anti-
Pakistan slogans’ (Bhowmik 2003). These kind of films show the stark contrast in the 
state’s attitude towards films which are based on themes of mutual harmony and peace 
like Anand’s documentary ‘Jung aur Aman’ [War and Peace]. Even the Indo-China 
relations were not spared from this state manifestation in a film entitled ‘Haqeeqat’ made 
by Anand in 1964. This film showed the valour of Indian forces in the shadow of the 
1962 war with China, received ‘unprecedented’ acclaim by the state (Bhowmik 2003). In 
many ways, Indian popular cinema seems to be held hostage by ‘politicians malice’ and 
tailored to match their vision of Indian security (Bhowmik 2002). The film censorship 
regime in India has become a ‘manifestation of state power’ (Bhowmik 2003). 
Vasudevan attributes this to the lack of a ‘modernist outlook of the political elite’ 
(Vasudevan 2005). It is the culmination of Indian rule s’ desire for ‘cultural 
homogeneity’ by way of ‘social engineering’ that leads to ‘disoriented cultural’ practices 
(Bhowmik 2003). It serves as a vehicle for imposing Hindu identity on the entirety of 
multi-cultural India by excluding minorities as a project of the ‘Hindu nationalist 
discourse’ and identifying a common enemy [Pakistan] (Bose 2009). The aim of the 
‘political manipulation’ of the censorship regime is not only to prevent  ‘objectionable 
films’ from mass screening, but also to deliberately promote ‘favourable’ ones and such 
actions have been taken by all governments ‘irrespective of their ideological bias’ 
(Bhowmik 2003). 
 The state’s involvement in censor boards can help shape and determine public 
opinion to support its social practices. Films that produced animosity toward the other are 




responsible for creating a ‘stereotyping image’. This is what French philosopher Michel 
Foucault refers to as the ‘Power of Knowledge’. He points out that those who hold power 
are also in the position to disseminate particular beliefs and values of society (Foucault 
1994). Power relations cannot be explained solely in terms of governmental authority, but 
they are also found in a ‘system of social networks’ (Foucault 1982). The power of 
popular cinema in India particularly from the 1990s onwards has helped to disseminate 
‘Hindu majoritarian nationalism’ by constructing myths from religious norms 
(Vasudevan 2000). This explains the underlying structure of social power that has its 
roots in cultural norms but is being controlled by the ruling elites in India and Pakistan. 
They have helped in the construction of knowledge and power relationships by 
reinforcing negative stereotypes of each other. 
 The question may be asked, can change be brought abou in people’s perceptions 
of one another, if alternative films are released about each other that reinforce norms of 
friendship and goodwill between the two countries? Although examples of these types of 
films are rare, I argue, particularly considering the large demand for Indian films in 
Pakistan, that, if they are given a chance, there is every possibility that the current hostile 
relationship may blossom into friendship. In the backdrop of a military standoff between 
the two countries in 2002, a film was released in India in 2004 entitled ‘Veer Zaara’. This 
film was based on friendship between the two countries and was extremely popular 
among both Indian and Pakistani audiences. Another film that was nominated for an 
Oscar award is ‘Lagaan’. This is a film which focuses on the past and shows how 
Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Dalits joined hands to defeat an imperial power. It shows the 
‘cultural accomplishment’ of the past (Stadtler 2005). The venue of battle is an imagined 




field of cricket. Do such past cultural accomplishments have the potential to change the 
current scenario of security dilemma between India and Pakistan? 
 
7.1.3 Popular social practices and some positive norms  
 The suggested normative structure of an India-Pakist n security community can 
be found in nostalgic literary works written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers. 
Some of the Pakistani authors include Saadat Hassan Manto, Intizar Hussain, Bapsi 
Sidhwa and many others. On the Indian side these famous writers include Krishen Singh 
Bedi, Ismaat Chughtai, Krishna Sobti, Bhisham Sahni, Gopi Chand Kishan, Qurratul Ain 
Haider, Krishna Baldev, Khushnet Singh and others. All these authors have fictionalized 
their own experiences of living together in an undivided India (Chakravarty and Hussain 
1998; Bhalla 2008). Their narration of the period of partition carries within it the seeds of 
a conceptualized normative security community betwen India and Pakistan. Their status 
as towering personalities of Urdu/ Hindi literature is never in doubt in their respective 
societies; however, they seldom get recognition from the state in lieu of teaching their 
books as part of educational curriculum for the younger generations. This shows the 
difference between the elite versions of a state’s identity and the popular one. The 
commonality of language has made these master-pieces easily accessible and 
understandable for the population of both states. However, the state guided discourses of 
national identity do not offer these authors any place in the national curriculum. 
 Ted Hopf, a conventional constructivist, has examined the relationship between a 
state’s identity and domestic or societal claims. He identified a ‘social cognitive 
structure’ based on ‘discursive formations’ which includes the study of literary classics in 




order to formulate a domestic ‘discourse’ of the state’s identity (Hopf 2002). In the 
preface of his magnum opus, Hopf encouraged scholars to “read pulp fiction in order to 
understand a state’s foreign policy”. Presently, the state’s elites postulate educational 
norms by way of spreading cultural myths of ancient rivalries against one another in the 
minds of people. An alternative ‘social cognitive structure’ could be offered that would 
be based on the work of these renowned literary personalities in both states. Thus, it can 
be considered as a way of informing and presenting the credentials of the ‘Others’ 
identity. I will briefly explore some of these classic texts in order to show what kind of 
social cognitive structure can be offered as an alternative. 
 The classic short story writer in Pakistan, Saadat Hasan Manto in his story ‘Dekh 
Kabira Roya’ [Look Kabir has Wept] presents the usele sness of savagery behind the 
carnage during partition. The main character is Kabir named after the Sufi saint Kabir 
who was the main figure behind the seventeenth century ‘Bhakti movement’. The 
movement promoted the mutual coexistence of Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent 
by encouraging them to shun their religious differences. In another classic, ‘Toba Tek 
Singh’, Manto laments over the level of hostility between India and Pakistan. In this 
story, Hindu and Muslim elites are portrayed as lunatics fighting incessantly over a piece 
of land in ‘Toba Tek Singh’ [a city in Pakistan]. Intizar Hussain, another Pakistani writer, 
derided the present day animosity between India and Pakistan and talks about tranquil 
times in his novel ‘Basti’ [community]. The name of Intizar’s novel ‘Basti’ or community 
explains the ideal type of co-habitation between Hidus and Muslims in the pre-partition 
days. He explains how the Muslims and the Hindus respected each other’s religious 
traditions and fervently participated in each other’s festivities. While giving an interview 




he narrated his devout Muslim father’s best friendship with an equally devoted Hindu 
(Bhalla 2008). This again shows one of the differences between Western understanding 
of a security community, where secularism serves as the foundational pillar, as opposed 
to religious South Asian states like India and Pakist n. It should also be mentioned here 
that there is a big difference between a religious Hindu or Muslim fundamentalist and a 
devout Hindu or Muslim. 
 The nostalgia created in these writings by the first generation of people who 
participated in the partition of the subcontinent needs to be shared with today’s fourth 
generation. These stories should also be included in the history books taught in schools in 
both India and Pakistan. Indian writer Qurratulain Hyder’s novel ‘Aag ka Darya’ [River 
of Fire] is one of the most famous works on both side  of the divide (Hyder 2007). The 
list is never ending, since literary classics are being created by literary elites of both states 
in abundance. The popular social practices show that these novels and stories are being 
read and enjoyed by the people in both states, yet these sorts of stories or texts are not 
included in the educational curriculum of the two states. Both writers in India and 
Pakistan have shown nostalgic feelings toward one another in their works. Many 
acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers and novelists set their works in the past when 
people lived together in peace and tranquillity. After partition, these writers have 
emphasized mutual respect and love of each other’s country. Bapsi Sidhwa in the opening 
page of Alok Bhalla’s book wrote, “We, Indians and Pakistanis alike, are always 
emotionally involved in our politics…I should add tha  politics in the subcontinent 
touches each person’s life” (Bhalla 2008). The novels of these writers are extremely 
popular on both sides of the border. They have written extensively on the former periods 




of friendship between the two communities [Hindus and Muslims]. The irony is that 
though the contribution of these writers have been r cognized by their respective 
governments and some of them have even been given national awards, the works of these 
authors have never been incorporated in the general cu riculum of the education system. 
 In summary, the main thrust of these great classics i  that they present Hindu and 
Muslim identities in a more complex manner than the antagonistically articulated 
identities in the two states’ nationalist identity discourses. But the question arises why is 
this ‘social cognitive structure’ not given a central place by the states’ ruling elites? The 
answer is obvious and points towards the vested intres s of the ruling elites of both states 
and their politically motivated agendas. Now I explain some of the popular social 
practices based on religious norms. 
 Hinduism and Islam are generally considered to be two very distinct religions. 
Islamic principles and the Hindu religion are believed to have nothing in common 
between them. Although Muslims and Hindus lived side by side for centuries on the 
subcontinent, their religious beliefs are poles apart. However, in the 15th century, the 
‘Bhakti Movement’ developed in the subcontinent tried to bridge the gap between the 
two communities with regard to their religious differences. The movement was highly 
successful in the region with a mass following in the subcontinent. This does not mean 
that Muslims and Hindus started to ignore their religious differences, but that their 
followers started giving respect to each other and each others religious doctrines. The 
Bhakti movement developed peaceful religious norms of mutual coexistence. It is useful 
to mention some of the salient principles of the Bhakti movement in the context of 
establishing better security relations between India and Pakistan. 




 The movement was initiated by Kabir [1398-1518] of Banaras [India] who is 
considered a saint by both Muslims and Hindus. His aim was to propagate peaceful 
religious norms of Islam and Hinduism. The idea behind the movement was to help 
Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent to rise above their religious differences and live 
peacefully together in the undivided India. The Bhakti movement was the converging 
point of mysticism in Islam and Hinduism. Kabir taught that the attributes of God remain 
the same whether one calls him “Ram” in Hinduism or “Allah” in Islam. He believed that 
all these differences were human artifices and not divinely created. He emphasized the 
positive attributes of Hinduism and Islam which were acceptable to both Hindus and 
Muslims. He stressed the unity of Muslims and Hindus in a common ‘religio-social 
platform’ (Hedayetullah 1977). Kabir also denounced the self appointed guardians of 
Hinduism, the Brahmins, the caste system in India and the Muslim pirs [clergy] who 
distorted religion according to their own interests. He proclaimed the universality of 
human beings while stressing upon the simple and comprehensible principles of Islam 
and Hinduism to the people. However, after Kabir’s death the Bhakti movement fell into 
disarray. The other important popular social practice derived from religious norms is 
reverence towards Sufism. The shrines of Muslim saint  in India are held in high esteem 
by Hindus and Muslims alike. It is quite interesting to see local Hindus meditating at the 
shrines of Muslim saints like Saleem Chisti in Fatehpur-Sakri, Mueen uddin Chisti and 
many others in India.  
The popular mass media initiative, “Aman ki Asha’ [Desire of Peace] of national 
dailies like The News (Daily Jang ) of Pakistan and Times of India [partially explained in 
Chapter 1] also explain the deviation of popular social practices from elites social 




practices. The popular stories of the masses of both sta es are published daily in these 
widely read newspapers in both states. These storie depict the desires of the people to 
visit their lost belongings on either side of the border, visit their distant and close 
relatives and a desire for family reunification. The strict visa requirements of both states 
do not allow people to freely visit each other’s countries. Visas are usually issued only 
for the intended city and people are not allowed to travel throughout the whole country. 
In spite of all these limitations, the Pakistan High Commission in India on an average 
issues 500 visas daily (Butalia 2.7.2010). The absurdity of these stringent visa sanctions 
enforced by the elites are even more evident whenever the border controls are eased a bit 
with emotional reunions at the border crossings betwe n India and Pakistan of lost family 
members (Butalia 2.7.2010). 
 To conclude, the differences between popular and elite social practices allow 
room for community formation at the popular level. It is important that we study security 
and identity as a discourse, and not as a pre-established reality of an anarchic world 
system. The prominent grey areas of cooperation between the two states have been held 
hostage by the elites due to their dichotomous separation of identities. Indian and 
Pakistani elites after having identified each other as the other’s existential threat, try to 
fortify their constructed claims with daily routines in order to create the right context for 
their message. At the elite level, the preparation of educational curriculum, elite’s 
rhetoric and censorship regimes imposed on popular c ture are some of the daily 
routines of the elites. At the popular level, the role of literacy classics, Sufism and 
popular mass media initiatives show congenial popular social practices for security 
community formation. In recent decades, the citizens of India and Pakistan have been 




presented only one perspective of the other as their en my. No effort has been made by 
the ruling elites of either country to promote living with a friendly neighbour with whom 
both have centuries old cultural ties and experiences.  
 There is no doubt that a systemic power structure does explain a state’s behaviour 
to a certain extent, but what is often ignored is the cultural determinant of power politics. 
How does power influence the beliefs of people by supporting myths and the contested 
social norms of society? The people of both countries have common ancestors, 
understand the same language, wear the same clothes and quite often imitate each other’s 
social norms at occasions like marriages, yet the ‘we-feeling’ required for a security 
community is currently at its lowest ebb. The absence of economic transactions with 
virtually no interstate institutions to conduct trade between the two countries has 
hampered the cause of creating an economic community according to the neo-
functionalist and functionalist theories of regional integration (Choi and Caporaso 2002). 
There is limited social mobility across the borders between India and Pakistan which is a 
key variable required for regional integration. The silver lining lies in re-constructing the 
state narratives from the vestiges of some common norms developed as Hindu-Muslim 
communities and evolved by living together for centuries. 
 The overwhelming success of the secular Indian Congress Party in the 15th 
general elections in May 2009 and the resolve of the Pakistani government to bring the 
plotters behind the Mumbai carnage to justice are steps taken in right direction. The 
Indian Congress party emerged as the largest party in the Lok Sabha [lower house] with 
its alliance [UPA] winning 262 seats in a house of 573 seats, slightly short of simple 
majority of 273 and the BJP alliance [NDA] won only 158 seats. These elections are 




significant in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist atacks and the belligerency of the BJP 
camp towards Pakistan. The Indian electorates’ dismissal of the BJP’s credentials of 
‘Hindutva’ and their communal politics along with teir anti-Pakistan slogans are further 
testimony of the gulf that exists between the elites professed social norms and their 
acceptance at the popular end. 
 The norms of mutual respect and friendship are not all wed to develop between 
the people of both countries by the ruling elites who have their own vested interests in 
perpetuating the current security dilemma and state rivalry. Indian cinema has the 
potential to act as an effective non-state actor by pla ing a vital role in establishing social 
norms of cooperation and trust building across the borders. A joint venture could be set 
up between the two countries to produce films on comm n themes and issues such as 
poverty and terrorism. It is also essential that tex books which profess hatred and 
intolerance toward each other should be eliminated from the educational curriculum of 
both states. This is a tall order, but here in lies the foundations of an ever illusive security 
community based on social norms of peace and harmony. Along with materialistic 
determinants of a security community what is needed as a precursor is a socially 
conceptualized “collective identity”. 
 For the resolution of any conflict or the formation f any security community, it is 
imperative to understand the cultural contexts of the two states. As Bailey explains: 
 
“In the end the best conflict managers will not be cultural outsiders.  
They will be those for whom the culture is second nature. The enlightened  
outsider, laboriously searching for the relevant cultural constructs, has much  
to learn. The willful outsider, who disdains the search and thinks he has a  
formula good for all occasions and all cultures,has almost everything to learn”  
                                                                         (Avruch 1998: 108). 
 




 In the next section, I will make a brief comparative analysis of hypothetical India-
Pakistan security community with the EU and ASEAN. I will first examine two existing 
securities communities the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). This analysis will be based on the path dependence model of security 
communities discussed in Section 7.1 of this chapter. It will particularly focus on the 
question of what lessons should be learned from the EU and ASEAN experiences when 
contemplating an India-Pakistan security community i  a social constructivist framework.  
 
7.2 A comparative study of security communities  
This section deals with the ideational components of he EU and ASEAN security 
communities by identifying their hidden normative structures. The argument of elite 
versus popular social practices will remain the same while treading on the path 
dependence model of security communities [section 7.1].  
 
7.2.1 European Union [EU] 
 The first two steps of the path dependence model examined the iscursive 
practices of elites and the role of chosen traumas in effecting the formation of a security 
community [section 7.1]. In the case of India-Pakistan, I have explained how partition of 
the subcontinent served as a tool in the hands of the elites to construct each other’s 
identities as hostile binaries [Chapter 4]. In the case of Europe, the shared chosen trauma 
was the ravages of World War II and the positive rol played by the elites in 
‘desecuritizing’ their contentious security issues for higher mutual benefits (Waever 
1998). Europe’s need for having a common security community has been discursively 




constructed out of the fear of war from Europe’s pat history. The myth of the past fear of 
war was too strong behind more integration without delving into the minutiae of the we-
feeling as a precursor to the formation of a security community. The ‘referent’ of security 
shifted from the traditional state centred approach towards a collective fear of Europe’s 
past (Waever 1998). 
 Critical social constructivists have examined the rol of the elites’ discursive 
practices in the integration discourse of the European Union (Onuf 1989; Diez 1999). The 
language spoken by the elites at ‘critical junctures’ (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999) of 
European integration have special meanings attached to them. It is not only the particular 
words used by the elites in order to speak for or against the Union , but they can also be 
viewed in a wider context as ‘performatory acts’ (Diez 1999). The case of British identity 
is often juxtaposed with that of German or French identities (Marcussen, Risse et al. 
1999). For the British integration with the European Union means the loss of their 
‘Common Wealth’ status and the loss of the portrait of their monarch on the British 
Pound. The British debate is often Euro-sceptic. The speech of Sir Winston Churchill in 
the House of Commons on the 11th of May 1953 still reflects the British mind set vis-à-
vis the European Union. At the time, Churchill stated: “we have our own Commonwealth 
and Empire” (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999). In contrast to this perspective, an analysis of 
German and French elites shows the use of ‘Euro-Speak’ rhetoric. For the Germans their 
identity construction after World War II required integration and more Europeanization 
to overcome the guilty feelings of being responsible for the war. At the time, Thomas 
Mann claimed, “we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany” 
(Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999: 622). 




 The third step in the formation of a security community at the popular level is the 
presence of socio-cultural norms for the formation of a collective identity.  For the case 
of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community, I have chosen linguistic similarity 
and common popular social practices. In contrast to it the European Union is a peculiar 
security community in the sense that though every European state strives for its 
membership, there is no common perception of European identity which binds the 
European societies together. It is remarkable that states in the European Union have 
compromised their sovereignty to a supra-national organization without socializing or 
presenting a unified European identity to their peopl . If it is essential for a security 
community to develop a “we-feeling” among the peopl of various nations, then it can be 
asked where is this common feeling in the case of the EU? 
 It is part of the European integration process that t ere is no essentialist version of 
national identity which is based upon the categorical assessment of an out-group and an 
in-group identities or us versus them (Tajfel 1982). In other words, at the popular level, 
although people in Europe today have national identti s, they also carry with them the 
semblance of a ‘European’ identity which is not based on the concept of Europe as the 
‘Other’. From a sociological point of view, people carry multiple identities and these 
identities do not necessarily have to conflict. Instead these multiple identities can be seen 
as forming ‘eccentric’ circles of identities, each accommodative of the other (Risse 
2009). European identity also includes the concept of ‘bounded integration’(Cederman 
2001). This means that the nation states carry their national identities along with the ‘we 
feeling’ of a community while bound together in a territory (Cederman 2001). Cederman 
examines the reality on the ground by exploring the lev l of  the ‘civic participation’ of 




Europeanization norms in ‘education, language and mass media’(Cederman 2001). The 
conclusions drawn are startling, since the nation state  in Europe have a tight grip on their 
educational policies. The curriculum is primarily being taught in respective national 
nomenclature and Europeans show a preference of chosing their own national channels 
when watching mass media (Cederman 2001). This sense of bounded-ness may be one of 
the prime reasons for the absence of a European ‘demos’ that is a community that is made 
up of people carrying the ‘we-feeling’ among themselves 
 Another aspect of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community is the role of 
the mass media and the impact Indian films have on Pakistani audience. Let us analyze 
the role of the mass media as an intermediary between national identities and European 
identity. Deutsch has already conceptualized the ‘we-feeling’ as a result of the dense 
communicative network between the states in a security community (Deutsch 1970). 
There is a definitive role which the mass media plays in constructing collective identities 
(Schlesinger 1991; Schlesinger 1993; Rajagopal 2001). A space for the ‘European Public 
sphere’ was created in the national public sphere in order to realize this objective. This 
reality grapples with the fact that there was no natio l recognition or legislation to 
provide the European public sphere a space in the various countries’ national media until 
the first half of the 1980s (Semetko, Vreese et al. 2000). In 1984 the European 
Community issued a ‘Green paper’ on ‘Television without Frontiers’ (TWF). The 
implementation of this TWF directive depended upon the national regulations which each 
state had devised for its media policy (Harcourt 2002). The E.C. directive ‘Television 
without Frontiers’ was amended twice and its latest v rsion is now a days called the 
‘Audiovisual Media Services Directive’ (AVMSD). It ‘covers all EU audiovisual media 




services’ and must be incorporated into national law by the end of 2009 (AVMSD 2009). 
This latest directive does not oblige any European n tion states to promote the imaginary 
concept of European cultural identity, but rather its aim is to create a ‘level playing field’ 
for the commercial activities of the audiovisual industry among various media players of 
the Union. In an ambiguous way Article 3(i) of the directive asks the member states to 
promote ‘European works’, but does not specify what exactly is meant by ‘European 
works’. What then is the normative structure of the EU which sets the terms of inclusion 
and exclusion in this security community? 
 The cultural demarcation of European identity can be found in the Lisbon Treaty 
signed in 2007 and which came into effect in 2009. In the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty 
it is clearly written what is meant by Europe. 
“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist 
 inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values 
 of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom,  
democracy, equality and the rule of law, (Europa 2007: emphasis original) 
 
 Therefore, the ‘inspiration’-al value of the European Union forms the core of 
European identity. If we historically examine the inheritance of Europe we find a cultural 
fault line running through the entire region of Europe. Judean-Christian identity, the 
schism between the Judean-Christian tradition, the struggle with the papacy and 
absolutism, the Crusades, the period of the Enlightenment and the civil rights 
movements, are all various manifestations of this grand family ‘inheritance’ that is shared 
by all Europeans. It does not matter if the interest of the various individual European 
states were conflicted with regard to these trends, the states were still all involved in one 
way or the other. All European states owe their tradi ions to this common ‘inheritance’. It 
is important to historically deconstruct the values of this inheritance in order to arrive at a 




better sense of what constitutes European identity. In his book ‘Europe, a history’, the 
historian Norman Davies explains the ‘concept of Europe’. It is worth quoting his exact 
words, he points out:  
“Europe” is a relatively modern idea. It gradually replaced the earlier  
concept of ‘Christendom’ in a complex intellectual process lasting from  
the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. The decisive period, however,  
was reached in the decades on either side of 1700 after generations of  
religious conflict. In that early phase of the Enlightenment it became an  
embarrassment for the divided community of nations t  be reminded of  
their common Christian identity; and ‘Europe’ filled the need for a  
designation with more neutral connotations” (Davies 1996: 7). 
 
Davies quotes T.S. Eliot, a famous poet, who said on the eve of the German defeat in 
1945 that:  
“I am talking about the common traditions of Christianity which has  
made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural elements which  
this common Christianity has brought with it.…It is in Christianity that  
our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe  
_until recently_ have been rooted. It is against a backdrop of Christianity  
that all our thoughts have significance. An individual European may not  
believe that the Christian Faith is true, and yet what he says, and makes,  
and does, will all…depend on [the Christian heritage] for its meaning” 
                                                                               (Davies 1996: 9). 
 
 It might be true that a simplistic monolithic European cultural identity does not 
exist in today’s European Union. The long hiatus of changing trends has severely limited 
the scope of a single European identity. But I am interested here in exploring a unified 
European identity. I am interested in tracing the legacy of Europe which is based on these 
historical epochs, shared among diverse European states and experienced by all ordinary 
Europeans. In other words, it is Europe’s shared interests based on its common heritage 
that determine the rules for inclusion or exclusion fr m membership in the EU. 
 At the popular level, the opinion polls conducted by the BBC in various EU 
countries shows strong opposition to Turkish membership. This can be explained on the 
parameters of the European Union’s normative structu e. The reasons cited against 




Turkish membership were its large population, high poverty levels and ‘doubts about 
cultural compatibility with Europe’. The strongest opposition came from the French, the 
Germans and the Austrians (www.bbc.com 30.9.2005). In the same BBC survey a very 
interesting remark was made by Guillaume Parmentier, a leading French political pundit, 
who said, “the Turkish elite has been European for centuries; but the vast democratic 
expansion of Turkey involves Anatolian peasants, who are not European by culture, 
tradition or habit”(www.bbc.com 30.9.2005). 
 The famous phrase by nineteenth century Italian stte man Massimo d’Azeglio,  
that “we have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans” (Cederman 2001), still 
has some resonance in today’s European identity discour e. There are a few lessons to be 
taken from the formation of the EU. One lesson is the positive role played by the ruling 
elites in creating a common security community. Another lesson can be drawn from the 
popular level that is how in the end Europe’s chosen trauma of World War II had the 
positive effect of increasing support among European n tion states and peoples for the 
formation of a common security community which ultimately led to the formation of the 
European Union. I will now explain the normative struc ure of ASEAN.  
 
7.2.2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]  
 ASEAN is an association of ten countries of Southeast Asia formed in 1967. 
These include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Philippines, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. If the EU was able to flourish in a 
cobweb of legalistic norms guided by their institutionalist’s practices, then ASEAN 
represents a different type of security community which shows an aversion to such 




institutionalism. There is little interference by the Secretariat of ASEAN in Jakarta in the 
domestic affairs of its member states. ASEAN’s policy of non-interference has been 
proudly cited as the “ASEAN way” and this is the normative structure of ASEAN. The 
problem with ASEAN countries is that some of them have been under long spells of 
despotic rule. In these cases, the state’s identitis were being ‘engineered’ by these elites 
amid challenges of increased ethnic diversity and the lack of civic culture whereby, they  
served as socio-cultural ‘gatekeepers’(Shaw 2009). Faced with conditions of increased 
ethnic diversity and the weak institutional stability of ASEAN, the task of formulating 
‘national values’ was conducted by the states elites as a ‘legitimate discourse’(Shaw 
2009). 
 Why ASEAN is such a loosely structured security community and what is the 
relevance of ‘the ASEAN way’ in its normative struct re in making this security 
community? The ‘socio-cultural’ norms that make up ‘the ASEAN way’ are 
“Mushawaraya” [consultation] and ‘Mufakat” [consensus] (Acharya 2009b). ASEAN 
norms have already been studied at the elite level (Solidum 1981; Adler, Barnett et al. 
2000; Acharya 2001; Rumelili 2007). However, at the popular level, they have seldom 
been explained. My study of ASEAN is based on some anthropological insights taken 
from its member states. This will help us to understand the informality behind the 
normative structure of the ASEAN way. 
 Generally, the political culture of ASEAN countries shows that all Southeast 
Asian states are “galactic” polities. Stanley Tambiah first used the term “galactic” polities 
to refer to states that act as if they occupy their own autonomous galaxies in the universe 
where each has its own ‘sphere of influence’ and distinctiveness (Huang 2009: 16). 




Anthropological and sociological studies of ASEAN countries (Kahn 1998; Goda 1999) 
explain the presence of highly patriarchal and hierarchical societies where subservience 
to the command of the higher authority does not represent the transgression of individual 
rights or liberties, but rather is seen as a matter of respect towards the authority. 
Southeast Asian culture as a whole shows reverence to religious ideals and the beliefs of 
Confucius. 
 All ASEAN countries, with the exception of Thailand, were subjugated by 
colonial rule for a long time. This is their common a d shared chosen trauma. There are 
more spiritual and social obligations of ‘give and take’ in a community setting, rather 
than any explicit rules or codified laws. The other important factor underlying Southeast 
Asian nations (apart from subjugation from colonialism) is the reverence of the people 
towards religion. It is a strange concomitance thatfour different religions are practiced by 
ASEAN countries which includes Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. 
 The ‘ASEAN way’ is a delicate balance of religious, cultural and ancient social 
practices from Southeast Asian societies. Ancient kingdoms and the presence of four 
religions have made it a very long cultural discourse to traverse, but I will only focus on 
those aspects which are relevant for understanding the ‘informality’ behind the decision 
making processes of the ASEAN security community. The Indonesian concept of a leader 
and a follower revolves around the traditional norms of  “bapakism” which refers to  a 
‘bapak’ (father) and the ‘anuk buah’ or children (Pye and Pye 1985: 117). A leader is like 
a father who guides his children through the vicisstudes of the dangers of the outside 
world and in return desires the respect and reverenc  of his followers. That is how the 
former Indonesian President Sukerno developed the concept of  ‘guided democracy’ 




during his reign. There is explicit ‘reciprocity’ in ‘patronage clientage relationship’ in an 
Indonesian society (Pye and Pye 1985). In the Philippines, they also have a similar 
cultural practice called ‘utang-na-loob’. This means if someone receives a  favour in the 
Philippines then he is personally obliged to reciprocate the favour (Pye and Pye 1985: 
124). 
 In Burma, group identity is centred around the concept of ‘awza’ (Pye and Pye 
1985) which means that one who has leadership qualities in a group will be implicitly 
recognized and will not be openly celebrated as the group leader. In other words, it is a 
‘subjective’ attribute which is intersubjectively recognized by all the members of the 
group. But at the same time it is also a contested concept since every Burmese boasts of 
‘pon’ or authority and aspires for ‘awza’ in a group setting. Furthermore, if one fails to 
succeed in one’s endeavours he will attribute it to‘abnadeh’ (Pye and Pye 1985) which is 
an innate desire to help the cause of others at the exp nse of one’s own personal sacrifice. 
Similarly, in Thai culture the consideration towards others or deference for other’s cause 
is a virtue called as ‘krengjie’(Pye and Pye 1985). Thai culture explains that ordinary 
people are vulnerable and therefore must bow before the commands of the superior. 
Every superior has to manifest kindness towards others which is called ‘metta’ which in 
return ‘certifies’ the superior with ‘karuna’ which is the ‘constructive’ leadership quality 
to lead from the front (Pye and Pye 1985). The legitimacy of the use of power in 
Vietnamese culture depends upon ‘uy tin’ which means ‘trustworthy authority’ (Pye and 
Pye 1985) and there is a moral sense attached to it (Pye and Pye 1985). Another 
obligation for leaders in Vietnam is to uphold the practice of ‘phuc duc’ which means 




that one has to do good deeds so that the future gen rations will enjoy the fruit (Pye and 
Pye 1985). 
 The Malaysian culture in times of conflict demands complete silence and 
withdrawal by suppressing the emotions and preventing any hue and cry (Pye and Pye 
1985). This helps us to understand the Malaysian people’s peaceful posture towards 
Indonesia in the mid-1960s during Suharto’s reign in Indonesia, in spite of ‘konfrontashi’ 
[armed conflict] with Indonesia during the years of President Suekarno’s term in office in 
Indonesia. It was during this same time that ASEAN was founded in 1967. Malaysian 
cultural norms eschew violent revenge or crying out in pain. Malaysian society is also 
‘loosely structured’ (Pye and Pye 1985).  In the eys of Malaysian people, authority is 
centred on “deferential accommodation, Islamic norms of fatalistic commitment to 
uncompromising ideals and British aristocratic standards of fair play but with status 
barriers” (Pye and Pye 1985: 256). 
 ASEAN represents a socially constructed community that has been carefully 
created by the elites who at the same time remain sensitive to the prevailing cultural 
norms of the region. ‘Communitarian’ values that stre s upon people’s obligations rather 
than their ‘individualistic’ rights form a central part of “Asian values” (Blondel 2006). 
The ideational components of a security community also emphasise on individual’s 
obligations and the respect one owes to his superiors or guardians similar to the 
traditional Asian family structure. For example, for Thai people the King is the highest 
source of authority and the monarchy is Thailand’s ‘cherished’ national symbol which is 
accorded the highest level of ‘legitimacy’ (Reynolds 2005). How can the structure of 




ASEAN’s ‘nascent’ security community overtake a centuries old traditional system of 
monarchy? 
 The mutual compatibility of local traditions and foreign ideas has led to the 
distinctive ‘constitutive localization’ (Acharya 2004; Acharya 2009a) of security 
community norms. With ‘constitutive localization’, ‘foreign’ ideas of regional 
cooperation or community are not being subsumed en-mass, but rather they are trimmed 
and tailored by the elites according to the popular prescription and cultural milieu, before 
its adoption at the regional level. The lessons to be learned from the formation of the 
ASEAN security community is the unique informal role consultation plays for elites in 
shaping policies that respect the social traditions a d cultural milieu of ASEAN societies. 
The long struggle of these states against colonial rule is their common shared chosen 
trauma so the elites are particularly mindful of the independence and sovereignty of each 
state. This explains the absence of intuitionalism in ASEAN. ASEAN is also an elite 
driven project, but it has no wide popular base to carry this project forward. 
 
7.2.3 The comparison  
It is important to note that the amalgamation of both material and ideational components 
is required for the formation of a security community. The presence of a normative 
structure in the security community provides states with a shared world view. However, 
the impact of this normative structure differs in all three security communities. Popular 
culture in the India-Pakistan security community is of immense significance to both 
states, even though it might be meaningless in the EU or ASEAN contexts. The 
hypothetical India-Pakistan security community follows a bottom-up approach [from 




popular to elite] due to the similarity of socio-cultural factors at the popular level. In 
contrast to it the EU and ASEAN followed a top-down approach [from elites to popular]  
in the formation of a security community. A comparative table of these variables and 




European Union ASEAN India/ Pakistan 
Shared 
Interests 
No war after 1945, the 
communist threat 
The communist threat 
The nuclear rivalry 
and the Kashmir 
dispute 
Hegemony USA security shield USA withdrawal USA & USSR rivalry  
Ideational factors 
Chosen trauma  World War II  Colonialism  
Partition of the 
subcontinent 
Interests Elites’ guided project  Elites’ talk shop 
Elites social practices 
as hostile binaries 
Normative variable 
Positive norms at 




‘ASEAN way’ at elites 
level only Negative norms at 
elites' level 
  
Positive Impact   
Negative impact   
Partially positive 
impact     
 
Table 7.1: A comparative analysis of security communities 




In the case of the EU, all the three variables [materi l, ideational and normative] 
have a positive impact since the states show shared cultural traits along with a shared 
interest to avoid the communist threat. Perhaps more interestingly is the role played by 
the presence of United States hegemony that offered a sort of security umbrella to help 
achieve the target of the formation of a collective security community. The chosen 
trauma of World War II was positively constructed by the elites to further the cause of 
integration in Europe and at the popular level, it also acted as a psychological deterrent in 
the minds of Europeans not to become an obstacle in the path of the formation of the 
European Union. The Judaea-Christian culture of the European Union is an implicit 
normative structure which forms the rules of inclusion and exclusion. 
 Southeast Asian states also possessed a shared interest in preventing the spread of 
the communist threat and this helped to facilitate he establishment of the ASEAN 
security community since there was no large superpower in the region [both are 
considered positive attributes]. The colonial struggle was the common chosen trauma of 
all ASEAN countries except Thailand [partial positive]. ASEAN does not share a 
common culture at the popular level, but it shows some positive effects at the elite level. 
The ASEAN way is the normative structure of ASEAN and after tracing its way from the 
socio-cultural norms of ASEAN societies it works well at the elite level only [partial 
positive]. 
 In the case of the India-Pakistan hypothetical security community, both states 
have shared material interests to resolve the Kashmir issue and their nuclear rivalry 
[positive attributes], but during the Cold War the superpower rivalry in the region re-
aligned India and Pakistan in opposite camps [negative tribute]. India sided with the 




former USSR and Pakistan became the ‘allied ally’ of the USA. Among both states the 
partition of the subcontinent is their shared chosen trauma, but this was negatively 
portrayed by the elites’ social practices in the idntity discourses of both states [negative 
attribute]. The normative structure in the shape of popular culture of India-Pakistan 
shows some partial positive trends by way of popular social practices, but they are 
negatively valued by way of elites’ social practices. 
 In order to understand the nature of security communities, I invoke here the 
dichotomous sociological terms first introduced by German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tonnies. The terms are ‘Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft’ (Tonnies 1955). ‘Gemeinschaft’ 
and ‘Gesellschaft’ are both forms of associations between people but on a slightly 
different scale. In the Gemeinschaft, the ‘natural will’ forms the underlying core of the 
association in which people share the same cultural understandings and memory groups 
together in a community. In the Gesellschaft, the ‘rational will’ of participating members 
forges them to make an alliance or association and their primary motives are to achieve 
individual material interest through collective action. It does not mean that there is no 
material interests involve in Gemeinschaft, but the trigger for an alliance is primarily 
based on shared common norms. 
 The European Union is more rationally organized an consensually formatted 
where Gesellschaft features are more common in contrast to the ASEAN and the India-
Pakistan security communities which possess Gemeinschaft attributes. Although the 
member states of the European Union have an implicit understanding of their common 
heritage, it is still primarily their rational material interests which drive the engine of the 
European Union. In contrast to it the highly paternalistic Asian societies are more akin to 




organize themselves normatively than following an organized economic agenda for the 
fulfilment of security community objectives. It is perhaps good to end this section by 
quoting Tonnies who pointed out that “the essential ch racter of such organizations is an 
existing common natural will or a constituted common rational will, both of which are 
conceived of as unities” (Tonnies 1955: 247). 
 The ‘context bounded’ security communities are working according to their ‘role 
specific’ behaviour. The European Union security community affirms the efficacy of 
institutional norms and a move forward approach despit  its vast cultural diversity. The 
fear psychology of Europe’s past has had a huge impact in gathering support for the 
cause of the greater union. But how much integration and how long it will go is the 
question being asked in today’s Europe? It seems that there is too much on Europe’s 
integration plate than it can be safely digest. This has taken the EU to the crossroads. On 
the one hand, there is no doubt that the novel experiment of the EU in the twenty first 
century has severely dented the rationale of state centric approaches, but the 
sustainability of such a magnum opus is making further policy choices hard to realize. On 
the other hand, the individual member states in Europe are increasingly becoming 
schizophrenic to any new tides of immigration in lieu of further integration. The lofty 
ideals of multi-culturalism and liberalism are now being questioned daily not only in the 
public discourse, but on the floors of the parliaments of the member states. 
 The ASEAN security community is dependant upon the constraining power of 
norms on its ruling elites. The changing behaviour of states in ASEAN is well accounted 
for if we seek guidance from cultural factors constructing the societies of Southeast Asia. 
It is imperative to study these social factors instead of lumping them together as like 




units. ASEAN is better understood by using the metaphor of the ‘two level game’ 
(Schelling 1980). One game is being played by the elit s at the forum of ASEAN while 
the other is being played by the societal norms which shape the conduct of the elites’ at 
home. If we deconstruct ASEAN at the two levels andsee the influence of cultural 
variables we can understand the presence of a wide gulf between its official claims of 
intersubjective community norms and the states’ actual social practices. 
 The hypothetical India-Pakistan security community shows viable and visible 
under currents present at the popular level of the two countries which can provide focal 
points for the ruling elites. In order to explain the duality between state’s social practices 
and people’s mass perceptions, one needs to look at socio-cultural accounts. The problem 
with both India and Pakistan relates to the ‘forces of production’ being in the hands of 
contesting elites who are involved in making ‘cultures of insecurity’ (Weldes, Laffey et 
al. 1999). 
 In sum, every security community is context specific and culturally ‘bounded’ 
where its ditto replications around the globe are only a delusion. The making of a security 
community is contingent on pre-existing cultural fault lines which define the identity of 
the region. A common or similar identity is in turn commensurate with the building of a 
security community. Security communities revolve around a shared sense of belonging to 
a region. There are common ideational factors or normative structures underlying the 
collective material interests of the states in a security community. This leads to ‘we-ness’ 
among the member states of the security community. The normative structure is based on 
a cultural core described by Anand as the ‘value  systems and perceived norms shared by 
states’ delegates at formal and informal meetings which are helpful in creating a sense of 




regional solidarity, leading to jointly approved decisions” (Anand 1981: xxiv). It is 
important to stress in conclusion the immense value of the cultural and the normative 
aspects of security communities. The more we appreciate their path dependence model on 
normative grounds the better we can identify their r spective spheres of influence and 

































The former Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral once commented , “A 
solution between Pakistan and India had to be evolvd, not presented to the people, as if a 
magician had pulled a rabbit out of a bag” (Nayar 16-7-2010). Accepting this 
evolutionary nature of India-Pakistan security relations, I examined the security 
discourses of both states by exploring the complex and dichotomous relationship between 
elite and popular social practices. It is also important to understand this dichotomous 
analysis. In both countries people have minimal contact with each other and this gives the 
free hand to the ruling elites to promote animosity through their social practices toward 
each other for their own vested interests. These div rgent attitudes are closely tied to the 
respective identity discourses of the two states. But paradoxically, the cross border 
transcendence of popular culture has brought the people of both states, who share 
linguistic commonalities, closer together. This inadvertently encouraged me to adopt the 
‘popular culture approach’ and study these two societies at the popular level (Milliken 
2001).  
The constructed-ness of this security dilemma was elaborated at the elite level, 
while steps for an abstract or hypothetical security community were explained at the 
popular level. The stranglehold that both states’ elites have on their respective state’s 
security discourses shows some of the impediments tha  s and in the way of forming a 
security community between India and Pakistan. Thisstudy highlighted the ideational or 
the socio-cultural components of the rivalry between India and Pakistan and these 
components play a central role in my arguments. Foucault called these social aspects of 
society as ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1994). He further insisted that there are social and 




cultural limitations of these truths (Nizamani 2008). In the context of India and Pakistan 
security relations these ‘regimes’ of truth constructed by ruling elites encircle both states’ 
identities and are based on an inventory of their social norms. My aim was to bring to 
light some of these social norms on which these ‘regim s of truth’ are based. The elites 
have manipulated socio-cultural myths to spread animos ty between the populations of 
both states. An American observer during India Pakist n war of 1965 vividly captured 
this popular mood. His views expressed over thirty f ve years ago are valid even for our 
contemporary times. He noted:  
“Again and again I have heard Pakistanis say India does not accept 
Pakistan and is determined to destroy it; that India s can’t fight and 
won’t fight…again and again I have heard Indians say th t Pakistan is a 
ruthless dictatorship and theocracy; that Pakistan i  bent on destroying 
India and determined to destroy the large Hindu minority in Pakistan”  
                                                                                 (Jones 2009: 94). 
 
This study uses social constructivism as its theoretical basis while at the same 
time employing anthropological observations. The theoretical edifice of social 
constructivism seems the obvious choice among the myriad of other state centric rational 
theories in International Relations because of its emphasis on understanding the social 
identities of states as the precursor to their material interests. I avoided adopting any 
particular variant of social constructivism, but myeffort to study states’ identities as a 
discourse or part of a process is conducted from a social constructivist perspective. This 
was an interpretative study. It was not intended to provide an exhaustive history of India-
Pakistan security relations. To explain interstate behavior by looking at material 
dispositions of power which are based upon predefined realist epistemologies is a much 
easier task. As compared to this, in order to develop a causal argument that shows the 
link between socio-cultural factors and states’ identities is an altogether a completely 




different proposition. I dwelled on the later part by highlighting soft variables like 
culture, norms and narratives that are often not even considered by the state centric 
rational approaches. 
There have been a few examples of cultural or social constructivist studies that 
have examined the historical events of these two countries, however, no one had yet 
attempted to conduct a comprehensive study to unravel the contrasting identities and 
interests of the two states from a social constructivist standpoint. The aim of this study is 
to bridge that gap by looking at additional socio-cultural contributing factors. I argued 
that the socio-cultural dimension of the security dlemma, which has hitherto remained 
unexamined by rational theories in IR, must be given more attention in the context of 
India-Pakistan rivalry. I showed that problematizing states’ identities can provide an 
alternative way to understand their mutual security relations. Although I acknowledged 
that this security dilemma was partly created because of the material interests of the two 
states, I argued that socio-cultural components are equally important and also need to be 
examined. The rivalry between the two states is because of an intersubjectively designed 
or mutually consensual social structure that was created by the elites of the two states 
through their social practices. My effort was to explore these social practices and if the 
state is the societal writ at large then we should be able to explain the security practices of 
a state to be the offshoot of these societal norms. Let us review the arguments presented 
in the earlier chapters. 
After explaining the general proposition, my problem statement, research 
questions and methodology in Chapter 1, I pointed out the theoretical relevancy of social 
constructivism for my case study in Chapter 2. It was not my intent in Chapter 2 to 




completely disregard the materialistic claims of rationalist theories of IR, but rather I seek 
to add to this body of knowledge by taking additional socio-cultural components into 
account. Chapter 3 defined security dilemmas and security communities from this 
ideational perspective. This chapter sets a theoretical framework which reformulated 
security dilemmas from a social constructivist’s ontology and referred to it as a social 
security dilemma. This was done because of the need of having new isights on this term 
which form the basis of my two empirical case studies which were done in Chapters 5 
and 6.  
Chapter 4 studied the identity discourses of India and Pakistan during the 
formative phase of state building by accentuating the role of ideology as a thick signifier 
of identity. I explored identity through the speechs of founding fathers of India and 
Pakistan, their constitutional arrangements, the ideological commitments of elites and the 
divergent attitudes between popular and elite social practices. The identities of both states 
were constructed as hostile binaries due to the ideologically based social practices of the 
elites. The popular social practices showed disillusionment towards the elites’ constructed 
identity discourses of the two states. Following this argument, I examined the credentials 
of Pakistan’s pseudo-Islamic identity and Indian ‘Hindutva’ norms which give us clue 
regarding the nature of the two states’ divergent social practices. The results were 
startling as it laid bare the Indian secular claims to its identity and exposed the equally 
important link of Islamic discourse to Pakistan’s identity. The constitutional history of the 
two states further enhances doubts regarding the presence of the two states’ espoused 
identity claims. The elites have been able to construct hese identities with the help of 
shared ‘chosen traumas’ experienced by the people of both states. 




An empirical case study of the Kashmir dispute was conducted in Chapter 5, 
while the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan was discussed in Chapter 6. Normally, 
both cases are strong avenues for realist assertions of power politics in the region. They 
have frequently been cited as the core disputes of materialistic dispositions and the 
primary causes of the security dilemma between the two states. An examination of the 
social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites showed how the distinct identity of Kashmir 
is being suppressed underneath India and Pakistan’s vested identity discourses. The case 
study of Kashmir was explained as a trilateral quest of identities of India, Pakistan and 
Kashmir. The distinct identity of Kashmir based on indigenous norms called 
‘Kashmiriyat’ was examined in detail. These are the norms specific to Kashmir and have 
so far been denied any space to flourish by the elit s’ social practices of both India and 
Pakistan. 
The study of nuclear rivalries is commonly based on the nexus of power and 
prestige. Without negating the significance of these factors, I explored the ideational 
components of this issue by conducting a discourse analysis of the speeches of Indian and 
Pakistani elites which strongly showed the presence of socio-cultural norms underpinning 
their decision to go nuclear in 1998. The social prctices of the Hindu fundamentalist 
party BJP elites and the decision to go nuclear in 1998 showed the importance of 
‘Hindutva’ norms. Similarly, Pakistan’s nuclear discourse showed elites’ propagating 
pseudo-religious myths based on an eminent Indian threa  while projecting the cause of 
an Islamic bomb. This ‘symbolic entrenchment’ of their nuclear discourses based on 
religious myths was also demonstrated through the nome clature of the nuclear missiles 
programmes of the two states (Hassner 2006). However, popular social practices showed 




a general lack of knowledge by the majority of the people in both states concerning these 
vital security issues regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. 
A corollary of my central hypothesis is to indicate ny prospect of change in the 
security relations between India and Pakistan. Social constructivism is not a recipe for 
predicting whirlwind changes in the security relations of staunch foes. However, by 
focusing on the fluidity of the social identities of states, as well as on the formation of the 
ensuing intersubjective normative structure prescribing and proscribing agents’ actions, it 
does hold out ‘promise’ for prescribing ‘how and where change may occur’ (Hopf 1998: 
180). It raises some prospects of change, mainly through its emphasis on highlighting the 
process, rather than focusing on the inherent flawed structure of anarchy. This aspect of 
change was studied under a normative shadow which looms large in the later part of my 
study. This transpired in the shape of envisaging a hypothetical security community 
between the two countries in Chapter 7. By exploring what norms would be necessary for 
a hypothetical security community between India andPakistan, this examination 
anticipated that ‘promised’ change. In my view, it is important to explore such a 
community between the two countries considering the low levels of trust between them 
and the incessant tides of terrorism in the region. For India and Pakistan, change will be 
an evolutionary process that requires the exploratin of peaceful norms on which the 
foundations of a relationship between the two state can be built. This study actually 
identified the negative norms constructed at the elit level which impede the formation of 
a security community between the two states. The norms identified here include 
educational norms, the rhetoric of the elites, the censorship regimes imposed on mass 
media and political party manifestos. At the same ti e the positive norms were studied 




under the banner of popular social practices. These norms included the impact of Indian 
films on Pakistani audiences, the mass media initiative for peace, the presence of 
nostalgic feelings of each other in literary classic  and religious practices. Popular culture 
in the form of Indian films was identified as an intervening variable between identity and 
the social practices of the states.  
In Chapter 7, the abstract India-Pakistan security community was further 
juxtaposed with the already established security communities of the EU and ASEAN. 
This brief comparison sought to expose the differences in the normative sub-structures 
underlying these security communities. This implicit normative intersubjective structure 
varies across regions and is primarily dependant upon regional norms. More importantly, 
it forms the rules of exclusion and inclusion for states in a security community. The 
presence of distinct normative sub-structures underpinning these three security 
communities further corroborates the efficacy of taking into account socio-cultural 
factors when studying security communities.  
After recapping and skimming through the main arguments what can we 
conclude? I conclude my remarks by looking at some ntological and epistemological 
questions. My ontological premises in studying thissecurity dilemma are both cultural 
and social constructivist. While exploring the distinc  national narratives and religious 
myths regarding India and Pakistan’s identities, I brought some of the influencing socio-
cultural factors that influence the construction of these identities to the forefront. 
Moreover, by exploring the social norms necessary for the formation of a security 
community, I adopted a social constructivist epistemology. It infact showed that the 
attempt to use a theoretical straightjacket in order to have a better understanding of 




security issues of the Third World in particular is futile. One way of overcoming this 
theoretical inadequacy, is to study the cultural variables of a region. Social constructivist 
scholars working on Asian regional integration have explored the intersection of local 
norms with the international nomenclature of security communities through a process 
called ‘constitutive localization’ (Acharya 2009a). This ‘constitutive localization’ 
depends upon a ‘cognitive prior’ in the shape of loca  beliefs and ‘local agents’ (Acharya 
2009a). The role of Indian and Pakistani elites as entrepreneurs of norms of animosity 
have had their work cut out for themselves with the careful ‘framing’ and ‘grafting’ of 
these norms through local myths and traditions while shaping the discourse of their 
respective national identities. Rather than following nstitutional norms of security 
community as universal prescriptions of security problems around the globe, the localised 
norms tell us about areas of convergence and disparities before arriving at empirical 
generalizations. 
In other words, a cultural perspective supplants an explanation based on material 
interests for the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. While lamenting the 
poverty of South Asian intellectuals in bringing forward any coherent theoretical 
understanding of their regional security relations, Nizamani explains security policies as 
“responses to the constant making and re-making dynamics of the societal fabric in which 
internal and external realms are fused together in a complex manner” (Nizamani 2008: 
103). It is most of the time a state’s external social practices which get acclaim for a 
state’s social identity. In the subcontinent the idntity of a state owes a huge debt to its 
internal ‘social fabric’. I tried to expose these underlying social forces in order to provide 
a framework for the dynamics of a security community, while showing that hitherto 




Indian and Pakistani social identities have remained unexplored in the state centric terrain 
of the rational theories.  
Throughout my dissertation, I remain beset with oneprimary concern, ‘When will 
the poverty stricken people of South Asia be able to njoy the fruits of cooperation or 
social harmony’? The worst scenario for Pakistan is that it will be torn apart in the wake 
of current terrorist upsurge and that this may have a domino affect in the region leading 
to the destabilization of many states. India is also vulnerable since it has already been hit 
by terrorists’ attacks and currently faces a dozen plus secessionist movements amid 
Hindu jingoistic parties. Sri-Lanka, battered by 30 years of war against LTTE, has a long 
way to go to pacify the grievances of the ethnic Tamils in order to bring them into the 
mainstream national discourse along with the majority S nhalese. Bhutan and Nepal have 
refugee crises and have come to blows several times at their borders. Amongst all these 
security crises of South Asian states, the rivalry between nuclear armed India and 
Pakistan is at the centre stage. The pragmatic answer to the question of peace is always 
negative with the security situation becoming grimmer with each passing day. Banking 
on political realism, perhaps the stakes first need to be raised. Maybe if there is a nuclear 
confrontation between the two states this will finally lead to the stark realization that 
there is a pressing need for the elites of India and Pakistan to stop demonizing each other 
and start to cooperate for the mutual benefit of the peoples’ of both states. Yet is it 
realistic to kill with nuclear bombs over one half of a billion plus population of both 
states? Is this not rather mutually assured destruction [MAD]? Then what are some of the 
other alternatives to initiate the states elites to co perate? The potential for peace lies in 
their shared indigenous cultural norms. Western devised theoretical insights cannot 




capture the exploratory or explanatory powers of these norms. I have only emphasized a 
handful of these norms to explore long term prospects of confidence building measures 
[CBMs] between the two states. By long term I am referring to a sociological change in 
the mind sets of the people of the two states and this does not refer to changes in the 
strategic interests of the two states. The differences between the European Union and the 
hypothetical India-Pakistan security community can be highlighted by using German 
sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies’ concepts of ‘Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft’ (Tonnies 
1955). According to Tonnies:  
“Gemeinschaft relates to a certain sense of belonging based on shared loyalties,  
norms and values, kinship or ethnic ties…Gesellschaft, on the other hand, relates  
that people remain independent from each other as individuals, but may decide in a 
‘social contract’, or a ‘convention’, to group togeth r for the conduct of profit-making 
transactions” (Quayes 2008:130).  
 
The EU falls into the camp of Gesellshaft meaning thereby, that a social contract 
is being constructed for exclusive monetary gains by rational actors to keep disparate 
states together in an association, while the India-Pakistan abstract security community 
alludes to Gemeinschaft which refers to a normative sense of belonging based on shared 
memories, myths and social norms. There is enough potential in emphasizing common 
shared social norms found at the popular level which can later be used in the path 
dependence model of their security community. The future discourse of community 
formation between India and Pakistan depends on the ruling elites who should bring to 
light these hidden norms of Gemeinschaft, evolved while living together for centuries, in 
order to ensure a safe and peaceful future of subseq ent generations. The irony behind 
this is that elites do recognize the proclivity of working amicably with each other, but 
they themselves are entrapped in their socially constructed security dilemma. For 




example the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Pakistan in 1999. In the visitor’s 
book at the historic Minar-i-Pakistan [place where Pakistan resolution was passed in 
1940], Vajpayee wrote: “India’s integrity and prosperity depends upon the integrity and 
prosperity of Pakistan” (Nayar 16.7.2010).  
Although, the socially constructed security dilemma between India and Pakistan is 
an elites’ creation, its obliteration via a security community is based on popular social 
practices. Understanding this dichotomous level of analysis [elites versus popular] will 
help us to understand the security dilemma of India and Pakistan and will further 
encourage to envisage the foundation of a security community between these two arch 
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In dit proefschrift worden de veiligheidsverhoudinge  tussen India en Pakistan 
bestudeerd vanuit een perspectief dat afwijkt van de gangbare benaderingen. In deze 
studie wordt de doeltreffendheid van de sociaal-constructivistische benadering bij het 
verklaren van de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen India en Pakistan onderzocht. Waarom 
deze benadering? Er is geen twijfel over mogelijk dat er veel materiële verklaringen zijn 
geopperd voor de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen deze twee landen. Er worden echter 
zelden alternatieve verklaringen gegeven die afwijken van deze materialistische ideeën. 
Mijn werk benadrukt echter de sociaal-culturele aspecten van de rivaliteit tussen India-
Pakistan. Het verklaren van het veiligheidsdilemma en het verkennen van sociale normen 
voor de potentiële vorming van een veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen deze twee landen, 
zijn de uitgangspunten van dit proefschrift. 
 Ik beargumenteer dat de rivaliteit tussen India en Pakistan grotendeels 
veroorzaakt wordt door het gedrag van elites. Daarbij onderscheid ik de sociale gebruiken 
van de elites en de bevolking en benadruk de verschillen tussen beide. Het is belangrijk 
om dit onderscheid goed te begrijpen. Enerzijds zijn het de elites die een intersubjectief 
patroon van animositeit tussen India en Pakistan creëren en zo het veiligheidsdilemma 
vormgeven. Anderzijds zijn er op het niveau van de bevolking ook positieve normen -
gebaseerd op onderling begrip tussen de bevolkingen van de twee staten – die mogelijk 
tot een veiligheidsgemeenschap kunnen leiden. Voortb uwend op deze sociale gebruiken 
van de bevolking, werpt dit proefschrift licht op de mogelijkheden voor een potentiële 
veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen India en Pakistan. In andere woorden, er wordt een 
bottom-up benadering van veiligheidsgemeenschapformatie geformuleerd. In de regel 




worden veiligheidsgemeenschappen vanuit een top-down perspectief geanalyseerd. 
Hierin gaat het om elites die door middel van gedeelde normen de intersubjectieve 
coöperatieve omgeving creëren die nodig is voor het vormen van een 
veiligheidsgemeenschap. Ik benadruk dat er in India en Pakistan sprake zou kunnen zijn 
van een bottom-up proces dat gevormd wordt door de dagelijkse gewoontes en sociale 
gebruiken van de bevolking van de twee staten.  
 Het theoretische deel van dit proefschrift licht toe waarom het neo-realisme en het 
neo-liberalisme niet in staat zijn om de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen India en Pakistan 
adequaat te verklaren. Daarnaast werpt dit deel licht op hoe een sociaal-constructivistisch 
perspectief ons deze rivaliteit kan doen begrijpen door middel van het problematiseren 
van de identiteit van de staat. Als onderdeel van dit sociaal-constructivistische 
theoretische kader is de term ‘veiligheidsdilemma’ – wat in wezen een realistische term is 
– geherdefinieerd als ‘sociaal veiligheidsdilemma’. Dit sociale veiligheidsdilemma is 
gebaseerd op het onderscheid tussen de sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking. 
De postkoloniale samenlevingen van India en Pakistan laten een cognitieve kloof zien – 
vanwege de tegengestelde sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking - omtrent  de 
identiteit en de belangen van de staat. De elites hebben deze kloof gebruikt om een 
staatsidentiteit te stichten gebaseerd op normen van ri liteit opzichte van de andere staat. 
Dit heeft tot een cultuur van animositeit tussen India en Pakistan geleid. Aldus is een 
veiligheidsdilemma, dat conventioneel wordt gekarakteriseerd als een strijd op basis van 
materiële ongelijkheid, geherformuleerd op grond van de sociaal-culturele tegenstelling 
tussen de elites en de bevolking.  




 Het empirische gedeelte van de dissertatie concentreert zich op de ontwikkeling 
van de identiteit van beide staten, zoals die door e elites zijn gecreëerd. De rol van 
ideologie als duiding van de identiteit van de staat, verklaart de tegenstrijdige aard van de 
identiteiten van India en Pakistan. De identiteitsdiscoursen werden in eerste instantie 
gedefinieerd door de ideologieën van de grondleggers van beide landen, en werden later 
verklaard door de sociale gebruiken van de opvolgende elites. Op basis van deze 
identiteitsdiscoursen zijn twee casussen -het Kasjmir conflict en de nucleaire competitie  
-bestudeerd. De sociaal-culturele aspecten van deze rivaliteit zijn in beide casussen 
benadrukt. Het Kasjmir conflict wordt beschreven als een trilaterale strijd tussen de 
identiteiten van India, Pakistan en de losstaande Kasjmiri identiteit. De identiteit van 
Kasjmir is nader verkend door te kijken naar de plaatselijke sociaal-culturele normen, 
genaamd ‘Kasjmiriyat’. Het hoofdstuk over Kasjmir con ludeert dat deze regionale 
identiteit geen werkelijke erkenning krijgt in de gvestigde identiteitsdiscoursen van 
zowel India als Pakistan.  
De casus van de nucleaire competitie benoemt de rol van religieuze normen, de 
‘Hindutva’, die de sociale gebruiken van de Indiase elites definieerden en uiteindelijk 
leidden tot de beslissing om een openlijke nucleaire macht te worden in 1998. Deze 
sociale gebruiken hadden tot doel een ‘Hindutva’ (Hindu) identiteit te definiëren voor de 
Indiase staat. Het sociaal-culturele perspectief van het Pakistaanse nucleaire programma 
werd gedefinieerd door het perspectief van een ‘Islamitische bom’: voorts was dit een 
reactie op het nucleaire programma van India.  
 Het normatieve deel van de dissertatie concentreert zich exclusief op het 
definiëren van de contouren van een veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen India en Pakistan en 




vergelijkt deze kort met gevestigde veiligheidsgemenschappen zoals de Europese Unie 
[EU] en de Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. Het onderwijscurriculum 
dat door de elites wordt vastgesteld, de retoriek van de elite en de censuur die de regimes 
de media opleggen tonen de aanwezigheid van negatieve normen, geconstrueerd door de 
sociale gebruiken van de elites. Dit zijn de obstakels voor de formatie van een 
veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen deze twee staten. De positieve normen op het niveau van 
de bevolking verklaren de aanwezigheid van ‘wij-gevo lens’ in de werken van 
belangrijke auteurs uit beide landen. Deze normen bevatten ook de religieuze normen van 
de Bhakti beweging, evenals initiatieven van de massa media in de vorm van ‘Aman ki 
Asha’ [verlangen naar vrede]. Het verschil tussen d sociale gebruiken van de elites en de 
bevolking geeft de ‘kunstmatigheid’ van de rivaliteit op elite niveau aan en illustreert dat 
er ruime mogelijkheden zijn om, met behulp van de sociale gebruiken van de bevolking, 
de onderlinge verhoudingen te verbeteren. De vergelijkende analyse van drie 
veiligheidsgemeenschappen – de EU, ASEAN en de hypot etische India-Pakistan 
veiligheidsgemeenschap- in het laatste deel van het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat elke 
veiligheidsgemeenschap bepaald wordt door de regionale culturele context. Daarnaast 
laat dit hoofstuk zien dat er ook een onderliggende ormatieve structuur is, gebaseerd op 
regionale sociaal-culturele normen die aanwezig zijn elke veiligheidsgemeenschap. Deze 
normatieve structuur definieert de regels van insluting en uitsluiting van een 
veiligheidsgemeenschap. 
 Dit proefschrift concludeert dat het sociaal-culturele aspect van de rivaliteit tussen 
India en Pakistan zeer belangrijk is. Daarbij gaat het niet allen om de sociale gebruiken 
van de elites maar ook om de dagelijkse gewoonten van de bevolking. Begrip over dit 




wezenlijke deel van de rivaliteit helpt ons de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen de twee 
staten te verklaren. Verder helpt het ons na te denken over een veiligheidsgemeenschap 
tussen deze twee aartsrivalen. Ik heb in deze studie geen specifieke variant van het 
sociaal constructivisme (zoals bijvoorbeeld de postm derne variant of de conventionele 
variant) als uitgangspunt genomen. Het belangrijkste doel was om de identiteiten van de 
twee staten te problematiseren en hun materiële belang n te verklaren aan de hand van de 
sociaal-culturele normen van de regio. Dit alles om het veiligheidsdilemma te verklaren 
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